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CONTENTS

On Approaches to the Study of International Relations, Or, Back to Machiavelli — *David Vital* 551

New Factors of Stability in Soviet Collective Leadership — *Jerome M. Gilison* 563

Regional Organization and the Regulation of Internal Conflict — *Linda B. Miller* 582

The Political Relation of the Village to the State — *Harumi Befu* 601

Ideology and Politics in Economic Planning: The Problem of Indian Agricultural Development Strategy — *Francine R. Frankel* 621

RESEARCH NOTE

Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Intergovernmental Organizations — *Chadwick F. Alger and Steven J. Brams* 646

REVIEW ARTICLES

The State That Mao Built — *John K. Fairbank* 664

The French Army: From Obedience to Insurrection — *Richard D. Challener* 678

When the Fighting Has to Stop: The Arguments About Escalation — *Fred Charles Iklé* 692

Weakening the Belief in General War: Schelling on Strikes — *Nathan Leites* 709

The Contributors ii

Index to Volume XIX 721

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ON APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Or, Back to Machiavelli

By DAVID VITAL

I

A HEAVY onslaught on the (predominantly American) "scientific" school of students of international relations has recently been delivered[1] to the evident satisfaction and comfort of those who practice or respond most comfortably to the "classical approach." Still, the defeat of one school—if defeat there was[2]—need not, of course, necessarily redound to the honor of the other, and it is surely worth considering what positive case has been made out on this occasion, explicitly or by implication, in favor of "classicism." In fact, this article will argue, neither approach is entirely adequate. Neither provides a really firm basis on which to found a coherent and well-integrated field of study or—what is undoubtedly more important—a framework within which the facts of contemporary international life can be selected, compared, and interpreted in a thoroughly valid and enlightening manner.

The present article rests on the view that the study of international relations is and must be an empirical one and that, in consequence, problems in theory depend for their solution *before all else* on an agreed demarcation of that sector of human experience and activity with which we are principally concerned. An attempt will be made to show that much of the debate on the nature and limitations of theory in international relations and on the methodology appropriate to its study conceals uncertainty about the objects of both theory and investigation.

Mr. Hedley Bull describes and defines the classical approach under two main heads. First, method:

> What I have in mind . . . is . . . the approach to theorizing that derives from philosophy, history, and law, and that is characterized above all by explicit reliance upon the exercise of judgment and

[1] Hedley Bull, "International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach," *World Politics*, XVIII (April 1966), 361-77.

[2] Strenuously denied by a notable "scientist": see Morton A. Kaplan, "The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations," *World Politics*, XIX (October 1966), 1-20.

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by the assumptions that if we confine ourselves to strict standards of verification and proof there is very little of significance that can be said about international relations, that general propositions about this subject must therefore derive from a scientifically imperfect process of perception or intuition, and that these general propositions cannot be accorded anything more than the tentative and inconclusive status appropriate to their doubtful origin.[3]

Second, subject matter:

For example, does the collectivity of sovereign states constitute a political society or system, or does it not? If we can speak of a society of sovereign states, does it presuppose a common culture or civilization? And if it does, does such a common culture underlie the worldwide diplomatic framework in which we are attempting to operate now? What is the place of war in international society? Is all private use of force anathema to society's working, or are there just wars which it may tolerate and even require? Does a member state of international society enjoy a right of intervention in the internal affairs of another, and if so in what circumstances? Are sovereign states the sole members of international society, or does it ultimately consist of individual human beings, whose rights and duties override those of the entities who act in their name? To what extent is the course of diplomatic events at any time determined or circumscribed by the general shape or structure of the international system; by the number, relative weight, and conservative or radical disposition of its constituent states, and by the instruments for getting their way that military technology or the distribution of wealth has put into their hands; by the particular set of rules of the game underlying diplomatic practice at the time? And so on.[4]

It is clear that if this is, indeed, the subject matter of international relations, then the suggested method of dealing with it is largely valid. In this respect Mr. Bull's view corresponds, broadly speaking, with Martin Wight's, namely, that the "disharmony between international theory and diplomatic practice, a kind of recalcitrance of international politics to being theorized about" must be recognized and that it follows from the fact "that the theorizing has to be done in the language of political theory and law."[5] But if the subject matter of international

[3] P. 361. [4] P. 367.

[5] "Why Is There No International Theory?" in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds., *Diplomatic Investigations* (London 1966), 33.

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relations is, genuinely, *diplomatic practice*, it is worth seeing how well Mr. Bull's questions serve to specify and clarify what underlies an otherwise somewhat ambiguous phrase. Alternatively, are the answers to his questions what we really want to know?

The first observation must be that many of the terms that Mr. Bull employs (e.g., "What is the *place* of war in international society?") cry out for preliminary but exhaustive philosophical-logical analysis. There is certainly very little room here for empirical treatment, for reasonably rigorous standards of observation and verification.

But what is possibly more striking is the emphasis on moral and partly moral questions, or on questions having a strong legal content, or, again, on questions which are in the most ordinary sense of the term political—*without* its being in any way stressed or explained that such questions are and must remain distinct for all purposes from those of a factual character. "Does a member state of international society enjoy a right of intervention in the internal affairs of another, and if so in what circumstances?" is a teasing combination of the legal, the ethical, and (at least one hopes) the factual. So is a question dealing with the fine point whether society may ever properly tolerate a "just war."

Now, of course, if we are really supposed to concern ourselves with such problems of indeterminate logical status to which no reasonably final, empirically based solution can conceivably be found, then the extreme form in which Mr. Bull has laid down the methods appropriate to theorizing about international relations (and, by implication, appropriate to its study as well) is only too valid, and the irrelevancy of any of the "scientific" approaches all too clear. On the other hand, those who are inclined to dismiss all such cogitations, however subtle and sophisticated, as so much wisdom literature may have a point. It is only odd that one of Mr. Bull's own most telling points against the "scientists" is that many of them pay far less attention to empirical evidence than they claim to do and that such evidence as they do adduce is often barely relevant to the issues they claim to be dealing with.

There can be no question that Mr. Bull's topics are, each in its own right, of great—one might truly say, of abiding—fascination. But their immediate value lies in their power to stimulate interest in the field as a whole, rather than in such answers as might be furnished in direct response to them. They bear much the same relation to "diplomatic practice" as, say, reasoned exhortations about the dangers of nuclear proliferation may be said to bear to analyses of the strategic considerations of the states concerned. At all events, the notable result of treating these topics as constituting the central subject matter of the study of in-

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ternational relations is to entrench the still common conviction that it is a field that cannot be unified, but must remain a congeries of disparate and disconnected studies, the logical and empirical ties between which we can dimly perceive, but cannot possibly formulate.

It would therefore seem pertinent to ask whether we ought not to pay much more attention to "diplomatic practice" in the raw, so to speak, and whether there is any room at all for a theory of international relations which is in any sense and to any degree incompatible with actual and observed diplomatic practice, and finally, by extension, whether any weight should be attached to studies—theoretical or otherwise—that do not in one way or another concern or illuminate it.

II

The "scientists" vary so greatly in their techniques, purposes, and subjects of interest that it may be presumptuous to attempt to generalize about them. In any case, as will be indicated below, some of their work is founded on an approach that is substantially that which this article attempts to advance. However, much "scientific" work suffers from a characteristic flaw: method largely determines subject matter. Much "scientific" work seems to be justified in terms of the proposition that once the right analytical and investigatory techniques are evolved, the heart of the subject will stand revealed and duly lend itself to study and analysis.

Not unnaturally, one is therefore faced with a great range and variety of projects. At one extreme there may be found an exhaustive collation on such a topic as which states were represented in which capitals at certain given times and by what rank of mission. At the other extreme one finds the altogether impressive analytical studies of systems, of which Morton Kaplan's are among the best known. In the middle range there will be an examination of the effect of stress on policy-makers, a study of the role of images, and so forth.

In the case of the first type of study, it is surely plain that, however meticulously executed, the forced attempt to find *something* in the political sphere of international relations which is amenable to quantification and statistical analysis only results, in practice, in the illumination (if that is the right word) of one, small, marginal point in almost total isolation from all others. Of the third type, a product of the general attempt to apply the content and methods of the behavioral sciences to the study of international politics, it may certainly be said that it represents an extremely valuable approach. But so long as the work is to all intents and purposes divorced from detailed and serious his-

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torical research (or, alternatively, from the careful and thoroughly informed study of contemporary cases) and is linked, as is only too often the case, to such "laboratory" techniques as simulation or is adapted from studies of the business world, the actual results are likely to be unhelpful and incapable of being clearly related to the problems with which most students of international relations are ostensibly concerned. It is simply not credible that study of the behavior of American (or any other) students of eighteen can reveal anything of proven or provable value that is not already known from other sources about Kaiser Wilhelm II or Patrice Lumumba or any other equivalent or lesser figure of whom it may be said with *prima facie* justification that their political behavior at some point must be at least partly explained in individual psychological terms if it is to be understood at all. However, the more general difficulty about this kind of work is that, while it can certainly reveal factors (such as stress) which, conceivably, may have been neglected in the past, the *verification* of any hypothesis concerning them must involve a return to historical (or contemporary) sources in what one may, perhaps, be forgiven for calling the ordinary way. And it is striking about much of this otherwise interesting work that it is precisely this verification that is very, very rarely performed.

Mr. Kaplan's work is in a different class. The conception that underlies it is, in his own words,

> If the number, type, and behavior of nations differ over time, and if their military capabilities, their economic assets, and their information also vary over time, then there is some likely interconnection between these elements such that different structural and behavioral systems can be discerned to operate in different periods of history. This conception may turn out to be incorrect, but it does not seem an unreasonable basis for an investigation of the subject matter. To conduct such an investigation requires systematic hypotheses concerning the nature of the connections of the variables. Only after these are made can past history be examined in a way that illuminates the hypotheses. Otherwise the investigator has no criteria on the basis of which he can pick and choose among the infinite reservoir of facts available to him. These initial hypotheses indicate the *areas of facts* which have the greatest importance for this type of investigation; presumably if the hypotheses are wrong, this will become reasonably evident in the course of attempting to use them.[6]

[6] P. 8, italics added.

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All this is logically and procedurally impeccable. (It is only odd that for all his harsh criticism of E. H. Carr, Mr. Kaplan has failed to notice the striking parallel between his procedure and the one that Mr. Carr has outlined in *What is History?*)

But two closely connected observations may be made. The first is that Mr. Kaplan (unlike Mr. Carr) leaves to others the systematic verification on the ground, as it were, of his own hypotheses. The second is that, in his own words, "international systems theory is designed to investigate problems of macrosystem structure." And he readily goes on to admit, "It is not, for instance, easily adaptable to the investigation of microstructural problems of foreign policy."[7] However, if this is the case—and surely it is—then it immediately becomes clear that he and Mr. Bull have much more in common than they seem to think. For it is only in "microstructural" terms that any empirical verification of the "macrosystem" is possible, and such a verification Mr. Kaplan has refused to attempt. The major purpose of the systems analyst is to account for behavior by positing regularities. This raises two questions. Firstly, what or who *behaves* in international affairs? Secondly, are all the observable or known facts accounted for or shown to be irrelevant? In this field, no less than in any other branch of social science, it is human behavior that we are concerned with, albeit in a particular context. Unless macrosystem analysis can be applied to human behavior (i.e., microsystems) or be shown to be advancing in that direction, we must, perforce, take it on trust. And so far no really convincing grounds for our doing so have been advanced.

The difficulty, in fact, goes far beyond the question of the "adaptability" of international systems theory to "microstructural problems." It is questionable whether any effective and continuous tie between the two is practicable at all, any more than between, say, meteorology and physiology, despite the evident influence of the weather on the behavior of our muscles, sweat glands, and the rest. For all practical purposes, investigation of one field must proceed separately from investigation of the other. And it is this kind of practical discontinuity between what Mr. Kaplan is engaged in and what, say, Messrs. Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin[8] have concerned themselves with that raises the question of the precise relationship of such international systems study to the very much greater body of work being done on "microstructural" aspects of the subject. If formulators of international systems hypoth-

[7] P. 11.

[8] Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, *Foreign Policy Decision-Making* (New York 1962).

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eses feel no urge to test the validity of their structures themselves and are not overtroubled by the divide between their work and that of those who are concerned more directly with the rude and intractable facts of international life, it becomes difficult to avoid viewing their work as interesting, often intellectually impressive exercises in latter-day scholasticism which are, and must remain, essentially peripheral to the subject as a whole. It is certainly remote from diplomatic practice.

In short, while one can sense and sympathize with the urgency of the desire of the "scientists" to introduce new techniques and new topics into the field, one remains unconvinced that the preferred combinations of topics and techniques are all of such weight as to contribute even indirectly to a substantially improved understanding of the matter in hand. It is not enough to state the simple belief that progress with the peripheral will ultimately lead to discovery of the central. A glance at any other field of empirical enquiry will surely reveal that it is enlightened consideration of central topics that leads to progress on all fronts and, ultimately, to better understanding of the peripheral, too. It is only if the seemingly peripheral topic is seriously thought to be, in fact, the truly central one that such vast labors on marginalia would seem justified. But so far, at any rate, no one seems to have made this claim outright.

III

Much of the difficulty evidently derives from the familiar fact that the student of international relations lacks a traditionally accepted and commonly respected frame of conceptual and empirical reference for his work, even one which he may reject, but in terms of which he can operate with reasonable confidence that at least on the essentials of what constitutes the subject he is in broad agreement with the majority of his fellows. A scholar who is dissatisfied with fashionable approaches or outlooks is, in a profound sense, a lonely man. To a degree that has hardly any contemporary parallel in other fields, he must create for himself the scheme in terms of which he will order his observations and analysis *before* proceeding to seek, let alone deal with, the evidence he will use to support that analysis and, ultimately, justify the chosen frame of reference itself. It is only natural that the most fruitful and original work is therefore precisely that which suggests new frameworks, new manners of ordering observations, and, by extension, new topics of investigation.

In retrospect it need hardly surprise us, then, that for many years the

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field as a whole was largely dominated by lawyers—for this much may be said about international law, that it is generally apparent what does and does not pertain to it and, moreover, that by adopting the necessary working principle that serious discussion of legal systems and practices must presuppose that whatever is law will be respected, it is possible for lawyers to operate quite rationally within a framework of some considerable internal rigor without having constantly to ask themselves how far it actually relates or corresponds to the facts of international life and which of its elements are fictions and which are not. However, for those who take international law as only one of the elements of the field, and by no means the most important—certainly not the lens through which the field as a whole is best surveyed—the major problems remain untouched by it. And if nothing better offers, one is then left with Mr. Bull's central questions.

It has already been suggested that the great value of these central questions is to stimulate interest in the subject. But the problem of pinpointing what topics should be investigated in practice is logically distinct, and his major questions cannot greatly assist us in solving it. The most cursory look at current "classical" literature consequently reveals, as does the "scientific," that a vast number and variety of topics ranging from statistically rigorous head-counting at the United Nations to a reinterpretation of Clausewitz in terms of twentieth-century military techniques are all thought, probably rightly, to pertain to the general field of "international relations." But what is not at all clear is how such disparate matters are to be related to one another, and, indeed, if the various specialists engaged in their study consider that such an interrelationship is genuinely rewarding or even possible, logically or otherwise. Above all, what is lacking is any sense of priority, any hierarchy of subjects, either empirical or conceptual, such as may be found in each of the physical sciences and, to some extent, within the class of physical sciences as a whole.

In political science in its municipal aspect such a hierarchy of topics does seem to be generally accepted. One justification (apart from the satisfaction of curiosity) for studying, say, the performance of the political press during a general election is, crudely, for the light that may be thrown on some aspects of the interaction between political institutions and organizations and the anonymous public itself. And this topic can be related in turn very closely and clearly to such central questions of political science as whose writ it is that runs within the given state, and how far, and in what manner and why. The great advantage of these latter questions, as opposed to the central questions of interna-

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tional relations put forward by Mr. Bull, is that it is possible both in principle and practice to proceed to the discovery of their answers. Furthermore, they provide both a key topic for investigation and analysis *and* a center for the field as a whole to which most, if not all, other topics relate centripetally.

It is this kind of central, dominating topic, broadly recognized as such, that we need. For reasons already suggested, it can be provided neither by the philosophically oriented, "classical" approach, nor by those approaches which owe their major origins and methods to econometrics or to the psychology of behavior or to studies in philosophy and logic. All are valuable, but because in the first case the insoluble problem of procedure cuts the student off from the facts of international life, while in the latter group procedure dominates to the extent of obscuring the subject, none, it would seem, can be accepted in unmodified form.

IV

The thesis of the present article is that the key subject in the study of international relations, the one in terms of which all others are to be weighed for value, and the only one which can provide a natural and unifying center of investigation in respect of both method and topic is the study of *governments in their foreign relations* (alternatively, "foreign policy analysis" or the study of "decision-making," in the broadest possible sense of these terms). Of course, it is *not* suggested that this is by any means a neglected subject today, still less that it is the only one really worth bothering about. The argument is that the proliferation of disconnected topics of research and the variety of logically and factually incompatible methodologies are functions of the failure of all too many scholars to ask themselves at regular and decent intervals what it is they are about. Specifically, the thesis is that if the study of international relations is to become an integrated discipline it is necessary, as has been suggested, that we agree to distinguish clearly between what is and is not of *central* interest and to be absolutely clear in our minds as to how the investigation or discussion of any given topic is likely, if only in principle, to advance our understanding of a very few simple, but interconnected, questions. These are (and no doubt improved formulations are possible), How do governments (or other bodies of equivalent authority) deal in practice with affairs that pertain to the sphere that is beyond their domestic authority? What material and diplomatic options are available to them? What motivates them collectively and individually? Under what circumstances, with

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what instruments, and to what extent can they alter the external environment at will? and, How do the actions or inactions of one government affect the affairs of another?

In themselves these questions are as old as the hills. What is contended here is that their priority, their place in the hierarchy of topics that interest us, and, indeed, their own profound and intrinsic interest tend to be overlooked—above all by those who are the staunchest champions of a single favored approach—and that it is surely time that they were restored to their proper precedence over all others. There will then be some hope that the "classicists" will emerge from the despair that seems to have impelled so many of them to concern themselves overmuch with disconnected studies of institutions, or diplomatic history in the narrow sense, or the texts of ancient theorists, and that "scientists" will cease to bury themselves in marginalia in the hope that, ultimately, the light will dawn.

The arguments in favor of such an approach to the subject are, accordingly, of two kinds: (a) those which pertain to the coordination of the various streams within the field as a whole; and (b) those which are concerned with the general advance of scholarship toward improved understanding and knowledge of the subject matter.

Under the first head, this approach would provide us with clear criteria for distinguishing the relevant from the irrelevant and the central from the marginal by facilitating the constitution of tests for judging the significance of any given piece of research not just in terms of its own internal logic, as is necessary at present, but in the light of the contribution it may make to answering our major questions. In addition, it would serve to bring home the absolute requirement that work be empirically oriented and the fact, too, that elaborate discussion of hypotheses for which evidence is lacking and which may not be susceptible to empirical verification even in principle is in a profound sense, despite superficial attractiveness, unfruitful. This approach would also provide a clear meeting ground (or, at the very least, a middle ground) between those whose interest in the subject stems from their view of it as a contribution to the kind of problems found in Mr. Bull's list and those who are, quite rightly, at pains not to divorce international relations from the mainstream of political science. Finally, in this approach the bond between the science and the practice of international relations would be preserved and greatly strengthened, and the descent into scholastic endeavors arrested.

But the arguments for this approach under the second head are probably of greater importance. Some of these, it is submitted, are as fol-

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lows: Firstly, concentration on the processes of government in the external sphere (diplomatic, military, institutional, intellectual, economic, personal, and so on) would cut to the heart of the subject and its central mystery, viz., the nexus between the domestic and external aspects of state affairs. In consequence, it would help to rework the traditional but misleading and confusing distinction between domestic and foreign politics. Eventually, it could be expected to help dissolve the myths associated with each of the two traditional categories and reduce the difficulty of relating one to the other—particularly where, as is so common today, the external activities of one state impinge directly on the internal affairs of another.

It may be noted, parenthetically, that international systems analysis, in contrast, tends to perpetuate the crude distinction between the foreign and the domestic and, more particularly, to reinforce the tendency to employ undifferentiated statehood as the key building block for general theories in international relations. There is surely at least a *prima facie* case for asserting that one of the notable characteristics of the modern international scene is the growing disparity in human and material resources to be found where important categories of states are compared—with the result that the only genuine common denominator left is the purely *legal* equality of states that carries with it only such tenuous advantages as membership in the United Nations. Even domestic authority varies so greatly in content and form that it is misleading to assume that it can serve, except very crudely, as a common denominator of "states."

Secondly, it is here (i.e., in the study of governments in their foreign policy-making role), if anywhere, that some solution is most likely to be found to the ancient problem of the interrelation between actors and environment, statesmen and states. For it is surely *through* the actor (statesman, diplomat, staff officer, intelligence analyst) that the environment—if comprehended—enters into the policy-making process or—where comprehension is absent or incomplete or erroneous—fails to enter into the process, with the result that the process itself is liable to fail in the sense that the ends of policy are not achieved.

Thirdly, by this approach the systematic study of international *institutions* would be kept firmly in its appropriate hierarchical place: matters to be understood primarily (but, of course, not exclusively) in terms of the policies of the participating governments. It is surely time that the last vestiges of neo-Wilsonian sentimentality and humbug about the United Nations, for example, were banished from the textbooks, let alone from research papers.

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Finally, such an approach would serve to make clearly apparent (as it is *not* in much or most of the literature) that generalizations and theories about states are liable to fail not only because of random dissimilarities between states, their resources, and their respective environments, but also because of random dissimilarities between leaders (and other policy-makers) and their views on, and attitudes toward, even such elementary questions as war, aggression, peace, deception, the value attaching to the status quo, and so on. It is surely much more important and instructive to bring out both the differences *and* such similarities (or common patterns) as may be uncovered, so as, ultimately, to make some progress toward a greater degree of understanding of the general processes involved and the beginnings of a real predictive capability, than to ponder about "just wars" (which question can be resolved only in terms of the ethos of a *single* society and political context), or to construct intricate theoretical models that cannot be relevant, even in principle, to more than a tiny unrepresentative sample of the some 140 members in the international state system in a limited number of artificial situations, or, again, to indulge in the study of marginalia in the pious hope that somehow, sometime, all will cohere.

It is only when we know enough about the processes of foreign policy-making in a very wide range of cases that we are likely to proceed to international systems-building with any reasonable hope of formulating substantially valid hypotheses. And it may also be worth observing that it would, in any case, and by these means, be desirable to break away from some of the provinciality that afflicts much international relations study, namely, the entirely natural, understandable, but, on the whole, harmful tendency to consider, in effect, the affairs of a very small number of very interesting and important states to the almost total exclusion of all others.

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NEW FACTORS OF STABILITY IN SOVIET COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP

By JEROME M. GILISON

WITH the reluctant retirement of Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Union entered a new phase of collective leadership. Past experience with such periods has led many Western specialists to expect that the collective leadership pattern will lead to the emergence of a single leader, who will hold preponderant power and who will seek to consolidate and strengthen that power, ultimately acquiring something approaching dictatorial authority. The assumptions of this "conventional wisdom" (to borrow a phrase from John Galbraith) are that (1) there is something inherently unstable in a collective leadership pattern, given Soviet conditions; (2) the personal ambitions and power drive of Soviet leaders prevent, in the long run, their acceptance of a situation of shared power; and (3) historical evidence of past breakdowns of collective leadership is applicable to present conditions.

This conventional wisdom is not upheld by all Sovieticians. In a recent article, Richard Lowenthal argues that the party bureaucracy has become conservative and "seems to have developed a degree of oligarchic solidarity and asserted a measure of collective control not hitherto observed in any totalitarian state."[1] But the consensus is probably more accurately expressed by Myron Rush's "cyclical theory of Soviet politics," in which "a stable phase of personal rule" is followed by an "unstable phase of succession crisis."[2]

In a very real sense, the portly figure of Joseph Stalin may be casting its shadow over the thoughts of those who look to the future for a repetition of the past. The mere fact that of the forty-nine years of Soviet power at least thirty-one can be described as years of one-man domination of Soviet politics makes the expectation of future personal dictatorship quite understandable. But, after all, Joseph Vissarionovich has been dead some fourteen years by now. Since his death, important

[1] "The Revolution Withers Away," *Problems of Communism*, XIV (January-February 1965), 11.

[2] *Political Succession in the USSR* (New York 1965), 204. The thesis of the inevitability of personal dictatorship is also invariably found in the literature on totalitarianism, which has been strongly influenced by Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia. Even a recent revision of one of the seminal works in the field does not stray too far from the old model of the totalitarian dictator. See the second edition, revised by Carl Friedrich, of Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (New York 1966), 31-44, 70-81.

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changes have occurred in Soviet society and in Soviet politics, and the accumulation of these changes may already have reached such proportions as to require a rethinking of views on the inevitability of personal rule in Soviet politics. The question to which we address ourselves is, quite simply, Does the Soviet system of government, in its present stage of development, lead inevitably to the accumulation of preponderant power in the hands of a single person? The consensus would probably answer Yes; the argument presented here leads to the opposite conclusion.

The Historical Argument

The two historical periods of collective leadership in Soviet politics have both been associated with power struggles resulting in the eventual emergence of a single contender as the supreme authority. Based upon the experience of these two periods—the first following Lenin's incapacitation through repeated strokes (1923-1929), the second following Stalin's death (1953-1958)—the assumption is generally made that the imposition of one-man control is a natural outgrowth of the system itself. Because of the historical preponderance of one-man control and the seeming historical instability of collective leadership, little consideration has been given to the question of whether there were, perhaps, some special circumstances—*no longer characteristic of the Soviet system in the 1960's*—which led to instability in the past. If, indeed, this is the case, then the prospects for continued collective leadership in the Soviet Union are probably much greater than is generally thought.

Logically, the examination of the two past experiences with collective leadership involves asking three distinct but interrelated questions:

1. What factors made the emergence of collective leadership possible?
2. What factors created instability in collective leadership?
3. What factors made the accumulation of preponderant power in the hands of one man possible?

Factors Supporting Collective Leadership

The two historical periods of collective leadership in the Soviet Union both followed the death of an acknowledged leader. This, in itself, imposes a number of similarities on the leadership situation in the immediate postmortem period. The two collective leaderships were separated, however, by thirty eventful years in Soviet history, and this

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implies—as the events clearly indicate—that the two leaderships could not operate in the same manner. Considering first the similarities, the following factors seem to apply to both periods:

1. There was no generally acknowledged second-in-command who could step into the leader's shoes without opposition.
2. There were misgivings or distrust in varying degrees on the part of the leader toward all his lieutenants.
3. There were lieutenants who were ambitious and—what is more important—who were used to playing the political game as a "zero-sum" affair in which one could advance only over the bodies —literal or figurative—of one's defeated opponents.
4. There were no well-established rules of the game for choosing a successor while limiting the intensity and scope of the conflict, and thus limiting the consequences of victory or defeat.

All of these factors, taken together, tended to create in both instances an uneasy equilibrium of the lieutenants in the initial postmortem stage, when the chief task of the leadership was to create the impression of unity, strength, and continuity. Even though in each case one can readily distinguish a "chief beneficiary" of the fallen leader (Trotsky in the case of Lenin, Malenkov in the case of Stalin), the factors tending toward equilibrium easily prevailed over the chief beneficiary's initial advantages in personal following and organizational support.

Naturally, there were many differences between the two collective leaderships in manner of emergence, operation, and decline. Primarily, these differences were the results of the differing leadership patterns developed by the deceased leaders in the years preceding, but the changes in society, in the role and position of the party, and in the staffing and relative importance of the party leadership compared with other control hierarchies also played a part. The fact that Lenin permitted dissent within the inner circle, and even accepted defeat on occasion, certainly affected the rules of the succession game after his departure from the scene. It is interesting to note that Lenin once chastised Ioffe in the following terms for an unguarded remark: "You are mistaken when you repeat constantly that I am the Central Committee. Such a thing can be written only by someone who is under great nervous strain and is overworked. The old Central Committee (1919-1920) defeated me on one of the really important questions, as you know from the discussion. There were a number of instances when I was in the minority on questions relating to organizational and personal affairs. You yourself, when you were a member of the Central

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Committee, saw examples of that many times. Why be so nervous as to write such a *totally impossible, totally impossible* [*sic*] phrase as one which holds that I am the Central Committee? This is a sign of overwork."[3]

Toward the end of his active political life, however, when faced with almost total economic collapse and the revolt of the previously pro-Bolshevik Kronstadt sailors, Lenin did introduce in the Tenth Party Congress a strong condemnation of "factional activity." It is likely that he considered the measures taken to be temporary, designed to meet the immediate crisis. He made this quite clear when he said to the assembled delegates, "We have spent quite a lot of time in discussion, and I must say that now it is far better 'to discuss with a rifle' than with the theses of the opposition. There's no need for an opposition now, comrades. *This is not the time*! Either over here or over there with a rifle, but not with the opposition. This arises from the objective situation, so don't blame me. We don't need an opposition now, comrades! And I think that the Party Congress must come to this conclusion: that for the opposition the end has come, a lid must be put on it; we've had enough opposition *for now*!"[4]

Throughout his life, Lenin permitted dissent only to those whose basic loyalty to him was beyond question; those who showed any independence of spirit, who challenged Lenin as coequals, could not achieve any permanent place of esteem or affection in Lenin's essentially authoritarian mind.[5] But once personal loyalty bound the follower to Lenin, Vladimir Il'ich permitted considerable leeway, even allowing Zinoviev and Kamenev to return to the party without loss of rank after they had openly condemned plans for the Revolution a few days before it took place. Furthermore, under Lenin, physical repression of deviant Bolsheviks was considered abhorrent, and this, naturally, lowered the intensity of the leadership struggle after Lenin's death, since in the initial stages the stakes were not felt to include physical annihilation.

The contrast with the post-Stalin collective leadership could not be more marked on this point. Khrushchev's remark, in his famous "secret speech" of 1956, that none of Stalin's lieutenants could ever be sure,

[3] As quoted in Sidney I. Ploss, *Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia* (Princeton 1965), 182.

[4] V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniia* [Collected Works] (Moscow 1930), XXVI, 227-28, emphasis mine. It is always possible, of course, that he would have forgotten his original intentions as the need for continued suppression of opposition became apparent.

[5] Compare, in this respect, Lenin's total rejection of Plekhanov and Martov with his support of the Tsarist spy, Malinovsky, despite the warnings of others.

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when entering Stalin's office, "where he will be sent next, home or to jail"[6] indicates how far Stalin had intensified political struggle by the end of his reign. Stalin did not have the natural authority that Lenin had acquired from having successfully led the movement through a revolution and civil war, and this meant Stalin had to resort to the complementary techniques of terrorizing his adversaries and creating a leadership myth, or "cult of the individual," around himself.

FACTORS LEADING TO INSTABILITY OF COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP

The first phase in the past two collective leaderships was marked by the removal of the chief beneficiary, and this series of events set the stage and the pattern for the ensuing conflict through which the eventual leader was to emerge. The two historical examples suggest that the chief beneficiary—indeed, any aspirant to dictatorial power—must establish three all-important bases for the assumption of supreme power:

1. He must win the support, or at least the benevolent neutrality of a majority of the other contenders.
2. He must establish control over important segments of the bureaucracy, which then can give him organizational support in the contest for supremacy.
3. He must ultimately create "outside" sources of personal legitimacy (closeness to his predecessor, heroic role in the Revolution, and so on) in order to protect his ascendancy from other contenders.

These three requirements interacted in a specific way in the two historical cases during the initial postmortem stages. The chief beneficiaries both had some initial advantages in the third requirement, had some underlying and not immediately apparent deficiencies in the second, and *because of* their position as *primus inter pares* eventually failed to acquire the crucial first requirement. The general point drawn from these cases is that outside sources of personal legitimacy are advantageous only *after* establishing organizational and leadership support; before this support is garnered, outside legitimacy works against the aspirations of the contender and, in fact, can be dangerous. Because the leadership struggle at the top of the Soviet hierarchy *is* a zero-sum game, the chief beneficiary, with insufficient initial advantages to assure predominance, becomes the natural enemy of the remaining oligarchs, who have in common the almost sure knowledge that the

[6] The Russian Institute, Columbia University, ed., *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism: A Selection of Documents* (New York 1956), 82. Khrushchev attributed the remark to Bulganin.

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ascent of the one means the descent of the rest. In the past, the initial legitimacy derived from being relatively favored by the deceased leader was not combined with sufficient organizational and leadership support and only served to set up the historical chief beneficiaries (both Trotsky and Malenkov) as the ideal targets for the slings and arrows of the less-favored lieutenants.[7]

The elimination of the chief beneficiary, however, also has its consequences. It forces the other contenders to organize, establishes a presumption or "operational code" that includes intraleadership conflict, and creates a power vacuum (in the sense that the removal of the chief beneficiary opens up some leadership functions for distribution to the other contenders). Historically, it has also established one of the contenders in a somewhat more advantageous position than the others.

In addition to the elimination of the chief beneficiary, other factors that tended to destabilize the two historical collective leaderships are these:

1. The growth of conflict arising from policy orientations, heightened by an atmosphere of continual crisis.
2. A lack of rules for limiting the intensity of policy conflicts and for depersonalizing policies. (Thus these policy conflicts, often resulting from organizational viewpoints and institutional conflicts, became identified with their spokesmen.)
3. The absence of a positive value for compromise or an established mechanism to accomplish it. (The ideology teaches that there is an indivisible Truth and all else is wholly error. Of course, this makes compromise essentially illegitimate, as though it involved bargaining with the Devil.)

Thus the initial collective leaderships can be seen as unstable equilibriums of mutually distrustful lieutenants, representing different institutional points of view, in a contest without rules. Not only was there in both cases a lack of consensus on the means to be employed in political struggle, but there was also a lack of consensus on the ends, on the proper form of party leadership. Neither Lenin's nor Stalin's form of leadership could be duplicated by his heirs. Party statutes gave (and still give) only vague responsibilities to the Central Committee and the Politburo. Under such conditions, without established and repeatable precedents to fill the void, it is not surprising that a no-holds-barred approach to the leadership problem was adopted by the chief con-

[7] In Trotsky's case, it should be noted, his initial legitimacy derived also from his brilliant role in the Revolution and civil war and from his impressive personal gifts.

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tenders.[8] In both the post-Lenin and post-Stalin successions, the combatants were fighting over totally new ground for an objective whose precise shape was unknown. Just as in other countries without established constitutional practice, the struggle for survival ended in the survival of the fittest, the combatant with the best combination of personal qualities, leadership contacts, and organizational support.

FACTORS LEADING TOWARD THE EMERGENCE OF A SINGLE LEADER

It is probably no exaggeration to say that the ideal aspirant for power, in the initial stage of a leadership struggle, combines solid organizational support in the decisive control structure of society (the party, in the Soviet cases) and enough obscurity and personal deficiencies to assure that the others will not fear him—even though they may find him contemptible. Historically, both successful aspirants to power, Stalin and Khrushchev, slowly applied pressure to the organizational levers they controlled in the party and ended by *surprising* their own colleagues as well as foreign observers. The accretion of power involved a sequence: from acquiring party support, to acquiring leadership support, and thence to an attempt—unsuccessful in Khrushchev's case—to acquire outside legitimacy, independent of the first two supportive factors. The process of acquiring leadership support implies the power to alter the composition of the leadership, and this in itself emphasizes the importance of prior control over the party bureaucracy and specifically over the crucial personnel (or "cadres") sections. Although this prior control would seem to be the decisive factor, both Stalin and Khrushchev also demonstrated the importance of developing support through advocating policies that appeal to the party bureaucracy.

Here again, the absence of any barriers, institutional or normative, to one-man predominance should be stressed. But the positive factors are equally important. Both successions were crisis situations. The death or incapacitation of a leader is always, of course, a traumatic event. Without rules making succession an automatic procedure, a crisis is implied by the very nature of the situation. In both historical cases, the atmosphere of crisis was heightened by additional factors, such as (1) loss of "party spirit" (*partiinost'*) in party ranks, (2) the diminished role of the party in the management of society, and (3) a functional

[8] In this connection, George Kennan refers to a lack of a "clear code of personal and collegial ethics" that could serve "to contain the powerful impulses of personal ambition and the multitudinous abrasions, frictions, misunderstandings, and jealousies that affect the mutual relations of men associated in a political undertaking." See his Introduction to Boris I. Nicolaevsky, *Power and the Soviet Elite* (New York 1965), xiv-xv.

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need for a final arbiter and ultimate decision-maker in the system, a need heightened by the bureaucratic unwillingness to resolve issues at lower levels. In both cases, the party was at low ebb, in the first because of the NEP, in the second because of Stalin's conscious transfer of powers to other hierarchies. In both situations, however, the party retained the legitimacy, the will, and the potential authority for a return to dominance.

Beyond this, however, was the supreme importance of both Lenin and Stalin (although in different ways) as the functional apexes of the political structure. Each performed vital functions as (1) the arbiter of top-level disputes, (2) the final decision-maker and authority, (3) the supreme interpreter of ideology (the "papal function"), (4) a success and security symbol, (5) a link with the masses (through mass media), and (6) a legitimacy symbol. Thus the sudden removal of both these leaders left a series of vital functions unperformed. It is no wonder that a week after Lenin's death, A. Bobrov wrote on the front page of *Pravda*, "The death of Lenin—this is the heaviest possible blow to us all. His thought was that cement which united all of us, Communists along with working class, in a single purpose."[9]

After Stalin's death—and reflecting the great increase in leadership functions associated with Stalin personally—the leadership issued a proclamation warning against public "panic."[10] Indeed, such panic as did ensue must have been centered in the Kremlin, and this is not surprising, considering that not one of Stalin's lieutenants alone, nor the whole lot together, could perform Stalin's functions successfully. The system had been adapted to the man, and in this lay its fundamental weakness and impermanence.

If we examine each of the six leadership functions performed by Stalin personally, it becomes quite obvious that none of them could have been performed by a collective leadership: the first three logically require a single person; the last three require the creation of a leadership myth, and it is much easier and more logical to create a "cult of the individual" than a "cult of the Politburo." The emergence of the dictator from the post-Lenin succession struggle and the emergence of the almost-dictator from the post-Stalin struggle can be seen as the logical outcomes of these functional requirements of the political system *under the historical conditions of the 1920's and 1950's*. It is quite another matter to say that these functional requirements remain in the 1960's, and beyond.

[9] January 31, 1924.

[10] Some disturbances and even riots reportedly occurred, but this is another matter.

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THE HISTORICAL ARGUMENT AND PRESENT REALITIES

In large part, the failure of the two past collective leaderships can be traced to a combination of political habits learned during the preceding dictatorial periods and the absence of barriers (such as competing institutions, legal norms, constitutional practice, or precedents) to the concentration of absolute, or nearly absolute, power in the hands of one man. It would seem, however, that the barriers to the Communist form of personal dictatorship have grown with time. The extent of Stalin's power was far greater than Khrushchev's. The limitations on Stalin's power, correspondingly, were much more nebulous, verging on the final limitations of his self-restraint. Khrushchev's power was apparently never sufficient for him to impose his will on his colleagues without considering the positions of the forces they directed. The Khrushchev period, as we are now more than ever aware, was filled with instances (education, military manpower reduction, farm policy) in which Khrushchev was forced to retreat unceremoniously from previously stated positions. His power was always subject to a vote in the Presidium, and the vote could apparently go against his leadership (as it actually did in June 1957 and October 1964), as well as against a particular aspect of his policy.

It is not unreasonable to consider the entire Khrushchev period, or at least a good portion of it, as a period of modified collective leadership, with Khrushchev occupying the position of *primus inter pares* rather than the Stalinesque role of *vozhd'* (supreme leader).[11] In this sense the removal of Khrushchev appears as a change toward a "purer" form of collectivity, a collectivity in which no one person in the Politburo (Presidium, 1952-1966) could develop an independent policy-making prerogative—even of the type that Khrushchev had, constantly subject to later "correction" by colleagues.

The present situation in the Kremlin does not give any indication that the intense power struggle long associated with the Politburo has disappeared. The clash of personal ambitions and of institutional interests apparently goes on—just as in other political systems—but the restraints have grown. And it was the absence of restraints, of limiting norms, that chiefly marked off past struggles in the Kremlin from the "political process" in cabinets, congresses, and parliaments across the "developed" world and made the Soviet struggles similar to those taking place in many of the new, "developing" nations. In the 1920's there

[11] In addition to Ploss, see Carl A. Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-1964* (Baltimore 1966).

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were no rules of the game, and the lack of any standards by which the conflict could be played out left the most ruthless of the competitors, Stalin, with a clear field for his tactical maneuvers. By now, on the other hand, there has grown a body of experience, based on almost five decades of power, as well as on the first successful removal of an acknowledged leader before the end of his natural life-span. This burgeoning "tradition" can, indeed, be a significant factor in modifying the activities of the power-seekers.

One of the major changes from the post-Stalin type of power struggle has been the reduction of the stakes. Stalin's political opponents, real or imagined, all eventually faced the probability of execution. After Stalin's death, however, only Beria and his chief lieutenants met this fate (and Beria was dangerous to the entire leadership rather than to a few individuals). Khrushchev's defeated opponents, from Malenkov to Molotov to Matskevich, all suffered the relatively mild penalty of being sequestered in politically insignificant jobs. More recently, both Khrushchev and his archrival Molotov surfaced briefly from the depths of political obscurity to cast their votes, dutifully and smilingly, in elections for the Supreme Soviet. Matskevich has returned to his former post of minister of agriculture. Pervukhin, a member of the anti-Khrushchev ("antiparty") group purged in 1957, has moved up the bureaucratic ladder. Obviously, the power struggle is no longer a life-and-death matter in the literal sense. It has become a political struggle fought and won with conventional political weapons.[12]

This modification of the consequences of defeat has its counterpart in a modification of the consequences of victory. One of the results of the de-Stalinization campaign has been the erection of a barrier to the development of a personal dictatorship in the future. As part of the campaign, a full-scale assault was made on the "cult of the individual," which is essentially the practice of glorifying a single leader. On the one hand, the cult was blamed for the errors of the Stalin period, and on the other, a principle of collective leadership was proclaimed to be the correct and legitimate Leninist norm of party guidance. Taking a typical example from *Pravda* in the period right after Stalin's death: "One of the fundamental principles of party leadership is collectivity in deciding all important problems of party work. It is impossible to provide genuine leadership if inner party democracy is violated in the party organization, if genuine collective leadership and widely devel-

[12] Zbigniew Brzezinski has suggested that the new processes have given rise to a "counterelite" of purged officials, ready, willing, and able to offer an alternative to the functioning leadership. See his article "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration?" *Problems of Communism*, XV (January-February 1966), 8.

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oped criticism and self-criticism are lacking. . . . No matter how experienced leaders may be, no matter what their knowledge and ability, they do not possess and they cannot replace the initiative and experience of a whole collective."[13]

Such a legitimation of collective norms of leadership has the effect of limiting the political goals of the leading contenders. If cults of the individual are no longer permissible, if being Number One implies that Numbers Two through Ten also have certain initiative and consultative powers, the net result is to limit the consequences of victory, the prerogatives of the victor, and thus the form of the struggle.

Soviet Theories of Legitimate Leadership

As with other areas of Soviet life, the form of political leadership must be presented for the edification of the party faithful in doctrinal terms, and these doctrinal terms must have some demonstrable relationship to the vague picture of reality provided by "Marxism-Leninism." The formation of political policies and attitudes is not, of course, simply a process of shaping practice to fit a preordained and fixed theory; rather it implies a process of interaction between theory and practice, in which theory also changes to suit the exigencies of new situations, calling for new practices.

With this in mind, it is interesting to consider the fact that in Soviet doctrine there is no theoretical support to be found for the idea that a single individual should rule the workers' party and the workers' state. In fact, quite to the contrary, even before Khrushchev's "secret speech" of 1956 and the subsequent campaign against the cult of the individual, the "treasurehouse of Marxism-Leninism" was well-stocked with condemnation of the idea of one-man rule. In general, the idea of the dictator, or the idea of the decisive role of the "hero" in history, has been loudly deplored and consistently identified as an attribute of bourgeois philosophy. Because of this attitude, the creators of Stalin's personality cult (and Mao Tse-tung's as well) had to create a myth of the leader's *uniqueness*, his almost supernatural personal qualities, and particularly his supreme contributions to the enrichment of the theory. In other words, the one-man dictatorship must in essence be pictured as an *exception* to the general ideological rule, legitimized by the leader's extraordinary gifts in advancing the theory, rather than by the theory itself.

[13] *Pravda*, April 16, 1953, as translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, v (May 9, 1953). This appeared three years before the beginning of full-scale de-Stalinization.

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Nevertheless, Soviet doctrine in fact allows considerable latitude in choosing specific political institutions. There is no sense—or at least precious little sense—of law or institutions standing somehow higher than individual men, and certainly no sense whatever that the forms of government must conform to certain absolute political rules, independent of and higher than the will of the leaders. Forms of government are viewed in the same sense as so-called "tactics"—built to suit particular needs of a particular time, but having no built-in legitimacy that could impel the leaders to retain them beyond the life-span of their apparent usefulness. Here again, effectiveness is the test applied, and few institutions can remain unchallenged through time on the basis of efficiency alone.

The Soviet situation is flexible enough to permit radical alterations of governmental institutions at fairly rapid intervals, whenever the efficiency equation yields a negative answer. In fact, the ease of changing institutions and the psychological resistance to blaming the basic premises of the Soviet system for its recurrent problems, both economic and social, have given rise to a tendency for institutional juggling. When something goes wrong, the first response has often been to seek a cure by administrative reorganization. Because the institutions themselves are always viewed instrumentally and (with the single exception of the soviets) never develop an independent sense of legitimacy, they are powerless to withstand the constant pressures for change that exist in a society constantly frustrated in accomplishing the overoptimistic goals set for it. Thus institutions are often the "fall guys" for the repeated failures of Soviet performance to match the unrealistic goals set for it by the political leadership.

The form of leadership is not above the level of constant experimentation, nor above the level of the efficiency test. Although in the past the emergence of a single leader has been the pattern, there is nothing in the theory, nor is there yet anything growing out of a sense of tradition, that would prevent the present pattern of collective leadership from persisting in the future. If the lessons of the personality-cult era are reduced simply to the proposition that a single leader cannot efficiently control the complex structure of the Soviet system, even this may be enough to prevent a recurrence of a Stalin-type leader. The implications of the Khrushchev period lead directly to this conclusion.

The Lessons of the Khrushchev Period

The period of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, for all its brevity, in many ways marked a turning point in the course of Soviet politics. The

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Stalinist caution and apparent fear of the outside world gave way to a buoyant Khrushchevian optimism, a simplistic faith in the correctness and eventual success of policies, no matter how experimental. More important than this, however, was the general development of Soviet administration along rationalistic lines, with the party once again becoming the dominant command structure for all of society. The Khrushchev era marked the complete ascendancy of the party *apparatchik*, the lifelong bureaucrat with a simple faith in the basic tenets of the creed and a technocrat's penchant for total management and control of an increasingly complex society.

It was under Khrushchev that the efficiency test became paramount. During Stalin's reign, efficiency sometimes had had to be sacrificed to other overriding concerns, such as supposed doctrinal orthodoxy and the absolute primacy of preserving complete political controls. (The preservation of the Machine Tractor Stations, or MTS, is a good example of the secondary importance of efficiency during the Stalin era.) Bureaucratism, in the Weberian sense, reached its present high state of development under the aegis of Khrushchev's power. Efficiency-oriented technical management of the economy became the primary concern of the party leadership as never before. Questions of yield per acre, tonnage per man-hour were discussed at plenum after plenum of the Central Committee, and always Khrushchev appeared as the supreme technical expert who found no aspect of the "people's economy" too insignificant for his attention and who was always ready to bestow technical advice on the technical advisers—advice generously mixed with earthy, homespun philosophy and peasant humor. The comparatively humdrum matters of technical management and the efficiency orientation of the leadership marked the style of the Khrushchev period.

Humdrum matters seem to be the very essence of politics in "developed" societies. The big revolutions are over, and rapid social changes go almost unnoticed because adaptation has become a way of life. In this respect, the relatively unspectacular quality of politics under Khrushchev (and even more so since) may be a sign of increasing maturity and the approach of the "end of ideology."[14] At any rate, humdrum matters are usually the concern of humdrum men. Stalin had systematically eliminated all his potential competitors, and the re-

[14] I am referring here not to the specific problem of Soviet ideology, but to the advent of a period when all ideological tendencies seem increasingly irrelevant, as described in Daniel Bell's *The End of Ideology* (New York 1961) and Seymour Martin Lipset's *Political Man* (New York 1960).

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sult was that at his death he was surrounded by mediocrity. Able administrators toughened by the hard realities of the struggle to the top in the Stalinesque political world, Stalin's successors all fitted comfortably into the shadow he cast. They were, to a man, marked by shrewdness rather than intelligence, narrow expertise rather than broad vision, diligent application rather than brilliant accomplishment. It had been possible to make a god out of Stalin, but it is difficult to imagine how the most gifted public relations man could have done so with Malenkov, Bulganin, or Khrushchev.

No one of the successors seemed a probable candidate for the role of dictator. Only Molotov, Kaganovich, and Mikoyan of Stalin's inner circle could claim any substantial continuity with Lenin, and each of these "Older Bolsheviks" had serious drawbacks. None of the other leaders could even claim revolutionary legitimacy, since none had played an important part in the Bolshevik Revolution, save perhaps the superannuated Marshal Voroshilov. Indeed, most of the leadership, including Khrushchev, had joined the party *after* the "Glorious October" uprising. No one had achieved personal domination of the leadership, and no one could claim it. It is thus hardly surprising that in the final analysis the Khrushchev period does not at all represent a continuation of the pattern of personal dictatorship, but rather a new pattern of bureaucratic control and cabinet rule.

The contrast between Khrushchev's and Stalin's rule can be clarified by borrowing the Parsonian terminology of *ascriptive* and *achievement* norms. In the Stalin era, leadership was expressed through ascriptive authority. Stalin successfully built up the image of himself as the legitimate heir of Marx and Lenin and bolstered his ascriptive leadership by falsifying and grossly exaggerating his role in the October Revolution. At the point at which this public relations campaign became effective, Stalin acquired ascriptive leadership, i.e., leadership based upon his name, his supposed personal qualities, and his legendary past. Stalin thus achieved a significant breakthrough in leadership by divorcing his authority from all questions of policy, from all considerations of the efficiency test, and from all dangers of personal antagonisms. His was the leadership described in the now classical expositions of the totalitarian system, a leadership generating a response that was unquestioning, loyal to the end, highly emotional, occasionally even bordering on adoration.[15]

The Khrushchev type of leadership, however, was of a different

[15] Of course, this analysis is not meant to imply that Stalin's support was unanimous or that fear was not an operative element.

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stamp entirely. It can be described, in the Parsonian terminology, as achievement-oriented. Khrushchev's leadership never became legitimate in itself; it always depended on performance and on the shifting alliances in the Kremlin leadership. Khrushchev had to produce, and to produce continually. A major policy failure could—and repeatedly did—create a crisis of confidence in Khrushchev's personal stewardship. He was never able to rid himself of opponents and critics, precisely because he had no "outside" source of legitimacy, no ascriptive qualities that could enable him to transcend the achievement-oriented style of leadership that he himself had been instrumental in creating. Ironically enough, Khrushchev expressed the attitude that led to his own downfall in a remark he made to an erring comrade at the January 1961 Plenum of the Central Committee: "What did you expect? Do you think all of us are eternal? The time is past when the leadership was hereditary. Now—work well and you will be hailed, work badly and you'll be replaced. This is how it will be and this is how it should be. This is a law; this is what democracy is."[16] As events later showed, not even Khrushchev was "eternal"; not even he could be exempt from the efficiency test; and when his failures accumulated in both foreign and domestic policies, he was replaced by men who followed his own example.

As is well known, there was a modest and somewhat sporadic attempt during the Khrushchev years to inflate his role during the Second World War, when he was a political officer on the Ukrainian front. The attempt was reminiscent of the earlier falsification of Stalin's role in the war, but was quite reserved by comparison. In a sense, this was the road Khrushchev had to travel in order to achieve Stalin-type ascriptive power, but Khrushchev never was able to proceed down it very far. Having condemned Stalin's ascriptive leadership, having emphasized from time to time the obvious fact that he himself was far from indispensable, he could not at the same time build a Khrushchev cult, raising himself above the level of conflict in the party Presidium. Unwittingly—but unerringly—he had created the conditions for his own downfall.

The *pattern* of his downfall is also highly significant. As already stated, Soviet institutions lack intrinsic legitimacy and are viewed by the leadership in an instrumental manner, resulting in frequent reorganizations as correctives for policy failures. This is true also of the institution of General (or First) Secretary of the party. There has been

[16] *Pravda*, January 15, 1961, as translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XIII (March 1, 1961).

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no regular procedure for removing the General Secretary, but in view of the Khrushchev episode, it can be assumed that a concurring vote of the Politburo and the Central Committee is enough to oust the leader *at any time*. The General Secretary does not, obviously, have a term of office. He is thus continually subject to the possibility of removal, and he must, therefore, be continually vigilant, careful to identify possible hostile coalitions, and generally cautious, so as not to antagonize other members of the leadership. What this may indeed mean is that the future leaders, including the present leader of the party, Brezhnev, may remain in power only so long as they do not rise too far above the rest of their colleagues. Survival under these conditions seems to dictate moderate exercise of powers, constant attention to conciliating hostile groups, continuous efforts to ingratiate oneself with a safe majority of the leadership group, and, in fact, an altogether selfless, behind-the-scenes type of leadership.

All of this would mean a new stability in the collective leadership pattern. It may be that the person filling the post of General Secretary will change occasionally, as one or another leader fails to assure his majority, but the change in personalities will not be as important as in the past, for there will be little to distinguish one General Secretary from another. They will be equipped with dull gray camouflage in order to survive.

Another relevant legacy of the Khrushchev period is the trend toward increasing institutionalization of the leadership. Under Khrushchev, Central Committee plenums and party congresses were reinstituted on a regular basis in conformity with party rules long ignored under Stalin.[17] In contrast to the secrecy prevailing under Stalin, minutes of Central Committee plenums were published in the press and given wide circulation. Although the party Presidium continued to meet in secrecy, it seems from certain outward signs that it met more regularly and systematically than in the heyday of Stalin's dominance. In any event, the net effect of this institutionalization was to place definite restrictions on arbitrary power exercised by the party leader. Stalin could be arbitrary partly because he could indefinitely suspend meetings of established party decision-making organs and substitute irregular gatherings of selected yes-men. Until the last months of his leadership, Khrushchev seemed bent on exactly the opposite course, that of bolstering the authority of party organs.[18] Thus, in yet another way, Khru-

[17] The post-Khrushchevian Twenty-third Party Congress indicated some relaxation of this conformity to rules, since it met some five months after the specified time limit.

[18] In his last months as First Secretary, Khrushchev apparently tried to overcome

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shchev seems unconsciously to have been building potential instruments for his own Waterloo. These instruments could operate in the same manner in the future, when another General Secretary accumulates failures based on "harebrained schemes" and "subjective decisions."

Finally, the future leaders will most likely come up from the ranks, through the party apparatus, or internal bureaucracy. All indications are that the career opportunities in the party machine do not attract the most vital and talented young people in the Soviet Union, but rather the "organization men," who fit well into a bureaucratic environment. The recruitment of patient mediocrity is reinforced by the process of natural selection in the *apparat*, so that all those who finally emerge through the recruitment tube into the highest party councils are so thoroughly squeezed into the predetermined shape as to be almost indistinguishable from one another. These are not exactly the sort of leaders who could, or would, capture a mass following. They are not Stalins, not even Khrushchevs; they are men like Aleksei Kosygin: capable, well-trained, efficient, dedicated—and dull. They do not relate well to the crowd. Their training has prepared them to be administrators rather than politicians. We can be fairly certain that their speeches will be boring, their public images indistinct.

The gray men of the future leadership will have little possibility of building a genuine connection with the populace that could give them independent popularity and thus might in some way insulate them from inner party conflict. Khrushchev was apparently able to achieve a certain amount of popularity, and this may have saved him from an even earlier departure. If the Khrushchev case is any indication of future trends, however, playing to the crowd is not a reliable safeguard in the long run against the inherent dangers of party leadership.

In fact, becoming popular with the masses can be a potentially dangerous operation for any of the leaders. Popularity could serve as the new equivalent of personal legitimacy, insulating the leader from the influence of his colleagues and establishing an up-dated version of the deplored cult of the individual. Even if someone with the potential flair for politicking did somehow climb to the top of the bureaucratic ladder, he would be restrained from using his talents. He might reflect on the

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hostile groupings around him by calling together *ad hoc* and essentially illegitimate groups of supporters to approve his proposals and create *faits accomplis* for the party leadership opposing him.

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history of Nikita Khrushchev's last days in office and on the futility of being popular with the weak and thus resented by the strong.[19]

Patterns of the Future

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, a more plausible alternative to the inherent personal dictatorship theory of Soviet government can be suggested.[20]

1. *Collective leadership as the normal pattern.* Individual leaders, unable to build ascriptive leadership authority, will not be able to achieve a predominant, unquestionable position within the party hierarchy. Furthermore, continual conflict within the highest leadership will probably operate as a constant restraint on any member of the group who begins to achieve a superordinate position. In other words, there may very well emerge a "balance-of-power" situation in the leadership, in which forces are continually realigned to prevent one side or another from tipping the scales too much in either direction.

2. *Continual shifts in leaders.* Considering the points raised above, as well as the aforementioned penchant for finding convenient scapegoats for policy failures, it would seem probable that there will be fairly regular changes in the leadership, including the post of General Secretary. Personalities will not, however, play as significant a role in policy determination, because policies will come to be identified more with institutions than with individuals.

3. *Relative stability and caution in policy.* This will result from several factors. The leadership, especially the General Secretary, will naturally wish to avoid being identified with a policy that proves unsuccessful. Since survival in a group of practiced scapegoaters depends to a large extent on avoidance of novel departures in policy-making, a noticeable caution within the collective leadership will most likely appear (if it has not already). Furthermore, to escape being made a scapegoat, it will be necessary for any leader to build a safe consensus within the group—preferably complete unanimity—for each policy measure, and this will inevitably mean that all measures will have to be watered

[19] In the summer of 1964, just a few months before his removal, Khrushchev went on a "barnstorming" tour of rural areas, during which he repeatedly seemed to be appealing directly to his audience over the heads of the party leadership. Carrying things this far undoubtedly worsened his relations with the other leaders, who already felt threatened by Khrushchev's maneuvers.

[20] The following pattern assumes a continuation of the present set of "external" pressures felt by the Soviet leadership. Most important is the assumption that such pressures will not increase traumatically and cause a return to a crisis situation brought about by a catastrophic failure in internal policy or a sudden and threatening increase in foreign hostility, from either the West or the East.

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down by a succession of compromises. There will thus, in all likelihood, be a tendency to take the path of least resistance in new policy moves, and this will result in a generally stable, cautious, and steadfast policy.

Recent Developments in the Kremlin

Aleksandr N. Shelepin's loss of his posts as Deputy Premier and head of the Party-State Control Commission at the December 1965 session of the Supreme Soviet can be seen as an example of the "balance-of-power" mechanism at work in the top leadership group. Shelepin had a most imposing position within the leadership, serving as a member of the Secretariat and the party Presidium in addition to being head of the Control Commission and a member of the Council of Ministers, and this powerful combination of positions may have been seen by the other leaders as a potential threat. It is precisely in this way that the balance-of-power mechanism exerts a leveling influence on the members of the leadership, preventing any one participant from securing a position of unchecked predominance. Shelepin has not been removed from his posts in the Secretariat or the Presidium, nor is there any indication as of this writing that he has so seriously antagonized his colleagues that he will fall further in the leadership hierarchy. Shelepin's loss of the Control Commission may very well be, therefore, simply another one of a series of internal adjustments designed to stabilize the collective principle of leadership through a rough equilibration of forces at the top.

Finally, it should be noted that the Twenty-third Party Congress in the spring of 1966 emphasized the collectivity aspect of Soviet leadership beyond all else. The speeches had all the diversity of a Greek chorus, and aside from the fact that this uniformity made the congress perhaps the dullest in CPSU history, the overall effect was to underline the determination of the present leadership to operate in a businesslike, unspectacular manner, to solve problems pragmatically, and to approach innovations cautiously. Following the suggestion of Alfred G. Meyer that "the USSR is best understood as a large, complex bureaucracy comparable in its structure and functioning to giant corporations, armies, government agencies, and similar institutions . . . in the West,"[21] it can be said that the Twenty-third Congress is the Soviet Union's closest approach yet to a stockholders' meeting, and the Soviet "managers" showed themselves to be no less anxious than their American counterparts to demonstrate their solidarity and collective confidence before the ultimate shareholders of their system—the Soviet people.

[21] *The Soviet Political System: An Interpretation* (New York 1965), 467.

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REGIONAL ORGANIZATION AND THE REGULATION OF INTERNAL CONFLICT

By LINDA B. MILLER*

I

ARE regional and global approaches to world order compatible or competitive? Policy-makers and scholars pose this question with increasing frequency. Yet too often assessments of the relative capabilities of regional and general international organizations fail to distinguish the different demands such issues as threats to the peace or modernization create for widely divergent institutions. Enthusiasm for regionalism waxes and wanes with events. As Inis Claude observes, "The advocacy of regionalism can be, and often is, as doctrinaire and as heedless of concrete realities as the passion for all-encompassing organization."[1]

The realities of contemporary internal violence suggest that international regulation of intrastate disorder is desirable. Internal disorders, in the form of armed insurrections, bloodless military coups, colonial revolts, or factional disputes, are prevalent in the less industrialized sectors of Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. The attempts of countries in these regions to modernize their societies generate social and political unrest and invite violent or subviolent civil strife.

These disorders may reveal a desire to achieve political change when previously legitimate means of effecting change have broken down or when the goals of dissident groups cannot be realized by legitimate means.[2] Revolutions, civil wars, coups, or mere threats of force attest to issues of policy or ideology; disagreements over foreign-policy, constitutional, ethnic, racial, or economic questions may spark violence that creates new issues for domestic and external parties.[3] Nation-building and insurgency are closely linked: the lack of a basic national consensus about the means and ends of government may raise doubts as to the legitimacy of the formal government in power; or bureaucratic ineffi-

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[1] *Swords Into Plowshares* (New York 1964), 95.

[2] Cyril E. Black, in Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton, eds., *Communism and Revolution* (Princeton 1964), 7ff.

[3] *Ibid.*, 9-12.

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ciencies may call into question the capacity of ruling groups to govern.[4]

Different kinds of internal violence create different international concerns. Conflicts that subside quickly or remain confined within national boundaries may arouse some interest on a regional basis and little or no attention on a global scale. Protracted disorders that may spill over territorial boundaries stimulate global interests in peaceful change and human rights. When struggles for internal supremacy are seen by local and foreign participants as parts of larger conflicts of a racial or ideological character, the potential or actual threat to global and regional stability is increased.

Competitive external interventions have become the familiar mode for larger powers who view internal conflicts as a means of extending their own national influence at the expense of cold-war adversaries or regional competitors. Thus the steadily expanding war in Vietnam has dramatized the extent to which the line between international and internal conflicts may be erased by the actions of third parties who regard civil disorders as threats to political values. The lack of substantive rules of conduct in civil strife increases the likelihood of unregulated third-party interventions. The specter of unilateral military responses to internal violence raises the most serious issues for world order. Few would disagree with Richard A. Falk who argues that "civil strife constitutes the major challenge to those convinced that decisions to use military power in world affairs should not be matters of national discretion."[5] Nevertheless, since the effective control of force remains on the national level, the prospects for international regulation of internal conflict depend upon the self-restraint of third parties.

Such a fragile basis for world order is unsatisfactory to those who would give primacy to transnational interests. Therefore it is not surprising that some scholars have attempted to postulate a series of "legal" restraints that might serve as guides for policy-makers. Falk, for example, has proposed that the legitimacy of particular interventions be based on whether they rest on prior principles that express "patterns of general community consent or merely reflect *ad hoc* political majorities of the moment." Thus unilateral interventions in which one nation intervenes in the internal affairs of another, as did the Soviet Union in Hungary, would rank lower on the scale of legitimacy than regional interventions in which a group of states forms a juridical entity and

[4] Lucian Pye, in Harry Eckstein, ed., *Internal War: Problems and Approaches* (New York 1964), 158, 164.

[5] "The International Regulation of Internal Violence in the Developing Countries," American Society of International Law, *Proceedings* (April 1966), 59.

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imposes a combined will on a dissenting member, as did the OAS with Cuba. Still higher on the scale would come collective interventions under the aegis of the UN, as in the Congo or Cyprus.[6] Falk would give to the UN greater legislative competence to intervene in domestic affairs, authority that would enable the Organization to move into *any* civil disorder threatening world peace or abusing human rights. In some instances the UN might become the sole authority in modernizing countries experiencing civil upheaval.[7] Regional interventions would occupy a middle position between undesirable unilateral interventions and desirable, but perhaps unattainable, UN interpositions.

The structural and political realities of regional organization indicate that the possibilities for attaining effective management of civil strife through regional efforts are limited. Nevertheless, it is useful to stipulate the *feasible* responses for regional actors even if these responses fall short of *desirable* ones.

II

It is important to differentiate both types of internal conflict and patterns of regional organization. The term "internal war" is not helpful in this context, since many internal disorders are not "wars" in a traditional sense. Moreover, "internal war" is rendered still less precise by its occasional use as a description of conflicts in which "Communist" states participate.[8] It would be advantageous if scholars could develop categories that permit clear distinctions between diversified internal conflicts.[9] In the absence of widely accepted categories, observers must select those pertinent to the scope of a particular inquiry. From the standpoint of international organization, three types of internal conflict are significant: colonial wars, internal conflicts involving a breakdown of law and order, and proxy wars and internal conflicts involving charges of external aggression or subversion.

Two types of regional organization are of potential consequence in the regulation of internal conflict: (1) groupings of states such as the Organization of American States and the Organization of African Unity, with a continental or hemispheric basis, a set of decision-making institutions, and established procedures for pacific settlement of dis-

[6] Falk, in Roland Stanger, ed., *Essays on Intervention* (Columbus 1964), 40-41.
[7] *Ibid.*, 40-44.
[8] See, for example, Roger Hilsman, "Internal War: The New Communist Tactic," in Franklin Mark Osanka, ed., *Modern Guerrilla Warfare* (New York 1962), 452-63.
[9] For an extended discussion of this point, see Linda B. Miller, *World Order and Local Disorder: The United Nations and Internal Conflicts* (Princeton 1967), Introduction.

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putes; and (2) collective defense arrangements such as NATO, SEATO, and the Warsaw Pact, whose geographical bases conform to strategic needs rather than natural boundaries and whose nonmilitary functions are virtually undeveloped. Regional organizations of both types are arenas in which competing governmental interests are acted out. When these interests converge, a consensus may emerge on appropriate responses to internal violence. These responses, whether they involve attempts to isolate an internal conflict, to foster negotiations between disputants, or to impose a settlement, develop pragmatically in each case. The British Commonwealth is a more anomalous type of "regional" organization. Despite the fact that the Commonwealth is unlike other organizations, it may attempt similar functions when internal strife breaks out in a member state, if political circumstances permit. The Commonwealth's lack of cohesion, apparent throughout Rhodesia's conflict with Britain, is a major impediment to effective action.

Few precedents are discernible in the practice of regional organizations in civil disorders, but some frequently observed deficiencies have proved to be highly relevant. In Asia, there is no regional grouping of stature and comprehensive authority. The recently formed Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) has no institutional structure and is limited to a few countries in the area. Even more restricted is Maphilindo, a grouping that has remained an expression of intent rather than a viable foundation for regional activities. In Africa, the existing OAU lacks military resources and is torn by periodic ideological splits. In the Middle East, the Arab League's membership is incomplete and the competition for dominance between Egypt and Saudi Arabia affects every regional undertaking. In Latin America, the U.S. continues to dominate the OAS and seeks to have American conceptions of Communist threats to the hemisphere prevail. Similarly, preeminent American power plus divergent attitudes toward the degree and quality of Communist involvement have characterized the responses of NATO and SEATO to intraregional civil strife.

Past attempts of regional organizations to regulate varieties of internal violence illustrate these deficiencies and others that preclude effective contributions to world order.

III

The chief colonial wars since 1945 have unfolded in parts of the world where regional organization is either precarious or nonexistent.

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Throughout the postwar period, the organizational focus of decolonization has remained the United Nations. The destabilizing effects of the new nations' transition to self-rule have colored the relations of the European nations with the Soviet Union and its allies, as well as intra-alliance relations in the West. The lengthy struggles of indigenous groups in Indonesia, Algeria, and Angola have involved third-party states and international organizations in asymmetrical conflicts in which incumbents have enjoyed an initial preponderance of power. These revolutionary wars have taken place in territories in which the metropolitan power remained distant, geographically and politically. Each European power in turn has confronted nongovernmental cliques determined to end foreign domination. The Dutch, French, and Portuguese governments sought to isolate these conflicts in hopes that concessions short of outright independence would be sufficient to quell disorder. Each colonial power vigorously opposed formal internationalization of the conflict, fearing that the UN (and later the OAU, in the case of Angola) would serve to confer status on the rebelling faction and to expose repressive administrative policies.

Insurgent groups in Indonesia, Algeria, and Angola have favored UN involvement (and now OAU participation) for the reasons the European states opposed it: first, as a means of enlisting sympathy for rebel goals; and second, as a means of enhancing bargaining positions and compensating for military weaknesses. In all three colonial wars, the UN's efforts (and those of the OAU) to confine hostilities, to restore order, to foster self-determination, and to encourage viable political settlements have been hampered by the reluctance of incumbents and insurgents to legitimize each other, to accord the recognition implied in acceding to negotiations. In each case, the international organizations have expressed a definite preference for change favorable to insurgents.

The vestiges of white rule in southern Africa constitute the last barrier to an independent continent. A "colonial" war that could dwarf the violence of preceding African conflicts is a distinct possibility. Can the OAU be expected to play a constructive role in securing the black majority's rights and in preventing uncontrolled bloodshed? The record of the OAU in the Angolan revolt is instructive.

Unlike many of the intra-African issues, the Angolan colonial war has served to unite the states of Black Africa on policy. The formation of the OAU in 1963 provided new impetus for a sanctionist approach to Portugal, but African leaders have sought a wider forum for their denunciation of Salazar's administration—hence their concentration

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on securing UN resolutions and UN investigations rather than exclusive OAU discussions. Lacking the military capabilities to intervene with force in Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, or South West Africa, the African states have tended to act individually in such matters as training rebels or recognizing a specific indigenous regime as the *de jure* authority. The OAU as an organization, apart from the actions of certain of its members, has not "regulated" the Angolan conflict in any sense; in fact, the revolt has diminished. The OAU members have cast themselves as a group in the role of negotiators for the rebels in their dealings with Portugal. These talks, urged in numerous UN resolutions, have foundered on the issue of self-determination for Angola. But the fact that the OAU has considered itself a party to the conflict and has been accepted as such by the UN may be a valuable precedent.

In view of the ideological splits that have plagued the OAU since its establishment and the continuing military weakness of the organization, it is difficult to foresee a more interventionary OAU role even in circumstances of policy agreement. It would appear that both regional and global approaches to change in southern Africa are dependent on shifts in the commitments of Western states, notably the United States and Britain. The African states continue to lack sufficient power to "impose" a settlement on Portugal or South Africa, even if the combined will of the OAU membership would favor an attempt to do so. Moreover, the pattern of settlement in the Indonesian and Algerian wars indicates a bilateral framework for eventual solutions rather than a regional one. Feasible OAU responses would involve continued diplomatic pressure on other UN members in presentations that stress violations of human rights and the compatibility of regional and global concerns. In addition, the thirty-eight members of the OAU might adopt more uniform procedures for urging all African states to refrain from trading with either Portugal or South Africa. The many examples of extensive trade between the new states and the "colonial" powers are impressive. Only if other economic arrangements can be devised so that the losses from an end to such trade are shared will the new African states be willing to adopt firm practices.

A severe outbreak of organized resistance to the South African regime, rather than sporadic incidents of civil disobedience, would involve the UN as well as the OAU. A potential source of disagreement between the two organizations might develop over the question of border-sealing. From the UN's perspective, such a move might increase the chances for isolating the disorder. But from the OAU's viewpoint, border-sealing would favor the police actions of the incumbents and

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prevent the external assistance needed to topple the white government. Thus border-sealing, while feasible, might not be desirable. In this instance, competitive means might mask compatible goals.

The role of security pacts in colonial wars appears even more restricted. In the Indonesian and Algerian conflicts, NATO served as a minor channel through which the United States could direct pressures against the Netherlands and France when it wished to do so. In the Angolan rebellion, the United States shifted its initial position in the UN and came to accept the *principle* of an arms embargo against its NATO ally Portugal. But since the alliance itself is in chronic disarray, it is unrealistic to expect "NATO" policies on colonial matters that appear less critical now than in the 1950's.

IV

The declining importance of prolonged struggles for independence has been accompanied by an upsurge in virulent forms of postcolonial civil disorder. These conflicts, often characterized by a breakdown of law and order, create a complex set of policy choices for third parties, both individual states and regional or global organizations. A compatibility of ends and means between the UN and the interested regional association cannot be assumed. Friction or tension between field operations of the UN and those of regional organizations may be the price of a mutual concern for stability. The Congo, Dominican, and Cyprus disorders have found international organizations deeply involved in seeking to halt violence and to promote political solutions.

The relatively uncomplicated roles played by these organizations in the colonial wars contrast sharply with the intricacies of their prolonged participation in the breakdowns of law and order. These conflicts have confronted international organizations with an array of parties whose interests transcend the colonial pattern of incumbents and insurgents. In countries as diverse as the Congo, the Dominican Republic, and Cyprus, a common instability arising from a lack of adequate preparation for full self-rule (as opposed to colonial or dictatorial rule) has marked the disintegration of political processes.

To an important extent, regional organizations and the UN have shared compatible goals in these disorders. Both have tried to restore and maintain international peace and security, pursuant to their principles and purposes. Both have tried to prevent external interventions from escalating local violence into superpower conflagrations. In attempts to realize their goals, both have been limited by inadequate

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means and by the attitudes of individual member states with narrower national interests in the outcome of internal strife. Similar limitations have plagued the efforts of international organizations in colonial wars and internal conflicts involving charges of external aggression or subversion. But special hazards have accompanied the involvement of international institutions in upheavals that have exposed the weaknesses of the social fabric in developing societies with minority groups of a mixed racial or linguistic heritage. The nature of the breakdowns of law and order has required the formation of a consensus within each organization. In each case, a commitment to a definite outcome has developed within each institution when local and external parties have evaded political solutions.

By the time the Organization of African Unity was formed in May 1963, the post-independence breakdown of law and order in the Congo had passed through several critical stages. From the beginning of tribal violence and the subsequent collapse of central authority in Léopoldville, African statesmen individually and collectively had sought to exercise some influence on events. Hammarskjöld and later President Kennedy and U Thant expressed the hope that the Black African states might play a constructive role in securing a political settlement of the Congo's turmoil. But the expectations of these officials rested on two assumptions, both of which proved unrealistic: that the African states could unite sufficiently to take a concerted approach toward the rival Congolese leaders, especially Tshombe and Lumumba, and that in matters of tactics and strategy African political figures would step aside in favor of U.S.-UN management. The initial response of the Africans to Hammarskjöld's principles for the operation of ONUC was favorable. Lacking military capabilities and a continental organization through which to act, African leaders endorsed a UN peacekeeping operation as a means of preventing direct superpower exploitation of the situation. Individual African statesmen took the lead in drafting Security Council resolutions that led to ONUC's establishment, and they contributed contingents quickly.

The Congo crisis soon threw the disagreements among African leaders into sharp relief. A central issue concerned the appropriate attitude for the UN to adopt toward Katanga's continued secession, and toward Tshombe personally. Severe differences separated Nkrumah and Touré, who wished to see the secession crushed, from representatives of the former French colonies, who were prone to regard the rebel leader as a bulwark against communism in Africa. This early divergence between the "conservative" Brazzaville group and the more "radical" Casa-

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blanca group proved to be the precursor of other cleavages that threatened to prevent the formation of an African regional organization. Neither grouping proved to be rigid in structure; the Brazzaville group itself split in August 1961. The military coups in Africa in 1965-1966 have produced new configurations, with Ghana now a "conservative" state in contrast to its earlier "radical" posture.

As conflict in the Congo persisted in 1961-1962, the activities of a more moderate group of African states, among them Nigeria, began to be prominent in Hammarskjöld's Advisory Committee and later in the UN Conciliation Commission. By the time the Addis Ababa conference convened to chart the course of the new African organization, it was apparent that the "bloc" configurations represented by Casablanca, Monrovia, and Brazzaville had become dysfunctional. Linked by the common but negative bond of anticolonialism, eager for a distinctively African association that would replace the imposed decentralization of the colonial era, the thirty-six states adopted a charter that revealed the need to avoid extreme positions. Faced with problems of internal security as well as of economic underdevelopment and the absence of a historical tradition of cooperation, the assemblage approved a constitutional document that placed emphasis on the legitimacy of existing regimes in Black Africa and the "illegality" of white-dominated governments in southern Africa.

Barely a year after its founding, the OAU was strained by the establishment of the Kasavubu-Tshombe government in July 1964. While Tshombe's return as head of a "Government of National Reconciliation" had been accomplished by legitimate means, he remained, for some African leaders at least, a "Belgian lackey" and a "white man's puppet." The Belgian-American airlift in November intensified the views of these dissenters. Prior to the rescue mission, the OAU's Conciliation Commission had failed in its efforts to negotiate the release of rebel-held prisoners in Kwilu and Kivu provinces. The vituperative Security Council debates on the airlift exposed cracks in the facade of African unity. The impotence of the OAU in circumstances of intraregional civil conflict was demonstrated unmistakably as Ghana, the UAR, and Algeria intervened on behalf of the rebels, while other African states urged a recognition of Tshombe's government. The Security Council's compromise resolution called for a conciliatory role for the OAU.[10] But as the time for ONUC's withdrawal neared, the African organization did not command enough respect to make its influence

[10] Security Council Resolution S/6129, December 30, 1964.

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felt, despite its pacific settlement procedures. African leaders, in failing to agree on the choice of a regime to govern the Congo or to endorse leaders already selected, prevented effective OAU participation.

V

In the Dominican Republic's lengthy civil strife the American military intervention shaped not only the course of the upheaval but also the responses of the OAS and the UN. The role of the United States throughout the course of the disorder was so pronounced, so predominant that some observers may question the utility of discussing the Dominican instance in the context of regional control of internal conflict. Yet it is precisely the way in which the U.S. used the OAS in an attempt to legitimize its own actions that gives the episode its importance.

From the initial stages, different characterizations of the circumstances leading to the American intervention were advanced by President Johnson, former Dominican President Juan Bosch, and competing Dominican forces engaged in the struggle.

The dispatch of American airborne units and Marine reinforcements to the Dominican Republic on April 28, 1965, was explained by President Johnson on that day as a measure to "give protection to hundreds of Americans who are still in the Dominican Republic and to escort them safely back to this country."[11] The same reason was cited in a letter dated April 29 sent to the President of the UN Security Council explaining the American action.[12] But on May 2, President Johnson, in answering widespread criticism of the intervention, stated that "the revolutionary movement took a tragic turn. Communist leaders, many of them trained in Cuba, seeing a chance to increase disorder, to gain a foothold, joined the revolution. They took increasing control. And what began as a popular democratic revolution, committed to democracy and social justice, very shortly moved and was taken over and really seized and placed into the hands of a band of Communist conspirators."[13] The President produced no evidence to support his assertion; but on May 5, the State Department released a list of fifty-five "Communist and Castroite" names to support the Johnson administration's claims of Communist takeover. The list, denounced by Bosch

[11] White House press release, April 28, 1965; reprinted in *Department of State Bulletin*, LII (May 17, 1965), 738.

[12] U.N. Doc. S/6310, April 29, 1965.

[13] White House press release, May 2, 1965; reprinted in *Department of State Bulletin*, LII (May 17, 1965), 744.

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and rebel leaders, was also ridiculed by other governments and individuals critical of the American action.

The extent of hemispheric hostility to the unilateral American intervention emerged when the United States sought to involve the OAS in a peacekeeping role. An American draft resolution calling for a cease-fire was adopted on April 30 by the Council of the OAS with no negative votes.[14] Similarly, a second draft resolution introduced by the U.S., in conjunction with Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru, at the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, a resolution calling for the establishment of an OAS committee to investigate "all aspects of the situation in the Dominican Republic" and to assist in the arrangement of a cease-fire, was adopted on May 1.[15] But prolonged negotiations were required to secure the adoption of an American draft resolution to establish an inter-American peacekeeping force. The creation of a regional military force, endorsed by the five-nation peace committee sent to Santo Domingo pursuant to the May 1 resolution, was opposed by Mexico, Uruguay, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru, states with social and political systems more advanced than those in many other Latin American states. These states, fearful that the American intervention might be a foretaste of other U.S. interventions in Latin American states experiencing domestic unrest, condemned the American action in the Dominican Republic and voted against the resolution. They decried the intervention as illegal under Article 17 of the OAS Charter[16] and scored the United States' failure to consult the OAS before taking its action. Their negative votes were not sufficient to defeat the plan; intensive behind-the-scenes discussions produced a bare two-thirds majority for the American proposal, as amended by five other Latin American states who recorded the view that approval of OAS intervention in the Dominican Republic should not be construed as approval of the initial American intervention. Venezuela abstained on the resolution.

Approved by thirteen states plus a representative of the Dominican Republic (although the country had no legitimate government at the time), the resolution provided for an international force to be estab-

[14] Resolution of the Council of the Organization of American States, April 30, 1965, U.N. Doc. S/6315, May 1, 1965.

[15] Resolution of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Organization of American States, May 1, 1965, U.N. Doc. S/6319, May 3, 1965.

[16] Article 17 of the OAS Charter states: "The territory of a state is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another state, directly or indirectly, under any grounds whatever."

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lished incorporating United States forces present in the Dominican Republic and units to be contributed by other members of the OAS. The resolution stipulated that the force would operate under the authority of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation and would have as its purpose "that of co-operating in the restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican Republic, in maintaining the security of its inhabitants and the inviolability of human rights, and in the establishment of an atmosphere of peace and conciliation that will permit the functioning of democratic institutions."[17] The Security Council, under Article 54 of the Charter,[18] was informed of passage of the OAS resolution, as it had been informed of other actions taken by the regional body in the Dominican conflict.

The preference of the United States government for OAS consideration of the Dominican disorder rather than United Nations involvement stemmed from America's dominant position in the OAS and its disinclination to encourage the Soviet Union or Cuba to exploit the American military presence on the island for propaganda purposes. Thus when the Security Council debated the Dominican question in sixteen meetings from May 3 to May 25, the American representative argued that the OAS should continue to exercise primary responsibility for attaining a permanent cease-fire and promoting a political solution to the disorder. In a series of statements to the Council, Adlai Stevenson defended the American intervention as necessary: "When hours and even minutes counted—there was no time for deliberate consultation and for the organization of international machinery which did not yet exist."[19] He repeated the claims of the U.S. government that its intervention was justified on humanitarian and legal grounds and stressed its interest in securing a settlement in accord with the wishes of the Dominican people.

The predictable Soviet and Cuban denunciations of the American position were echoed by British, Bolivian, and French criticisms. The United States succeeded in preventing the passage of a Security Council resolution that would have condemned its actions and given U Thant and the Council more extensive responsibilities in the Dominican con-

[17] Resolution of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Organization of American States, May 6, 1965, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/6333, Rev. 1, May 7, 1965.

[18] Article 54 states: "The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security."

[19] U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 1200, May 5, 1965, 12.

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flict. While debate in the OAS and the UN continued, the United States shifted its support from the military junta it had placed in power to a coalition regime, in a belated acknowledgment of the depth of non-Communist endorsement of the rebel cause. Throughout the next few months, the rebel forces continued to press for an enlarged UN role rather than OAS mediation, which they regarded as partial to the Dominican military forces manipulated by the United States. Each local party to the internal conflict sought to use one of the interested international organizations to advance its cause against its opponents.

The eventual settlement of the Dominican conflict, the establishment of a provisional government after a cease-fire, and the inquiries into violations of human rights took place under OAS aegis. Frequent reports of "confusion" between the regional body's functions and those of the UN observer on the scene were voiced in Security Council debates and in the press. U Thant on several occasions expressed concern over the precedents that the OAS actions might set for relationships between the UN and regional organizations. The Charter articles setting forth the desirable balance between regional and UN activities are ambiguous. They emphasize the need for Security Council authorization when regional enforcement action is undertaken, but they do not clarify what kinds of action shall be considered "enforcement." The United States, arguing that the OAS actions in the Dominican Republic did not constitute "enforcement," claimed the primacy of the regional organization. Apart from legal questions, the conflict raised, but did not resolve, a practical issue: the compatibility of functions between regional organizations and the UN in civil strife. Might it be desirable to consider allotting *peacekeeping* functions to one organization and *peacemaking* functions to the other? What function should each organization assume? Can a feasible combination be found?

The widespread distaste for the American intervention was evident as few Latin American countries endorsed a United States plan for a permanent inter-American peace force. Aside from Brazil, only the military dictatorships of Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay contributed troops; Costa Rica contributed police. The initial intervention raised doubts about the purposes of regional organization in the hemisphere; the subsequent establishment of the inter-American force and the OAS assumption of responsibilities for securing a specific settlement ran the risk of hindering the organization in the performance of other political tasks.

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VI

The capabilities of security pacts in circumstances of intraregional civil strife remain untested. When disturbances between the Greek and Turkish communities erupted on Cyprus in December 1963, it appeared that NATO might lead in the search for a settlement of the internal conflict. The British and American governments clearly preferred a regional approach to a global one. The British proposed a three-month, NATO-recruited peacekeeping force of 10,000 men under British command with political guidance from a committee of ambassadors, as well as the appointment of a mediator from a North Atlantic non-NATO country.

Turkey reluctantly assented to the plan, Greece accepted it with some reservations, but the Greek Cypriots rejected it. American support for the British plan was subject to temporary suspension of the two contested treaties and avoidance of any Security Council control. The U.S. hoped to prevent Soviet intrusion into the affair via Council vetoes. The Cypriot president, Archbishop Makarios, then demanded that the proposed force be made responsible to the Security Council, that Turkish troops be excluded from its composition, and that mediation be confined to Britain, Greece, and Turkey (with the Turkish Cypriot minority barred from the talks). He also urged that a Commonwealth force be established rather than a NATO one. Shortly thereafter, the United States yielded to Makarios' demand that the force be "linked" to the UN via "reports." After additional negotiations between U Thant, American and British officials, and the Archbishop, the U.S. abandoned its earlier position and, with Britain, endorsed an appeal to the Security Council.

Speculation on alternatives to the course adopted are worth pondering. Could the U.S. and British negotiators have given Makarios a choice of a NATO force or no force at all and risked Soviet intervention in the Cyprus dispute? Would Makarios have invited the Soviets to intervene directly, and would they have done so? Could the two Western powers have arranged to have the Council meet in order to authorize a force whose composition and instructions were agreed upon in advance by the parties? The Archbishop's refusal to accept a regional peacemaking force or continuation of the British force on Cyprus marked a defeat for Anglo-American diplomacy. It was clear that his rejection did not derive from the military deficiencies of these proposals but from his conviction that the UN would serve as the most reliable mechanism for realization of his internal political goals. Controlling

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eighty percent of the island's population, the Archbishop defined the problem as one of "self-determination" in an attempt to court the sympathies of the new states who might be expected to support anticolonialist positions in the General Assembly.

The evidence suggests that instances of a breakdown of law and order may pose the most intractable problems for regional organizations and for the UN. One issue that remains unsettled is the character of the desirable relationship between the two types of organization. Since it can be assumed that political rather than legal considerations are uppermost in the minds of policy-makers, any clarification of these ill-defined relationships that would require advance commitments to use one or the other type of organization first or exclusively appears remote. The demands placed on the UN in breakdowns of law and order are comparable to those placed on regional organizations when they become involved in similar conflicts. It is clear that rival local factions will attempt to use these organizations, against one another if necessary, in order to realize internal political aspirations. Also, it is apparent that the different members of regional organizations may disagree on the nature of outside threats or external control in individual conflicts and may withhold the support needed to promote collective peacekeeping actions or negotiations between disputants. As a result, it is possible that a regional organization may become overcommitted, politically, if its members cannot agree on a single candidate or group of individuals among many to perform the order-giving functions of government.

The efforts of regional organizations to foster peaceful solutions to internal disorders may be unrewarding if the type of settlement proposed ignores the fact that the very outbreak of violence indicates the lack of a national consensus needed for orderly government. Recommendations that call for the establishment of new political structures must take national histories and traditions into account. If a solution is proposed in regional decision-making councils that is not suited to the politics of the country in disorder, tensions may be exacerbated rather than eased. The more extensive the role of the international organization, the greater the uncertainties that hamper attempts to secure cease-fires and lasting accommodation between local adversaries. Less ambitious but no less desirable tasks for regional actors to perform in breakdowns of law and order include adequate fact-finding procedures and selective border-sealing or supervision while violence works itself out. These activities would be extremely valuable, given the frequent inability of the UN to undertake them. In addition, such responses would underscore the compatibility of regional and global approaches,

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a compatibility threatened by elaborate peacekeeping operations that appear competitive.

VII

The interests that have limited the effectiveness of international organizations in colonial wars and in conflicts involving a breakdown of law and order have assumed still greater proportions in proxy wars and conflicts involving charges of external aggression or subversion. The actions of third-party states—the superpowers in Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Lebanon, Laos, and Vietnam, and Egypt and Saudi Arabia in Yemen—have heightened the threat to regional and global stability when internal violence has erupted in these countries. International organizations as political institutions have represented at best a partial embodiment of national objectives for third parties. They have served chiefly as forums for debate and propaganda. Occasionally, the UN and regional organizations have undertaken investigations or observation missions, but patterns of response have developed excluding large-scale peacekeeping operations or responsibilities for obtaining political settlements.

The policy preferences of the United States and the Soviet Union continue to be crucial in determining whether regional and global approaches to these conflicts are perceived as compatible or competitive. Throughout the postwar period, American, Soviet, and, more recently, Chinese policy-makers have exercised wide discretionary powers in classifying internal conflicts as externally initiated, abetted, or controlled. Major U.S. foreign policy "doctrines"—the Truman, the Eisenhower, and the Johnson-Rusk—have had as a prime purpose the delineation of "subversive" threats or "aggressive" intentions that the United States commits itself to combat by whatever means—unilateral, regional, or multilateral—it selects. Similarly, Russian and Chinese policy statements have argued that "wars of national liberation" or "people's wars" against "imperialist oppressors" are not subject to international review procedures that might assess the legitimacy of interventions and counterinterventions. Since the Chinese leadership is not represented directly in the UN or in regional organizations, its doctrines and actions are removed still further from review than are those of the United States and the Soviet Union.

The superpowers, both in the UN and in their respective alliances, have adopted flexible criteria for estimating the dangers created by each other's interventions in internal conflicts. Understandably, security pacts have served as the most convenient vehicles for the super-

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powers in their efforts to legitimize interventionary courses of action. Yet the internal stresses and strains of their defense systems—NATO, SEATO, and the Warsaw Pact—have confronted the U.S. and the Soviet Union with the need to "go it alone" if they choose to intervene on a massive scale in conflicts like Vietnam. The increasing reluctance of formal allies to support superpower interventions in internal conflicts, of which Vietnam is the most notable example, has reduced one value of security pacts to the superpowers. At the same time, the lessened tension between the superpowers themselves has called the rationale of such alliances into question.

Throughout the postwar period, the superpowers have used a variety of instrumentalities to secure endorsement of their own policy goals as well as to prevent unfavorable shifts in the world balance of power. When internal conflicts involving charges of subversion or external aggression have appeared to presage detrimental shifts, the United States and the Soviet Union have employed security pacts and the UN to explain the selection of direct intervention, lesser forms of manipulation, or, in some cases, abstention. The United States used the UN, prior to NATO's formation, as the mechanism for exposing what it termed a Soviet-inspired foreign challenge to Greek independence and sovereignty. The announcement of the Truman Doctrine reaffirmed the already evident U.S. policy of meeting such challenges with unilateral or collective defense responses rather than with UN measures.

In the 1954 Guatemalan disorder, the U.S. successfully used the OAS as a Latin American NATO, while the Soviet Union argued for Security Council primacy. In the 1956 Hungarian uprising, the U.S., preoccupied with intra-NATO ramifications of the Suez crisis, used the UN as an instrument for expressing its desire to avoid intervention. The Soviet Union, defending its unilateral intervention in Hungary, cited the Warsaw Pact in a transparent effort to adduce "regional" legitimacy for its actions. In Lebanon, the U.S. approved UN observation, while it supported the incumbent Chamoun regime with a unilateral intervention.

Repeatedly, the superpowers have denounced each other's interventions or defended their own by referring to Article 51 of the UN Charter.[20] In no disorder has the tendency to allege "self-defense" against

[20] Article 51 states: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council

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"armed attack" produced greater controversy than in the Vietnam war.[21] In no instance has the failure to develop mandatory review procedures for arguments based on Article 51 been more dangerous. The United States, in asserting that infiltration from North Vietnam to assist insurgents constitutes "an armed attack" that justifies its large-scale intervention on behalf of incumbents in South Vietnam as "self-defense," has underscored the impotence of regional security pacts as well as the UN in proxy conflicts. Despite American attempts to place its intervention in a SEATO context, many states in the region, as well as outside it, have denied the validity of this characterization. Apart from the legal ramifications of such questionable arguments, the political consequences for international organizations are serious.

The absence of agreement on definitions of aggression, self-defense, and armed attack hinders, but need not preclude entirely, the development of review procedures in the UN or in regional organizations whereby member states might subject to careful scrutiny the claims and counterclaims made under Article 51. Without such scrutiny, unilateral interventions can continue to transform internal disorders into proxy wars with no chance of effective international regulation. With such procedures, the salience of regional organizations as centers for debate, conciliation, negotiation, or even selective interpositions would be enhanced.[22]

Clearly, it is in the interest of the developing countries to press for the institutionalization of review procedures since the larger powers cannot be expected to do so. Relevant discussion in the OAU and the OAS might demonstrate the compatibility of regional and global approaches in enforcing a pause in fighting during which parties could move toward negotiations. Collective defense arrangements, by definition, will tend to favor a revision or maintenance of the status quo favorable to one or the other superpower, an objective that may be incompatible with the aims of international organizations in specific instances. The Afro-Asian states and the Latin American states who wish to avoid client status may improve their chances by forming organizations that avoid alliance connotations.

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under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."

[21] For a lucid analysis of the legal aspects of American intervention in Vietnam, see Falk, "International Regulation of Internal Violence," 63-67.

[22] For a provocative discussion of this point, see Oran R. Young, *The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises* (Princeton 1967), chap. 3.

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VIII

The preceding discussion has emphasized the internal and external limitations that characterize the responses of regional organizations to civil strife. Some limitations—for example, restricted memberships, jurisdictions, and resources—are equally significant in attempts to regulate the three types of internal conflict considered. Others, especially ideological splits, may be more relevant to one type of conflict than to the other two. Colonial wars, internal conflicts involving a breakdown of law and order, and proxy wars and internal conflicts involving charges of subversion or external aggression confront regional organizations with demands they are not well equipped to meet. The line between the three types of disorders is fluid, of course. A colonial war may be but the first step toward a breakdown of law and order, and then a proxy war. The perceptions of leaders of third-party states rather than objective tests may be most important in determining the classification of internal conflicts and, hence, the compatibility or competitiveness of regional and global approaches. These approaches appear to be most compatible in the colonial wars and potentially most competitive in the breakdowns of law and order.

The coincident interest of global and regional organizations in proxy wars is the maximization of pressures that will restrain the superpowers, China, or smaller revisionist powers in the modernizing areas from counterinterventions in civil strife. The present resources of regional groupings like the OAU and OAS permit investigatory activities that present little risk and, too often, are of little value in civil strife. The resources of security pacts, on the other hand, are impressive militarily but of peripheral political value in promoting peaceful change in modernizing countries.

Barring desirable changes in the direction of stronger autonomous regional groupings, the prevailing pattern of *ad hoc* responses to internal conflict is likely to persist. A restructuring of regional organization would facilitate the regulation of internal conflict on a subglobal basis. As already suggested, the smaller states, whose territories are targets for competitive unilateral interventions, might well take the lead in establishing new organizations that exclude the superpowers from membership. But if countries in disorder are to avoid foreign interventions, third-party states must exercise greater restraint in using internal conflicts for the achievement of national policy goals. Both changes in the international system are desirable for purposes of conflict management. Both are feasible only if a large number of states give priority to them.

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THE POLITICAL RELATION OF THE VILLAGE TO THE STATE

By HARUMI BEFU*

I. Introduction

ALMOST everywhere in the world man lives in communities, and a vast majority of these communities are not independent political entities but are subject to political control from above. When village communities are under the control of a central authority, there necessarily arises the problem of working out a political relationship between the local communities and the central authority. This relationship is, of course, far from uniform. The modest state of the aboriginal Fiji, where the ruler has little more power than to demand tributes, is a far cry from the modern state of Communist China, which controls practically every sphere of peasant life. A question arises then as to what determines the variation in the political relationships between the village community and the central authority and within the village's internal political structure. The purpose of this article is to explore these determinants and examine their consequences for the village community as a political entity.

It will be assumed for the purpose of this article that the nature of the village-state relationship, as well as that of the internal village political structure, will be a function of (1) the nature of the state and (2) factors within the village community. For the first variable, three broad types of state—primitive, classical, and modern—will be recognized on the basis of relative evolutionary development, political complexity, and goals of the state. For the second variable, I have selected the role of kinship in the overall village structure and patterns of allocation of critical subsistence resources as major factors affecting the nature of a village's polity. Though perhaps not directly causally related, these two variables are assumed to have a general correlation, so that as the political superstructure evolves from primitive to classical to modern, the role of kinship and patterns of economic allocation in a village com-

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munity also change. The nature of the village polity, then, is affected by both external and internal factors.

Before the substantive part of this discussion, a few words of methodological caution are in order. First, the three types of state and the three types of village-state relationship are suggested here not as categories neatly subsuming all empirical cases, but as ideal types—heuristic concepts—devised to facilitate analysis of the problem. Second, this article will limit its discussion to those features of political structure that are *formally institutionalized* as part of the normative political system. Covert or informal systems of power relations, such as the *cacicasmo* of Mexico[1] or the *oyabun-kobun* system of Japan,[2] interesting as they may be, cannot be considered here. Third, since this is an exploratory attempt at outlining the general features of village polity in relation to the central authority, the article presents broad outlines rather than detailed analysis of any one segment of political structure, say, judicial processes in criminal cases. Fourth, this article merely proposes a hypothesis, or rather a series of hypotheses, concerning the relationship between the local community and the state; it does not intend to be a test or demonstration of a proposition.

II. The Primitive State

The primitive state, as the term is used here, is characterized by the presence of some centralized political authority above the local community which integrates several such units. But the term is limited to those states in which cultural elaboration has not reached the level of civilization, that is, a level at which the political elites—with their distinct style of life—are clearly demarcated from village populations (as will be elaborated upon in the next section). Thus the category includes, for instance, what Eisenstadt has called "centralized chiefdoms"[3] and Vansina's African kingdoms,[4] but generally excludes acephalous, autonomous villages and segmentary societies.

In primitive states, kinship or other particularistic relations play an important role not only in organizing the political leaders into a hierarchy but also in linking the rulers with the ruled. As a consequence, the villages have a feeling of identity with their rulers. At this primi-

[1] Paul Friedrich, "A Mexican Cacicazgo," *Ethnology*, IV (April 1965), 190-209.
[2] John W. Bennett and Iwao Ishino, *Paternalism in the Japanese Economy* (Minneapolis 1962).
[3] S. N. Eisenstadt, "Primitive Political Systems," *American Anthropologist*, LXI (April 1959), 210.
[4] Jan Vansina, "A Comparison of African Kingdoms," *Africa*, XXXII (October 1962), 324-35.

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tive level, political activities of the rulers, such as taxation, conscription, public works, and adjudication, tend to be minimal, compared with those of the classical or modern state, and they are not felt to be onerous by the people. At this level, as Fallers has argued, the villagers and the ruling elites are on the whole culturally homogeneous.[5] Although there is some degree of cultural difference between the rulers and the ruled in the primitive state, this difference is not so pronounced as in the civilizations of Europe or Asia. This relative lack of cultural contrast between the ruling elites and the rest of the society means that the populace, correspondingly, feel little ambivalence or distrust toward their political leaders, and they do not feel they are being judged from above by a set of standards to which they cannot attain. The political superstructure of the primitive state tends to be relatively simple. Without writing—that important hallmark of civilization—development of bureaucracy tends to be minimal. Activities and organizations needed for such bureaucratic tasks as accurate and elaborate record-keeping, reference to written records, transcription of rules and regulations, documentation of events, and so on, are thus absent.

The extent to which a given case fits this characterization of the primitive state varies a great deal. In some states, e.g., those that Service calls "chiefdoms,"[6] the control the chief can exercise is limited to demanding tributes and corvée, and the amount of such control is extremely circumscribed. On the other hand, in more elaborate states such as the Interlacustrine kingdoms of Africa, rulers can be quite as despotic as those of classical states. The latter examples, in fact, approach the classical type on the primitive-classical-modern continuum suggested here.

Let us now turn to the political structure of the village under the primitive state. Some of the features of this structure are consequences of the nature of the state outlined above; others are a direct outcome of factors at work within the village; and still others result from interaction between these two systems.

A village community of this level is composed of a kinship group or, more likely, of a number of kinship groups, to which distant kin or strangers may be attached. Of course, the structure of kinship groups varies from one society to another: it may be patrilineal, matrilineal, ambilineal, and so on. But whatever the form of kinship group, however many groups there may be in a village, and whatever other prin-

[5] L. A. Fallers, "Are African Cultivators To Be Called 'Peasants'?" *Current Anthropology*, II (April 1961), 110.

[6] Elman R. Service, *Primitive Social Organization* (New York 1962), 143-77.

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ciples of organization there may be, kinship remains the basis of the village structure. As a consequence, the leadership—in fact, the whole political structure of the village—is primarily based on the structure of kinship in the village. The village has no special subsystem for political activities; instead, the framework of kinship organization serves as a basis for organizing these activities. Generally speaking, one dominant kin group plays the leading political role in the village and supplies its political leaders, such as the village headman. This is true, for example, of the Ashanti, Moala, Ngoni, Ngwato, and Soga.[7] Speaking of the Soga village, Fallers states: "Kinship institutions are intimately bound up with village structure in two ways. First, the position of village or sub-village headman is in most areas hereditary. . . . It is inherited in the patrilineal line and is under the control of the succession lineage. Thus, as the Soga say, the village or sub-village is 'owned' by a lineage group. Second, where the population of a village or sub-village has remained stable, all of its members tend to be related to one another by ties of near or extended kinship. The village or sub-village becomes a network of kinship relations, and relations among its members tend to be structured in kinship terms."[8]

Another important "internal" consideration, in addition to kinship, is the ecological adaptation of villagers. When adaptation to the environment requires shifting residence from place to place and when a subsistence economy is carried on by individual families rather than cooperatively by the entire village, the headman's power tends to be weak, for when geographical movement is possible, villagers can leave their village if the headman is too demanding or tyrannical and go to another village where the headman is more congenial. On the other hand, in societies in which change of residence is impossible for all practical purposes—owing to scarcity of land, for example—the headman can exercise a greater amount of control over his villagers without fear of losing them. Thus among the Anuak, Lozi, Tonga, and Yao of Africa, where people move about a great deal, the headman's power is relatively weak.[9] In fact, his primary concern is how to retain his

[7] See, for the Ashanti, K. Busia, *The Position of the Chief Among the Ashanti* (London 1951), 63; for the Moala, Marshall D. Sahlins, *Moala* (Ann Arbor 1962), 295-96; for the Ngoni, Margaret Read, *The Ngoni of Nyasaland* (London 1956), 19-21; for the Ngwato, I. Schapera, "The Political Organization of the Ngwato of Bechuanaland Protectorate," in M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, eds., *African Political Systems* (London 1940), 58; for the Soga, L. A. Fallers, *Bantu Bureaucracy* (Cambridge 1956), 97.

[8] *Bantu Bureaucracy*, 97.

[9] See, for the Anuak, Godfrey Lienhardt, "Anuak Village Headmen," *Africa*, XXVII (October 1957), 341-55, and XXVIII (January 1958), 23-36; for the Lozi, Max Gluckman,

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villagers. What Easton has called "marshalling of support" becomes one of the most pressing problems of the village headman in this situation.[10]

In integrating the village with the central authority, as mentioned earlier, kinship and other particularistic bonds play a crucial role. This bond is sometimes putative or symbolic rather than actual; it nonetheless provides a tie, a sense of identity that positively unites the ruling authority with villagers. This bond does not, to be sure, always tie the lowliest to the highest ruler of the state. The tie might extend only partway up the political hierarchy. Still, it helps in integrating the ruling class with the ruled and in articulating the village with the political superstructure of the state. This bond may be provided through the headman of the village, who has a kinship or clientship relation to a political official above him, as in Busoga.[11] Or it may be, as among the Lozi, provided by marriage between the ruling royalties and the commoners.[12]

The headman of a village does serve as a representative of the state, e.g., in collecting tax, organizing corvée, or transmitting messages from above. But such duties are seldom onerous in villages of the primitive state. Nor is his duty as a representative of his villagers vis-à-vis the state very important, though he does have such tasks as accompanying the villagers when they must appear at courts outside the village. Villages at this level are relatively autonomous units, suffering little interference from the state. Political "output" of the state down to the villages and political "input" from the villages up to the state are both relatively limited.[13] The headman's role as a "systemic link" between two social systems is not very important at this stage.[14]

It is for this reason that, at this political level, there seldom is more

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"Kinship and Marriage Among the Lozi of Northern Rhodesia and the Zulu of Natal," in A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and D. Forde, eds., *African Systems of Kinship and Marriage* (London 1950), 166-206; for the Tonga, E. Colson, "The Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia," in E. Colson and M. Gluckman, eds., *Seven Tribes of British Central Africa* (London 1951), 94-163; for the Yao, J. Clyde Mitchell, "The Yao of Southern Nyasaland," in Colson and Gluckman, 292-353.

[10] David Easton, "Political Anthropology," in Bernard J. Siegel, ed., *Biennial Review of Anthropology* (Stanford 1959), 229-35.

[11] Fallers, *Bantu Bureaucracy*, 155.

[12] Max Gluckman, "The Lozi of Barotseland in Northwestern Rhodesia," in Colson and Gluckman, 76-78.

[13] David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," *World Politics*, IX (April 1957), 383-400.

[14] For elaboration of the concept of systemic link, see Charles P. Loomis, "Systemic Linkage of El Cerrito," *Rural Sociology*, XXIV (March 1959), 54-57; and Edward Hassinger, "Social Relations Between Centralized and Local Social Systems," *Rural Sociology*, XXVI (December 1961), 354-64.

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than one village official—usually the headman—who is sanctioned by the state. This does not mean that there are not other political offices in the village community. Some societies do have, for example, a council of elders or lieutenants who informally perform political duties, usually to assist the headman. But these offices, though sanctioned by the tradition of the village community, are not part of the political organization of the state.

The headman's role in relation to his villagers is far more critical than his role as a link to the state. The most important source of his power is his position as the leader of his kin group.[15] Whatever other attributes the headman may have, without the support of his kinsmen he is powerless. One of the most important political functions of the headman is adjudication of civil and criminal cases. In civil cases, his role is more that of a conciliator, trying to arrive at some mutually agreeable settlement, than that of an administrator of impersonal justice. In case his decision does not satisfy either party, the dissatisfied party usually has the right to appeal the case to a higher court. Minor criminal cases are settled by the village court, but more serious crimes must be brought to the attention of a higher tribunal. Disputes between members of different villages are considered matters for higher authority, and institutionalized means of settlement are generally available.

Recruitment to the office of the village headman is an internal matter with no interference from above. The position may be created initially through appointment of a district chief's kinsman or client as headman. But once the position is established, succession to the office rarely is interfered with by a political superior, since the state is by and large unconcerned about village affairs and makes little demand on villages. The headmanship is not necessarily hereditary, however, though one tends to associate primitive societies with ascriptive recruitment. In societies where the population is mobile, the headmanship is an achieved position, won by gaining the support of a majority of the villagers. Lienhardt discusses the intense competition in Anuak villages for headmanship, with the deposed headman moving to another village in exile.[16]

At this stage, the headmanship is a spare-time position.[17] The headman engages in subsistence economy, much as his fellow villagers do, in order to support himself and his family. He may or may not receive

[15] For illustrations from Africa, see Max Gluckman, J. C. Mitchell, and J. A. Barnes, "The Village Headman in British Central Africa," *Africa*, XIX (April 1949), 89-106.

[16] "Anuak Village Headmen."

[17] Harumi Befu, "Spare-Time Specialist," *American Anthropologist*, LXVI (February 1964), 140-41.

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compensation for his official duties. If he does, the compensation is usually more symbolic than substantial.

In sum, village communities of societies at the primitive level find the basis of political integration in kinship. In fact, kinship is so important at this level that it may even be said that the village as a political entity is meaningful primarily in terms of its kinship structure. Another important factor in the village's political structure, in addition to kinship, is the absence of interference from above. Villages are by and large left alone to carry on their own internal affairs. This relative autonomy of the village is based on the corresponding lack of authority of the primitive state: that is, at this level, the norm of the society does not allow the state, for example, to send troops into villages to enforce its law. It will be seen that this is in great contrast to the situation in the classical state.

III. The Classical State

The classical state is characterized by cultural differentiation, social separation, and political opposition between the ruling elites and the mass. Culturally, an elaborate development of the "high culture" or the "great tradition" as a way of life of the rulers separates them from the peasants, who partake of, at best, a folk version of the high culture. For example, the culture of the rulers involves extensive use of literacy, knowledge of the classics and other esoteric forms of art, possession of material wealth, and so on, whereas the peasants are illiterate or only semiliterate, possess little knowledge of arts and letters, and have a much lower standard of living. Associated with this cultural differentiation is the social separation of the elites from the mass, resulting in the elites' indifference toward the welfare of the peasants. Politically, the rulers develop autonomous political goals that are divorced from the interest of the mass, e.g., territorial unification and expansion, conquest, enrichment of the polity, economic development, and maintenance or expansion of a given cultural pattern.[18]

As far as their relation to the peasantry is concerned, the rulers have two major objectives: economic exploitation of the peasants and enforcement of law and order in the villages. These are the two most important, and the almost exclusive, concerns of the state in relation to peasants; indeed, in many classical states the only time peasants come in direct contact with the state is when taxes have to be paid and when a serious crime is committed in the village. This is attested to by Shimizu's and Martin Yang's comments on China, Srinivasan's on

[18] S. N. Eisenstadt, *Political Systems of Empires* (New York 1963), 116.

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India, and Befu's and Steiner's on late feudal (Tokugawa) Japan.[19] In Yang's words, "Formerly, if the land taxes were paid and no criminal case which had to be referred to the law courts occurred, the village and the government had little to do with each other."

For the attainment of these objectives, rulers of the classical state make use of the political structure and its incipient bureaucratic organization, which, as Eisenstadt points out, are well developed at this level.[20] The first of these two objectives is by far the more important, for the treasury of the classical state is almost entirely dependent upon the revenues derived from villages. Smith, for example, flatly states that, in China, "of the affairs which concern the government, the most important is the imperial land or grain-tax. . . ."[21] Rulers accomplish this goal by requiring the peasants to contribute time, skill, labor, or products thereof. It goes without saying that these various taxes are not only substantial in amount but are in some cases oppressively great. (Taxation of such large proportions is possible in classical states partly because peasants are expected by tradition, if not required by law, to maintain a standard of living far below that of the rulers, surrendering as tax any surplus created.)

The second major concern of the classical state as regards the peasantry is maintenance of peace in its territory. Use of force at this stage is more effectively monopolized by the state than at the previous stage, and any use or attempted use of force by private individuals is considered criminal. This means that categories of acts that are legally defined as criminal are much more numerous and more detailed than in primitive states. For reasons to be given below, however, the classical state cannot completely achieve this second objective. As we shall see, it is this weakness of the state that the village polity takes advantage of in asserting its corporateness. Another important consideration with regard to definition of crime at the classical stage is that the rulers who define what constitutes crime and who dispense justice are culturally removed from the peasants. Consequently, their system of values, upon which definition of crime and a concept of justice are based, is alien to the peasants.

[19] Shimizu Morimitsu, *Shina shakai no kenkyū* [*Studies on Chinese Society*] (Tokyo 1939), 203; Martin Yang, *A Chinese Village* (New York 1945), 186; N. Srinivasan, "Village Government in India," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, XV (February 1956), 203; Harumi Befu, "Village Autonomy and Articulation With the State," *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXV (November 1965), 19-32; Kurt Steiner, *Local Government in Japan* (Stanford 1965), 13.

[20] *Political Systems of Empires.*

[21] Arthur H. Smith, *Village Life in China* (New York 1899), 228.

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The goals of the state as defined here are not only foreign to the interest of the peasantry, but are inimical to it. The ruling elites can further their goals only through economic exploitation of the peasantry and maintenance of law and order as defined by their own value system. These goals are further inimical to the interest of the peasantry because, unlike the modern state discussed below, the classical state does not attempt to balance what it takes from peasants with any state activity from which peasants might benefit. If, therefore, the peasants resist giving, the rulers are likely to use force rather than persuasion in taking what is due them. It is in part this imbalance between what the state takes from the peasantry and the little that the peasantry gets in return that creates the hostility toward ruling elites that is so common among peasants of the classical state. Moreover, as stated above, the legal system imposed upon peasants from above is based on an alien value system that has little meaning to them; this situation further helps create a feeling of hostility.[22]

Sometimes territories under colonial control present essentially the same condition as that in the classical state. The political, social, and cultural disparities between rulers and the ruled are even more accentuated in a colonial situation. Here the rulers are foreigners whose "high culture" has nothing in common with the native culture. For example, Fraser writes of Rusembilan, a Malay village under the foreign Thai government: "Because they were, in a sense, a conquered people and because a system of government suitable for Thai villages was imposed upon their culturally different society, the Malays tended to dislike and fear the power of the men who were sent to administer them. Although at present the villager has almost no contact with any part of the administrative hierarchy above his local district and relatively little at the district level, he resents what he feels to be a superior and discriminatory attitude on the part of the officials."[23] Social distance is sometimes even consciously maintained between colonial administrators and natives, and economic exploitation of the colony for the benefit of the colonial power, through the instrument of the colonial administration, is often a major objective of the colonial rulers. To the extent that these conditions prevail in colonial territories, generalizations in this section apply to colonial villages.[24]

[22] Such an antagonistic relationship between rulers and peasants in medieval France is vividly described in Robert T. and Barbara G. Anderson, *Bus Stop for Paris* (Garden City 1965), 114-18.

[23] Thomas M. Fraser, *Rusembilan, A Malay Fishing Village in South Thailand* (Ithaca 1960), 93.

[24] Some colonial governments, however, are actively attempting to modernize their

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Given these characteristics of the classical state, let us see what sort of relationship obtains between the state and the village and how the village political structure is organized. Because collection of taxes and maintenance of peace are such important objectives, it is common for states of this stage to impose some responsibility upon the village for their execution. Usually, the headman of the village is held responsible for both tax collection and maintenance of law and order. In these capacities, he is delegated to represent the state and empowered to enforce state-instituted regulations. Since he is now a state representative, recruitment to this office requires at least tacit approval of the state. It is not likely that the state will attempt direct control of the village, e.g., by creating a tax-collector's office.

Internally, the village community at this stage is a much more significant social and political unit than it is at the primitive state level. Correspondingly, kinship is no longer as important in providing a basis for the political structure of the village as it is in the primitive state; and it is even less important in relating the village to the supravillage political structure. This is not to deny the place of kinship in village polity entirely: kinship does play a significant role, but it no longer is the sole critical factor; at this stage, there are factors of social differentiation other than kinship. Occupational groups, caste groups, and social classes based on economic conditions (such as differential landholding), for example, develop at this stage, reducing kinship to only one of several structural alignments in the village. Moreover, none of these alignments is politically as crucial as the village as a corporate entity. It is no accident, then, that the so-called "closed corporate peasant communities," such as those described by Wolf, are typically found in nations that exhibit the character of the classical state or in those that are just moving from the classical to the modern level, such as Mexico and Indonesia.[25]

It is precisely because the village is the fundamental building block of the society that the state so often treats the village as the basic fiscal unit in its administrative structure.

Economically, the peasants under the classical state are much more

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colonies. To the extent that modernizing processes, discussed in the section on the modern state, are present in colonies, villages in such colonies resemble those in modern states. In many actual cases, one inevitably encounters colonies or former colonies that are in some respects classical and in others modern as far as the relation of the village to the ruling authority is concerned.

[25] Eric Wolf, "Types of Latin American Peasantry," *American Anthropologist*, LVII (June 1955), 452-71, and "Closed Corporate Peasant Community in Mesoamerica and Central Java," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, XIII (Spring 1957), 1-18.

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oppressed by the scarcity of subsistence resources than are the cultivators under the primitive state. At the classical level, possession of such resources, particularly land, becomes an obsessive problem for peasants. Agriculture is much more intensive, and change of residence is now well-nigh an impossibility. Peasants are bound to the particular land where they are born and raised. This factor enhances the importance of the village as a social unit. In some societies, communal ownership of economic resources, such as forest land, or communal management of, say, the irrigation system serves as an added factor in integrating the village. All these economic considerations have important political implications in that as the village community gains economic importance, there arises a differential allocation of the power and right to make decisions concerning these economic affairs. Herein lies the crucial importance of the peasant village as a political entity.

The village community is corporate in the classical society not only because of these internal factors just considered, but also because of the policies and attitudes of the rulers. As was already mentioned, as long as peasants pay their tax and maintain relative peace, rulers are not concerned with how peasants live. This lack of concern with the welfare of peasants is another consequence of the social removal of the ruling elites from the peasantry and the cultural difference between them which prevents the elites from understanding and appreciating the hardship of peasant life resulting from the rulers' very exploitation. Left alone by default, by the rulers' lack of concern, peasant villages are forced to look after their own welfare. Toward this end, the village polity performs a critical function.

The village as a political corporation has several important functions. It protects its interest against neighboring villages and other outsiders. It is true that at this level of political development the intervillage relationship is officially defined by the state, so that any disputes between villages are required to be settled by a higher authority. However, partly because of the lack of sufficient interest on the part of the state and partly because of the strong feeling of "campanilismo," it is quite likely that villages will settle disputes with one another by taking up arms rather than by taking the matter to a court.

Maintenance of its own internal peace and security is a second important political function of the village. Since the state does not interfere with village affairs except in cases of major crimes, it is the function of the village polity to police the community and maintain peace.

In legal spheres, too, the village polity attempts to settle internal problems, such as disputes between its members, without recourse to

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higher authority.[26] This is often true even when such recourse is available and even when the law of the state requires that a case—such as a homicide—be turned over to a higher court, as is reported by Hickey in a Vietnamese village and by Fraser in a Malay village.[27] A village's taking the law into its own hands, so to speak, is a result of at least three factors. First, the state is generally not interested in administering justice if the case seems trivial in the eyes of the rulers, even though it may be important to a given peasant or a certain village. Second, because of the poor transportation and communication facilities of preindustrial societies, the authority may not be readily accessible and therefore always dependable in time of crisis. Third, peasants do not always trust the rulers in administering justice, for, as stated above, the rulers' standard of judgment is often at variance with that of peasants.

In addition to protecting the village from neighboring villages and maintaining law and order within its boundaries, the village polity has a third task as yet little explored by students of peasantry, that of protecting the village from encroachment by the state. Since in its relations with its villages the state is mainly concerned with exploitation of peasants, its policy toward villages tends to be oppressive and despotic. Thus it sometimes becomes necessary for the village polity to guard against the threat of the state's overexploitation.

In villages of the classical state, there often are political offices other than the headmanship, such as the headman's assistant or a council of elders. But still the headman is the most important village official—particularly in the eyes of the constituted authority. It is he who receives and transmits any message or new legislation from the government to villagers. It is also he who is held responsible for the acts of his villagers. As mentioned above, the state must approve the choice of a new headman. This is a way of ensuring that he is a man the government can trust, as well as a way of symbolizing both that the state has power over its smallest constituent units (villages) and also that the headman is a representative of the state. Nevertheless, the headman is a member of his village before he is a government official. His first loyalty is to his fellow villagers rather than to the state.

This Janus-like role puts the village headman of a classical state in a dilemma that his counterpart in a primitive state seldom encounters. At the primitive state level, there are few occasions when the interest

[26] See Martin Yang; and M. N. Srinivas, "The Social Structure of a Mysore Village," in McKim Marriott, ed., *India's Villages* (1955), 30-31.

[27] Gerald C. Hickey, *Village in Vietnam* (New Haven 1964), 195; Fraser, 106.

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of the state and that of the village are in conflict. Second, the village is not as crucially important a social unit as kinship structure is. Third, through kinship or some other particularistic ties, local units often have positive bonds with higher political authorities. In the classical state, on the other hand, the village is the corporate unit *par excellence,* and there are few and only tenuous positive articulating bonds between the village and the state. Moreover, the interest of the state and that of the village are in conflict. The headman, standing between these inimical units, is thus in a predicament. On the one hand, his sentiment and loyalty make him side with his villagers; on the other hand, he is obliged to act as a representative of the state. This problem of the headman is aggravated in a colonial situation, as Gluckman and Southwold point out, where the indigenous values of the village have little in common with the values of the foreign rulers (or, in a postcolonial situation, with the values of the native government, which are heavily colored by those of the former foreign rulers).[28]

The headman and other officials of the village are practically never outsiders brought into the village by the state. The bureaucratic structure of the state—with appointment of officials from above, recruitment on the basis of competence, and rotation of posts from one region to another—ceases at some level above the village. In the village, officials are almost all native-born. It is important to realize that the classical state, with all its power and authority, still has to rely on the traditional and indigenous power structure of the village in articulating the state with the villages, as I have shown with respect to late feudal Japan.[29]

The headman's position tends to be either part-time or spare-time. He may receive some compensation for the performance of his official duties, in such forms as a fixed salary or tax exemption; but usually such compensation is not enough to support his family at the level he is expected to maintain. But the village of a classical state is generally a stratified community, in which leaders are recruited from among the wealthier or more established families. The headman is thus in a position to spare some of his time for political duties while leaving the management of the family property to other members of the family, to a trusted manager, or to tenants who work the headman's land, as in Punjab.[30]

[28] Gluckman, Mitchell, and Barnes, 93-94; Martin Southwold, "Leadership, Authority and the Village Community," in L. A. Fallers, ed., *The King's Men* (London 1964), 231.

[29] "Duty, Reward, Sanction and Power—Four-Cornered Office of the Tokugawa Village Headman," in Bernard Silberman and H. D. Harootunian, eds., *Modern Japanese Leadership* (Tucson 1966).

[30] Zekiye Eglar, *A Punjabi Village in Pakistan* (New York 1960), 31.

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Village elites are likely to have and to exercise a good deal more power than their counterparts in a primitive state. For one thing, because of the relative lack of freedom for villagers to change residence, it is not necessary for the headman to devote much effort to soliciting their support, as is sometimes the case under the primitive state. The headman under a classical state normally has "captive" subjects. In addition, it is extremely difficult, practically speaking, to oust the headman and replace him with another.

Since the headman and his assistants, as the sole links with the state, have a much more direct and often personal tie with the government authority immediately above the village than do ordinary villagers, it is difficult for villagers to register their complaints against their own village officials.[31] Moreover, if the headman is malicious enough to have caused his villagers' complaints, he is likely also to have bribed the immediate superior, making it even more difficult for ordinary peasants to make their grievances felt and for solutions to be brought about.

A major difference between the primitive state and the classical state is that in the former the state's institutionalized power to intrude into village affairs is weak, and the state does not interfere, whereas in the latter the institutionalized power of the state, i.e., the right of the state to interfere with the local community, is enormous—the state has legitimate authority and power to interfere with village affairs if it wishes. But at the same time, such interference is rare; the state leaves villages to manage their own affairs most of the time.

The political relation of the village to the state at this level is quite different in kind from that at the primitive level.[32] The crucial difference lies in the facts that the great polity (the state) and the little polity (the village) are in inimical relationship and that the little polity manages to maintain its relative autonomy because the great polity, for reasons stated above, fails to exercise its full authority. Because of the potentiality of state interference and because of the antagonistic relationship between the great and little polities, the village headman, mediating between them, is in a difficult position.

[31] This is a point Karl Wittfogel makes in his *Oriental Despotism* (New Haven 1957), 119.

[32] I differ with Fallers ("African Cultivators," 109) and Service (*Primitive Social Organization*, 175) in this regard. Both these writers tend to see what I have called the primitive state and the classical state to be essentially the same. Fallers, in particular, considers the village-state relationship in pagan Africa and in civilizational Europe and Asia to be quite alike.

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IV. The Modern State

In its relation to its villages, the modern state differs from the classical state in several important respects. The modern state is characterized by industrial technology, by an effort to obliterate the divergence between the political goals of the state and those of the village, and by a gradual appropriation of the political power of the village. In Eisenstadt's words, modern political systems "are characterized by the weakening of the distinction between the goals of the rulers and the political aspirations of the ruled, and by the development of types of political institutions and processes directed toward incorporating the social and political aspirations of different groups into the goals of the polity."[33]

Economically, the modern state is characterized by industrialism and all it implies. Of course, industrial complexes are initially of minor scale and are established near urban centers, so that their effects upon villages are at first negligible. But soon, as their scale expands, rural areas become involved in a market economy in which cash is needed for the purchase of necessary goods and in which certain necessities of daily life must come from outside. Development of systems of communication and networks of transportation is also concomitant with industrialization, and these are factors that further lessen the ingrown character of the village and widen the social and political horizons of peasants.

Ideologically, a current of nationalism sweeps across the nation, so that peasants identify themselves with political leaders in the common cause of demonstrating to other nations their nation's independence or in winning independence from colonial rulers. The effort of the government to spread literacy and formal education among the populace is at least in part aimed at achieving this goal. Such "political socialization" is probably going on most thoroughly in socialist states, as evidenced in C. K. Yang's study of Chinese villages under communism.[34]

Politically, the government begins to affect more and more areas of life, gradually replacing the traditional political structure of the village with a structure of its own creation. As Ward puts it, in reference to village government in Asia: "A significant measure of centralization and depersonalization of authority, an increase in the ambit of governmental interests, planning and regulatory action, and a concomitant diminution of the sphere of local autonomy and free unpoliticized activity are inevitable attributes of the process termed modernization.

[33] *Political Systems of Empires*, 368.
[34] *A Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition* (Boston 1959).

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Where village government is concerned, this means increased central supervision, intervention and control."[35]

But the process of assuming power is a gradual one. In the meantime, the traditional village polity and the newly introduced political machineries of the government are in competition. In modern Turkey, the village authority is still more respected than are government officials. When authority is split, "respected authority lies with the authority bearer belonging to the community rather than with the government official. . . ."[36] Similarly, "for many years after British administration was established in Busoga, the changes introduced made relatively little impression upon the position of the [village] headmen."[37] And in fact, the headmen in Busoga refused to be part of the new administrative fiscal system when it was introduced in 1936.

In the area of law, what constitutes a crime or tort is more and more formally defined by the central government, and the customary law becomes less and less effective. Adjudication of civil and criminal cases increasingly becomes a function of the courts established by the central government; correspondingly, traditional means of dispute settlement by the village headman or elders become obsolete. In the transitional period, peasants, while having both the traditional means and the newly instituted ways of settling disputes, will increasingly resort to the newer method, as Ayoub shows in regard to conflict resolution in modern Lebanon.[38] Intervillage disputes can no longer be settled privately by taking up arms. The classical state, though formally prohibiting armed conflict, ignores it so long as it occurs on a small scale; the modern state prohibits it both formally and in practice.

In this process of appropriation of power, the state no longer is satisfied merely with giving approval to the villagers' selection of their headman. It now imposes a whole host of political offices that villages must accept. Introduction of the panchayat system with greatly extended power in post-independence India and passage of the Local Autonomy Law by the central government in Japan are such examples. The very reason that we can speak of *the* local political institution in modern India or modern Japan is in part the fact that there is uniformity in this institution resulting from national legislation. This

[35] Robert E. Ward, "Introduction to Village Government in Eastern and Southern Asia: A Symposium," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, XV (February 1956), 178.

[36] C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze, "The Near Eastern Village: A Profile," *Middle East Journal*, XVI (Summer 1962), 305.

[37] Fallers, *Bantu Bureaucracy*, 173.

[38] Victor F. Ayoub, "Conflict Resolution and Social Reorganization in a Lebanese Village," *Human Organization*, XXIV (Spring 1965), 11-17.

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uniformity is in contrast to the political system of the village in classical states, where the local political institution is to a large extent a product of the natural evolution of the village polity in its cultural context. The process of the modern state's "usurpation" of power from villages is seen in its most extreme form in socialist states. There, appropriation of local autonomy, direct intervention, imposition of administrative structure, and so on, are most obvious.[39]

It is in the state's penetration to the peasant level that modern, particularly socialist, states differ fundamentally from the "oriental" or "hydraulic" despotic powers of the classical variety, in which the power of the state did not ordinarily reach the grass-roots level.[40] We may contrast the classical state with the modern state by saying that in the classical state the village claims the power that legitimately belongs to the state, whereas in the modern state the state claims the power that traditionally has belonged to the village.

While taking autonomy away from villages, the modern state tries to balance what it takes with something given in return. Ward states: "Having emancipated themselves from colonial or feudal controls in the not-too-distant past and being presently committed in every case to a democratic philosophy of government, all of the national governments concerned feel some obligation to provide at the local level institutions which will to a varying extent ascertain or effectuate the peoples' political desire."[41]

Community development programs, land reforms, public health measures, rural reconstruction projects are all aimed at this objective. At the same time, the interest of the people is represented in the government, though perhaps not very effectively, through popularly elected representatives, in a way it never is in a classical state. This form of political input gradually increases as peasants realize that such input can affect the political output of the government and can thus benefit their village.

As the central government attempts to bring village communities into the national fold—through dispensation of economic aids or edu-

[39] Governments following the model of the West attempt to introduce self-government institutions in the village, requiring village officials to be elected by villagers and rules and regulations to be decided by vote. These attempts should not lead us to believe that there is fundamental political autonomy at the village level. The semblance of autonomy is actually something imposed on villages from the central government, and the sphere of life in which the village government can exercise control is rather rigidly circumscribed. Thus what is remarkable about self-government in villages of modern states is the extent to which they lack basic autonomy, a point well illustrated by Fraser (pp. 108-9) in discussing Malay village organization.

[40] See Wittfogel, 122-26.

[41] P. 180.

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cational programs on the one hand and through increasing control of villages on the other—the village government is left with more and more administrative chores and fewer and fewer decision-making activities. A major consequence of these processes is that the village political offices become primarily administrative agencies for the central government, and their main tasks are those such as record-keeping and transmission of messages from the central government. The village government thus becomes incorporated into the bureaucratic structure of the national government.

As the modernization process goes on, the village as a corporate entity, as a little polity, gradually loses significance. Kinship is much less important than in the previous stages, as increased mobility separates kinsmen from one another geographically as well as socially, and as increased economic differentiation also puts kinsmen into different interest groups. Communal ownership of subsistence resources, which in previous stages often provided an important basis for political integration of the community, is either absent or plays an insignificant part compared with the centrifugal forces based on social and geographical mobility and also with the penetration of government power. Industrialization and a market economy create an exchange system of much wider scope based on interdependence between villages and cities and between regions. This breakdown of village polity and the formation of wide-scale economic interdependence further make it easier for the government to penetrate the village and influence its internal activities.

The foregoing discussion makes it evident that the headman and other officials of the village community in a modern or modernizing state do not have the autonomous power of the village officials of a classical state. In the classical state, the village community is very nearly a self-contained unit that the rulers leave alone as long as villagers pay their taxes and maintain relative peace. In the modern state, the central government exercises more and more power in wider and wider areas of village life. As a consequence, the area in which village leaders wield genuinely independent power gradually shrinks, whatever power they have now being almost entirely that delegated by the central government.

One of the predicaments of the village headman at the classical stage is the fact that he is caught between two opposing interests, the state and the village. At the modern level, this predicament is lessened, though not completely eliminated, for a variety of reasons. For one thing, the village is no longer a corporate entity asserting and defending itself against outsiders. Second, since much of its power is taken

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by the state, it has little power to oppose the state. Third, the interest of the villagers is no longer opposed to that of the state, thanks to successful ideological indoctrination by the state. Fourth, through numerous government programs to assist peasants and improve their livelihood, peasants are conciliated and accept the government as a benefactor.

When peasants thus become involved in the politics of the modern state, they are no longer "peasants" in the sense they are in the classical state. They are now a politically conscious lot with watchful eyes cast on the activities of the national government, identifying themselves with the goals of the state, rather than being restricted in their political horizons to the boundaries of their village. They are ready to exert whatever pressure they are able to muster in order to influence the government, rather than being fatalistically resigned to the high-handed decisions and policies of the government. They identify themselves with the goals of the state in attempting to assert or achieve independence and enhance the nation's position in world politics. These are aspects of a broad process that Geertz has called "depeasantization."[42] I propose to call these cultivators of the modern state "farmers" to distinguish them from peasants, who are cultivators under the classical state. The term is much less cumbersome and more straightforward than Geertz's "post-peasant." A state's emergence from the classical to the modern stage thus has its counterpart in the transformation of peasants into farmers. The latter process inevitably lags behind the former because the emergence of the farmer is a consequence of the emergence of a modern state, and not vice versa. It is for this reason that we can find peasants or quasi-peasants in states that are essentially modern.[43]

V. Conclusion

This article has presented a broad outline of the types of relationship that obtain between the village and the state. The hypotheses presented here need to be tested. Also, it is desirable to look into further details of the problem so that we may have more sensitive indicators of the proposed relationship. For example, in the primitive state we would like to know how the presence or absence of kinship ties between the village and higher authority affects the political relation of the village to the state. It would also be interesting to see whether each of the types of political system differentiated by Eisenstadt or by Vansina on the basis

[42] Clifford Geertz, "Studies in Peasant Life," in Siegel, *Biennial Review*, 6.
[43] See Anderson and Anderson for an example from France.

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of modes of overall political integration shows a distinct type of village-state relationship.

This article has distinguished three types of state and three corresponding types of political relations between the village and the state. The article makes it evident that the conventional dichotomy between the primitive and the modern state is inadequate in understanding how villages are articulated with the state. It also indicates that the peasant or folk culture, or the "little tradition," which has been recognized as an entity separate from the modern and the primitive, has distinct conceptual significance in the political sphere.

Although it is beyond the limits of this article, one may argue for an evolutionary development of the village-state relationship from the primitive through the classical to the modern stages. Postulation of such a development would require knowledge of the processes of the emergence of the classical state as well as of the formation of the modern state. Such knowledge is at the present time far from complete; when we know more about these processes, we may be able to speak of the general evolution of the political relationship between the village and the state.

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IDEOLOGY AND POLITICS IN ECONOMIC PLANNING

The Problem of Indian Agricultural Development Strategy

By FRANCINE R. FRANKEL

FOR the first time since independence, economic planners in India are experiencing a serious crisis of confidence. Although there has always been some debate on alternative policies and programs, the central assumptions of development planning have remained unchallenged since the 1930's. Now, in contrast, the very core of economic development strategy has become the target of open and bitter criticism. The final draft of the Fourth Five Year Plan has been delayed for more than a year, and the end of fundamental disagreements seems nowhere in sight.

Basic to the approach of the five-year plans has been the consensus on concentrating public investment in the industrial sector. India's leaders have accepted as an article of faith the proposition that rapid industrialization is the key to self-sustaining growth. Both the Second and Third Plans (1956-1961 and 1961-1966) allocated the largest share of public investment to capital projects, especially to those that "make machines to make the machines needed for further development." Agriculture was meanwhile the subject of much discussion and the focus of some high hopes. The Second Plan proclaimed that agricultural production should be doubled within ten years to meet the demand for food and raw materials arising from industrial progress and growing incomes. The planners, however, assumed that a substantial measure of this increase could be accomplished through more efficient utilization of local resources, especially underemployed manpower. Consequently, agriculture was clearly assigned a secondary priority in the allocation of public funds. Only in one sense was it considered primary: agriculture was to serve as the base for domestic resource mobilization. Adequate rates of growth in this sector were perceived as essential to the accumulation of additional savings that could be reinvested in agricultural development, but, perhaps more important, could also be transferred to the industrial sector.

Serious weaknesses in this strategy have been apparent since 1958,

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when the government was forced to reduce the size of the Second Plan. However, modest increases in national income (four percent annually) and industrial expansion averaging seven percent annually compensated to some extent for low agricultural growth rates of about 2.5 percent per annum and apparently helped persuade planners that technical deficiencies in implementation, rather than incorrect policies, could explain the most serious shortcomings in economic performance. Since 1961, critical failures in the agricultural sector have called this interpretation into question. During the period of the Third Plan, from 1961 to 1966, the annual rate of growth in food-grains production was slightly over one percent. Unfavorable monsoons in 1965-1966 and again in 1966-1967 reduced absolute levels of production to those achieved in the middle years of the Second Plan. Growth rates in population and in urbanization meanwhile showed no comparable decline. They remained positive and substantial. In the last three years of the Third Plan, they generated a fifteen percent increment in the demand for food grains and a forty-six percent rise in the wholesale prices of food grains.

The inability to meet production targets, moreover, was accompanied by a pronounced inertia in the mobilization of additional resources. During both the Second and Third Plans, the Planning Commission's guidelines suggested that roughly fifty percent of additional taxation should come from the rural sector. In fact, agricultural income tax, land revenue, and irrigation rates together provided little more than one percent of additional taxation during the Second Plan and less than three percent during the Third Plan.

The unfortunate consequences of this record were not restricted to the agricultural sector. They had decisive repercussions upon the entire economy. Industrial growth rates hardly managed an annual average increment of 7.5 percent during the Third Plan (the target was 11 percent) and fell to less than 5 percent in 1965-1966. The average annual growth rate in national income was less than 2.5 percent, while the target was 5 to 6 percent. Most dramatically, per capita income actually dropped from Rs. 326 in 1960-1961 to Rs. 325 in 1965-1966. In short, the poor performance of agriculture practically wiped out all the gains of five years of development effort.

It is now clear that the cumulative failures in Indian agricultural development can no longer be viewed as a transient sectoral aberration. They suggest a serious miscalculation in the basic assumptions of economic development strategy. It is no less clear that these, in turn, can be

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corrected, if at all, only by a vigorous and realistic reexamination of the rationale of agricultural policy in terms of its actual performance.

I

Many reasons have been advanced to explain the failure of the agricultural sector to perform as expected: technical and technological deficiencies, poor cultivating practices, inadequately trained extension personnel, inefficient administration, inadequate credit, and shortages of improved inputs. Commonly ignored, however, is the fact that economic goals have never received absolute priority in the agricultural development strategy. Ideological objectives of planning have commanded at least equal importance, and in several significant instances of conflict, they have received priority over economic considerations.

Since 1929, when Jawaharlal Nehru and other Congress socialists first succeeded in committing the All-India Congress Committee to "revolutionary changes in the present economic and social structure of society," national leaders have insisted that the "correct" approach to economic development must include social reforms and institutional changes. In the Second Plan, the Planning Commission gave eloquent restatement to this commitment and clearly defined the fundamental ideological goals and values that should inform all Indian planning. They asserted:

> The task before an underdeveloped country is not merely to get better results within the existing framework of economic and social institutions, but to mould and refashion these so that they contribute effectively to the realization of wider and deeper social values.
>
> These values or basic objectives have recently been summed up in the phrase "socialist pattern of society." Essentially this means that the basic criterion for determining the lines of advance must not be private profit but social gain, and that the pattern of development and the structure of socio-economic relations should be so planned that they result not only in appreciable increases in national income and employment but also in greater equality in income and wealth. Major decisions regarding production, distribution, consumption and investment and in fact all significant socio-economic relationships must be made by agencies informed by social purpose.[1]

[1] India, Planning Commission, *Second Five Year Plan* (New Delhi 1956), 22.

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It is, of course, not unusual for public officials, committees, or commissions to express such lofty ideals. It is far less common to find these ideals extending into policy formulation. Yet this is evidently what has happened in India. In practice, *ideological objectives have imposed rigid limitations on the range of acceptable means for achieving the economic goal of increased productivity*. No strategy for agricultural development has been acceptable which achieved gains in output at the cost of (1) perpetuating or increasing disparities among cultivators and (2) relying upon and reinforcing capitalist incentives and organizational patterns. Moreover, in a number of cases where ideological goals conflicted with the economic objective of maximizing productivity, the national leadership subordinated economic efficiency to socialist values. Such indeed was the case in three key policy choices in the 1950's: (1) recommendations in the First Plan to establish ceilings on the size of individual holdings as part of a comprehensive program of land reform; (2) the decision, in 1953, to achieve all-India coverage under the Community Development program as rapidly as possible; and (3) a set of decisions in 1956 to establish cooperatives as the basic unit of economic organization in the rural sector.

First, let us examine the case of ceilings. In the draft outline of the First Five Year Plan, the Planning Commission cited a number of reasons why legislation imposing limitations on the size of landholdings should *not* be included in a general program of land reform. These reasons included the weaknesses in the administrative machinery that had to carry out the program, the problem of providing even limited compensation to landowners, and even the possibility of widespread social conflict among various claimants of surplus land. The most decisive argument in the Planning Commission's view, however, was an economic one. Given the unfavorable man-land ratio in India, ceilings and a consequent redistribution of land could not go far enough to establish economic units of cultivation for the large majority of uneconomic holders and the landless. On the contrary, these measures could only accomplish the breakup of efficient farms, proliferate subsistence-type holdings, and, most probably, depress total output. Yet, such arguments were ultimately dismissed by the socialist-minded Congress leadership. In the final draft of the First Plan, the Planning Commission reversed itself and recommended a ceiling of three times the standard family holding as the amount of land any individual might hold. In explaining this decision, the planners frankly assigned overriding importance to "the social aspect" of land policy and defended ceilings as

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a means of bringing about greater equality of income, status, and opportunity in the rural sector.[2]

A second striking example of the subordination of economic efficiency to ideological preferences is provided by the Community Development program. Apparently the Planning Commission fully appreciated the economic arguments in favor of concentrating scarce inputs in selected areas of the country, as opposed to distributing them evenly, but rather thinly, over the entire cultivated area. In view of the wide variations in the quality of the soil, the availability of water (rainfall or irrigation), and even the effectiveness of cultivation practices, it would certainly seem feasible to focus upon those areas where scarce inputs of fertilizer, seeds, pesticides, equipment, and technical personnel could be expected to bring the highest possible yields. In fact, the selection of the first Community Projects in 1952 was guided by precisely this rationale. These were allocated only to districts with assured water from rainfall or irrigation facilities. The principle of selective and intensive development was abandoned the following year, however, when the national leadership decided to undertake rapid all-India coverage with special attention to the most backward areas. No economic reasons were advanced for this decision. Rather, the government's commitment to equality and social justice was again cited. As the Additional Secretary of the Community Development Ministry explained, "All-India coverage is not strictly rational from an economic point of view, but we would not adopt the capitalistic method of intensive areas" (i.e., concentrated investment in selected areas).[3]

The policy of rapid all-India coverage, moreover, was pursued with little modification even in the face of steadily accumulating evidence documenting the economic objections to such a policy. For instance, the Planning Commission's own Programme Evaluation Organization reported in 1958 that the adoption of improved agricultural practices was substantial only in areas where "the rainfall is adequate or the proportion of irrigated to total cultivated areas is high" and concluded, "The favored areas which are also better suited to adopt agricultural improvement practices can make much greater contributions to in-

[2] India, Planning Commission, *First Five Year Plan* (New Delhi 1953), 187.

[3] Interview with S. Chakravarti, Additional Secretary, Ministry of Community Development and Cooperation, in New Delhi, January 16, 1963.

It should be noted that before 1965, Community Development, Cooperation, and Panchayati Raj constituted one ministry; Food and Agriculture another. In 1965, these ministries were amalgamated to form the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Community Development, Cooperation, and Panchayati Raj. Both in this article and in official documents, the ministries are commonly referred to by shortened titles.

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creases of agricultural production in the short run."[4] Direct evidence of the very wide range of productivity throughout the country was provided in 1959 by data published by the Directorate of Economics and Statistics of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture. They show that in the period 1955-1958, 39 out of 177 rice-producing districts and 39 out of 193 wheat-producing districts accounted for more than half of all rice and wheat grown in the country.[5] This trend was also demonstrated in a more recent study by B. S. Minhas and A. Vaidyanathan which found substantial divergences among 184 districts in the rate of growth of crop output as well.[6]

The point, however, is not merely that some districts in India (as anywhere else for that matter) lacked the basic preconditions to assure even a tolerable input-output ratio and that, therefore, the dispersal of chemical fertilizers, improved seeds, pesticides, and implements throughout the country condemned major portions of these scarce resources to waste. No less significant is the corollary fact that as a result of so extensive a coverage, the share of those communities where such inputs would in fact have produced substantial gains was severely curtailed. The dimensions of this problem can be illustrated by a brief glance at figures for the availability of chemical fertilizer during the 1950's and 1960's. Although the Planning Commission has called the introduction of chemical fertilizer one of the most important means for increasing agricultural production taken up by the Community Development program, the total amount of nitrogenous fertilizers available in 1953-1954 was less than 90,000 metric tons. During the Second Plan, supplies of nitrogen increased slowly to a peak of about 212,000 tons in 1960-1961 and, under the Third Plan, advanced further to roughly 500,000 metric tons by 1964-1965. In other words, the total amount of nitrogen provided per acre of cultivated land was little more than one pound in 1953-1954, approximately one and one-fifth pounds in 1960-1961, and less than three pounds in 1964-1965[7] By con-

[4] *The Fifth Evaluation Report on Working of Community Development and N.E.S. Blocks* (New Delhi 1958), 30.

[5] *Agricultural Situation in India*, XIV (August 1959), 616-22.

[6] *Analysis of Crop Output Growth by Component Elements: India 1951-54 to 1958-61*, Discussion Paper No. 1 (November 1964), prepared for the Perspective Planning Division, Planning Commission, mimeographed.

[7] Figures for production, imports, and distribution of nitrogenous fertilizers from 1952-1953 to 1964-1965 are given in Fertilizer Association of India, *Fertilizer Statistics, 1964-65* (New Delhi 1965), 90. To calculate per acre availability of nitrogen in 1953-1954, 1960-1961, and 1964-1965, I have used figures for area under crops, published in India, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Economic and Statistical Adviser, *Growth Rates in Agriculture, 1949-50 to 1964-65* (New Delhi 1966), 84-85. Data in this publication on area under crops are presented in the form of index numbers, with the agricultural year 1949-1950 as the base. I have converted the index numbers back

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trast, Indian agricultural experts most commonly recommend dosages of twenty to forty pounds of nitrogen per acre for major food-grain crops, depending on local conditions.[8]

The decision for all-India coverage had another consequence as well. Budgets allocated to each Community Development Block (about 66,000 population) for headquarters costs, agricultural development programs, and social amenities projects were radically curtailed. Thus, for example, the first Community Projects were allocated Rs. 720,000 annually (almost Rs. 11 per capita). This was reduced to Rs. 500,000 (about Rs. 8 per capita) in 1953 and to Rs. 300,000 (less than Rs. 5 per capita) in 1956. The current pattern provides for two stages of Community Development—a five-year "intensive" phase, followed by a five-year "postintensive" period of development activity. In the first, intensive, stage, each Block receives a budget of Rs. 250,000 annually (less than Rs. 4 per capita), and in the postintensive stage, this is reduced to Rs. 150,000 annually (little more than Rs. 2 per capita).

Budget reductions were inevitably followed by retrenchment in staff. Originally (before 1953), Community Projects provided for one agricultural extension officer and four subject-matter specialists (in crop production, plant protection, farm management, and fertilizers) at the district level; four or five agricultural extension officers at the Block level; and an additional extension worker for every five villages. The decision for all-India coverage brought a reduction to one agricultural extension officer at the district level, one agricultural extension officer at the Block level, and one additional extension worker for each ten villages.

Perhaps the most dramatic example of the paramountcy of ideological criteria in the formulation of agricultural development policy, however, is the decision to establish cooperatives as the basic unit of economic organization in the rural sector. Cooperatives have been consistently perceived as socialist agencies of development in agriculture. The planners have believed that cooperative institutions can best transform socialist ideals into economic reality by organizing all resources in the village for production and distribution for the common benefit. In the First Plan, the Planning Commission candidly characterized its own recommendations for the cooperative reorganization of agriculture as a "preference" and asserted, "As it is the purpose of

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into acres using the Second Plan's estimate that some 326 million acres were under crops in 1949-1950 (*Second Five Year Plan*, 259).

[8] A useful compendium of fertilizer recommendations for various crops in each state is found in *Fertilizer Statistics, 1964-65*, 114.

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the Plan to change the economy of the country from an individualistic to a socially regulated and cooperative basis, its success would be judged, among other things, by the extent to which it is implemented through cooperative organizations."[9] In the Second Plan, the national leadership reiterated that building up the cooperative sector in agricultural credit, marketing, processing, and distribution would be adopted as an integral part of the development strategy for agriculture and as "one of the central aims of national policy."[10]

This decision was taken in the face of the Reserve Bank's 1954 All-India Rural Credit Survey *Report*, which focused attention on the economic pitfalls of such a sweeping commitment. Recalling previous experience, the *Report* suggested that cooperative societies were too weak to compete with the vastly superior personal finances and managerial skills of private moneylending and trading groups. The Survey revealed that existing village cooperative societies were too small to attract adequate capital resources and that they suffered from poor management techniques, high operating costs, and a large proportion of overdue loans. In the end, the *Report* concluded that if agricultural credit and multipurpose service cooperatives were to enjoy at least minimum economic viability they would have to be organized on a multivillage basis.[11] India's leaders accepted this recommendation in the Second Plan. This must have been a reluctant concession, however, for no sooner was it made than it was reversed. As early as January 1957, the Community Development Ministry announced plans for revitalization of existing small-size village cooperatives during the Second Plan period. In September of the same year, the Ministry instructed the states to organize additional village societies. Finally, in November 1958, in the face of the Planning Commission's own studies demonstrating once again that multivillage societies are, on the whole, economically more viable than village cooperatives,[12] the National Development Council decided to discontinue the organization of large-size societies and recommended that "cooperatives should be organized on the basis of the village community as the primary unit."[13] Prime Minister Nehru, who had earlier supported the Rural Credit Survey's recommendations for larger-size societies on grounds of economic efficiency, suddenly re-

[9] *First Five Year Plan*, 164.

[10] *Second Five Year Plan*, 221.

[11] India, Reserve Bank, Report of the Committee of Direction, All-India Rural Credit Survey, Vol. II, *The General Report* (Bombay 1954), 211-20, 253-77.

[12] See India, Planning Commission, *Evaluation Report on Working of the Large and Small Sized Cooperative Societies* (New Delhi 1959).

[13] India, Ministry of Community Development and Cooperation, *Cooperation in India* (New Delhi 1965), 33.

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versed his position and argued that village-size societies were superior in preserving the essential characteristics of cooperation—close contact, social cohesion, and mutual obligation. "In the final analysis," he explained to the National Development Council in April 1959, "we were trying to produce better men."[14]

II

An analysis of these key policy choices in agriculture during the 1950's leaves little doubt that India's leaders were genuinely committed to their ideological objectives. They were prepared on a number of occasions to sacrifice gains in output and resource mobilization in order to advance their image of a socialist society. This does not mean, however, that they were oblivious to the imperative of economic development. On the contrary, *it was their basic assumption that progress toward ideological objectives would not seriously retard the pace of advance toward self-sustaining growth*. Actually, the planners foresaw economic advantages flowing from ideologically determined policy choices which would at first mitigate, and later more than offset, initial sacrifices in production and resource mobilization.

Indian leaders hoped, for example, that land reforms, with their provisions for ceilings on agricultural holdings and redistribution of land to small cultivators and landless laborers, would give tangible form to the ideal of social justice and would expand popular identification with the national development effort. Similarly, the planners believed that by expanding the Community Development program beyond the strict limits of economic cost-accounting, they could expose all areas of the country to new possibilities of progress and involve the energies of the entire rural population in development activities.

In the absence of substantial monetary and other material incentives to increased production, the planners stressed that "social justice, i.e., equitable distribution of the burdens and benefits of economic development, is one of the important conditioning incentives for rapid progress."[15] The Planning Commission believed that such incentives could effectively increase the propensity to invest in public capital formation by reducing the prevailing resistance to tax collection. Even more important, they expected that land reforms and the rehabilitation of

[14] *Agricultural Situation in India*, XIV (April 1959), 29.

[15] B. N. Ganguli, "Institutional Implications of a Bolder Plan With Special Reference to China's Experience," in India, Planning Commission, Panel of Economists, *Papers Relating to the Formulation of the Second Five Year Plan* (New Delhi 1955), 449.

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backward classes through the Community Development programs could provide powerful rewards for mass participation in labor-intensive agricultural development and social amenities projects.[16]

From the very beginning, primary importance was assigned to the role of voluntary labor in all rural development work. The First Plan suggested that idle manpower could "be marshalled in rural areas for the construction and repair of sources of water supply, roads, schools, buildings and works for better sanitation and for satisfying a variety of needs." The Planning Commission admitted frankly that "the assistance which the government can give for programs such as road building, minor irrigation and soil conservation, etc., is limited and should be designed primarily to supplement and make possible village development through the use of village labor. . . ."[17] This theme was constantly repeated in the Second Plan. The Third Plan expressed it more forcefully still. The planners envisaged "concentrated effort in agriculture on a scale calling for the participation of millions of peasant families of agricultural workers in village production plans and in large scale programmes of irrigation, soil conservation, dry farming, afforestation and the development of local manurial resources. . . . One of the main aims of the Plan, therefore," the planners emphasized, "is to harness the manpower resources available in rural areas. This is to be achieved through the programmes of development for which the Plan provides, supplemented by extensive rural works programmes for utilizing manpower resources in the villages, especially for increasing agricultural production."[18]

Finally, the cooperative movement, like land reforms and community development, was expected to yield economic dividends by providing social as well as material incentives for the mobilization of rural saving. Cooperatives were the institutional embodiment of the national obligation to use all economic resources for the common benefit. But at the village level, the larger landowners were asked to play the largest role in redeeming this obligation. Only they had sufficient resources to contribute to the cooperatives in significant amounts. "Through cooperation," declared the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, "a sense of social responsibility should be created. This is the essence of the movement. The well-to-do farmers in a village should assist the programmes . . . by depositing their savings in the cooperative societies

[16] Each Community Development Block budgeted only one-half or less of the cost of village development projects and required village panchayats to mobilize matching funds in cash, kind, and labor.

[17] *First Five Year Plan*, 148.

[18] India, Planning Commission, *Third Five Year Plan* (New Delhi 1961), 49.

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so that as soon as practicable, the entire short-term credit needed by the society is found from members' deposits."[19]

In order to fortify the funds of cooperatives further, the government was prepared to contribute some of its own resources to share capital. Starting with the Second Plan, a number of National Funds were established to extend loans to the state governments to permit them to subscribe to the share capital of primary (village) agricultural credit and multipurpose service cooperatives, central (district) cooperative banks, and apex (state) cooperative banks. Starting in 1956, the Reserve Bank also made substantial short-term credit available to apex banks at concessional rates of interest for advances to central cooperative banks and primary agricultural credit societies.

The resources of the larger cultivators, supplemented by government capital, were expected, moreover, to supply the foundation for universal membership in the primary agricultural credit cooperatives. It was hoped that even small and subsistence farmers would voluntarily join, contributing their own small share of capital in return for the prospect of obtaining cheap production credit under a new system of crop-based loans. In the Second Plan, the government proposed that cooperatives should abandon existing criteria of land or other property as security for loans and should advance credit on the basis of approved production plans and repayment capacity in kind.

The government's decision to provide agricultural credit through the cooperatives was supposed to have the initial advantage, therefore, of facilitating a rapid expansion in the internal resources of the cooperative movement by attracting share capital and deposits from all classes of agriculturist families. Secondly, and equally important, planners hoped to use the cooperative structure as an organizational framework for central control over the disposition of agricultural saving and surpluses.

Government money was quickly followed by government control. After 1956, when existing state laws were amended to provide for official participation in share capital of cooperative societies, provisions were also adopted permitting nomination of government representatives to the boards of directors of all cooperative societies receiving financial assistance. As a result, it became common practice to appoint officials of the Department of Cooperation as secretaries, accountants, managers, and other executive officers of cooperative societies of all types and at all levels of organization.

Official control of the cooperatives was to be enhanced further

[19] V. T. Krishnamachari, *Community Development in India* (New Delhi 1962), 161.

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through the "integrated scheme of rural credit" proposed by the Planning Commission. Under this pattern, primary agricultural credit societies would advance loans on the basis of an approved production plan—instead of land or other real security—but only on condition that borrowers would agree to sell their produce through a primary marketing society affiliated with the credit cooperative. This system had two major advantages in relation to planning: (1) it permitted official scrutiny of loan applications to ensure that credit would be advanced only for productive purposes and (2) it facilitated the collection of the rural surplus for distribution in urban markets and thereby made it possible to use the price mechanism as a lever of regulation and control over rural saving and consumption. In 1958, the national leadership took the first step toward utilizing the cooperative structure for this purpose. The National Development Council announced a long-term program for state trading in food grains, with the ultimate objective of displacing the private trade. This was followed by strict regulation of private traders, announcement of maximum controlled prices for wholesale transactions in food grains, government purchases of rice and wheat, compulsory levies on the stock of private millers and traders, and the rapid expansion of the network of government-supplied fair-price (retail) shops in major urban centers.

III

The anticipated economic benefits of India's ideologically motivated development policies did not really materialize. They failed to do so because implementation of these policies was singularly uneven. Loopholes in some state laws and inefficient administration of others permitted widespread evasion.

Such was clearly the case with land-reform laws. Every state, for example, passed acts imposing ceilings on the size of land holdings. The Seventeenth Round of the National Sample Survey (September 1961–July 1962), however, must have been discouraging in the extreme to those who counted equality first among the aims of planned development in the rural sector. Compared to data reported by the National Sample Survey's Eighth Round for 1953-1954, there was almost no change in concentration of land ownership in rural India. In the earlier year, 74.7 percent of all households owned 16.3 percent of the land; in the later period, 75.2 percent of all households owned almost 20 percent of the land.[20] These results were certainly too meager to generate

[20] Indian Statistical Institute, *The National Sample Survey, Number 140: Tables*

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incentives founded upon widespread and acute awareness of progress toward social justice.

In contrast, the Community Development program was able to report one hundred percent coverage of all areas and villages in India by 1963-1964. Unfortunately, this was more an administrative than a substantive accomplishment. It may have facilitated the collection of Rs. 17.7 crores (177 million rupees) of taxes by newly created local government institutions[21] and an additional Rs. 4.6 crores of village taxes between 1961 and 1964,[22] but compared to the total investment of Rs. 322 crores in Community Development and panchayats during the Third Plan, this record can hardly be considered satisfactory. Moreover, extensive coverage did not produce the mass participation in labor-intensive development programs that is at the core of the concept of community development.

It is virtually impossible to make an accurate estimate of "people's contributions" to community projects during the three plans. Contributions in labor, cash, and kind were made in an *ad hoc* fashion for each village project. Records of public contributions kept by the panchayat secretaries or village-level workers were not inspected or audited. The Community Development Department admits that official valuations were too high. Block Development Officers, whose own performance rating partly depended on fulfilling targets for people's participation, were often tempted to inflate these figures. It is all the more striking, therefore, that even official statistics for popular contributions to community development schemes show a steady *decline* since the Second Plan. Despite the fact that the number of Blocks allocated rose from over 3,000 at the end of the Second Plan to more than 5,000 in 1965-1966, the total for people's contributions declined from Rs. 77.3 crores during the Second Plan to Rs. 48.7 crores in the Third Plan period. During this same period, government expenditure in the Blocks nearly doubled.[23]

With Notes on Some Aspects of Landholdings in Rural Areas (State and All-India Estimates), Seventeenth Round, September 1961–July 1962, Draft (Calcutta 1966), 11.

[21] During the Third Plan, all states except Kerala and Madhya Pradesh established two new sets of local government bodies at the Block and district levels and gave them responsibility for administering development programs within their areas. Some states also gave the newly created Block Committees and District Councils wide powers of taxation.

[22] Preliminary estimates provided by the Department of Panchayati Raj, Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Community Development, Cooperation, and Panchayati Raj, August 1966, unpubl.

[23] India, Department of Community Development, *Highlights of the Programme, Community Development, Special Programmes, Panchayati Raj* (New Delhi, August 1966), 31.

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With few exceptions, moreover, local contributions to community development programs were successfully mobilized only for social amenities projects—roads, schools, drains, drinking-water wells—rather than for agricultural development programs. Block funds for minor irrigation, land reclamation, and soil conservation were used almost entirely for loans to individual cultivators. In many Blocks, funds for these purposes were underutilized in the absence of matching village contributions.[24]

If the economic benefits of community development were impaired by the inadequate implementation of land reform, they were further vitiated by the performance of cooperatives. By the end of the Third Plan period, almost eighty percent of all villages were covered by agricultural credit and multipurpose service cooperatives. However, their contribution to the mobilization of agricultural saving was much more modest than the planners had anticipated. At the end of 1963-1964, primary cooperative societies had succeeded in raising only some Rs. 108 crores in share capital and reserves from their own resources.[25] This can be compared with an estimated total requirement for short-term credit of all agriculturist families of about Rs. 1,200 crores annually.[26] Consequently, after the Second Plan, lending operations had to be increasingly financed through outside borrowings. In 1960-1961, the total working capital of agricultural credit societies amounted to Rs. 273.9 crores, of which more than sixty percent (Rs. 174.7 crores) represented borrowings from central cooperative banks. In 1963-1964, the total working capital of all agricultural credit societies had increased to Rs. 442 crores, but over sixty-seven percent (Rs. 297 crores) represented borrowings from central banks.[27]

[24] Community Development Blocks consistently failed to meet targets for labor-intensive agricultural production programs. Among other consequences of this failure was a striking shortfall in the utilization of irrigation facilities. During the three plans, major and medium irrigation projects created an additional irrigation potential of 18 million acres. But only 13.8 million additional acres were brought under irrigation, largely because cultivators had not constructed field channels from project outlets (India, Planning Commission, *Fourth Five Year Plan: A Draft Outline* [New Delhi, August 1966], 216). Most Blocks also reported shortfalls in targets for the extension of area under minor irrigation, soil conservation measures, and green manure plants.

[25] India, Ministry of Community Development and Cooperation, Department of Cooperation, *Cooperative Movement in India, Important Statistics, 1963-64*, Part 1: Credit Sector (New Delhi 1965), 5.

[26] This figure is based on the formula used by the Food and Agriculture Ministry's Working Group on Cooperative Policy, which was constituted in November 1958 to study the short-term credit requirements of the cooperative sector. It provides for a production credit of Rs. 200—Rs. 40 to Rs. 50 per acre—to each cultivator having an average holding of four or five acres. There are approximately sixty million agriculturist families in India.

[27] *Cooperative Movement in India*, 5.

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Contrary to the basic intention of the government, the volume of short-term loans actually advanced by primary agricultural credit societies was closely tied to the level of available government finance. In 1963-1964, the cooperatives advanced Rs. 295 crores in short-term credit; in the same year, the Reserve Bank of India advanced Rs. 146 crores to the apex cooperative banks for agricultural loans.[28] In reality, therefore, fully one-half of all short-term credit advanced by cooperative societies each year was financed by the government of India.

The limited success of the cooperative structure in mobilizing agricultural savings in turn impaired the government's prospects of using these institutions as a means of control over the rural sector. The weak financial structure of the cooperative movement favored the arguments of those who insisted that cooperatives should continue to follow conservative banking principles and to require land or personal surety by a landowner as security for all loans. In any case, crop loans, a crucial ingredient in the government's plan to control the economic activities of the mass of small cultivators, never became available. As a result, this large class of agriculturists found little incentive to seek membership in village credit societies. In June 1966, sixty percent of all agriculturist families remained outside of cooperative societies.[29]

Failure to link credit with crop plans and repayment in kind also undermined the government's ability to control agricultural surpluses through the cooperative marketing structure. Although primary marketing societies covered all major marketing centers in India by the end of the Third Plan, one-third of the primary agricultural credit societies were not affiliated with a marketing society. Those cooperative banks that included provisions in loan bonds requiring members to sell their produce through an affiliated marketing society did not enforce such provisions. During 1964-1965, for example, only about ten percent of the loans advanced by primary credit cooperatives were recovered by marketing societies from the sale proceeds of members' produce.[30] Much the greater share of agricultural surplus was consistently delivered to private moneylenders and traders as interest payments on loans; any remainder was likely to be consumed. Market arrivals of food grains—especially rice—declined even in years of rising production.[31] Under

[28] *Ibid.*, 41.
[29] *Fourth Five Year Plan: A Draft Outline*, 136.
[30] *Ibid.*, 142.
[31] Complete figures are not available for market arrivals of rice. However, the Directorate of Economics and Statistics does make estimates of arrivals of rice in selected markets. These show that market arrivals of rice have steadily declined since 1962-1963, while production of rice has steadily increased. Total rice production was 31,520,000 metric tons in 1962-1963; it rose to 36,311,000 tons in 1963-1964 and to

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these circumstances, government attempts to enforce maximum controlled prices for food grains and to procure rice directly from producers, millers, and traders through compulsory levy resulted in widespread smuggling and hoarding activities—and a flourishing black market. The Ministry of Food and Agriculture did not expect state and central government agencies to procure more than one-thirteenth of the marketed surplus in 1966-1967 and does not foresee the possibility of increasing this proportion beyond twenty-five or thirty percent in the near future.[32] Yet, Ministry officials believe that the government must procure at least one-half the marketed surplus in order to have effective control over the price of food grains.[33]

The government's inability to build cooperatives into an organizational framework of control had this further ironic consequence: not only was the government unable to maximize resource mobilization in the rural sector and to facilitate the transfer of agricultural saving into industrial capital formation, it had to watch helplessly while substantial portions of its own scarce resources invested in agricultural cooperatives were squandered. The Programme Evaluation Organization's 1961 study on the utilization of cooperative loans reported that over one-quarter of the total amount of short- and medium-term credit advanced by cooperatives was annually diverted from production to consumption expenditures.[34]

IV

Evidently, India's leaders miscalculated the prospects for implementing their ideologically determined development policies. That they did so suggests a certain insensitivity to the realities of their own environment. First, they were insufficiently impressed by the fact that the organizational preconditions for such a strategy did not exist in the early years of planning. Moreover, financial and technical limitations made it unlikely that such an organizational base could be created

38,123,000 tons in 1964-1965. During these same years, market arrivals of rice in selected markets totalled 1,218,000 tons, 968,000 tons, and 841,000 tons respectively (India, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Community Development and Cooperation, *Bulletin on Food Statistics* [New Delhi, February 1966], II, 17).

[32] Interview with B. Balasubramaniam, Joint Secretary, Procurement, Department of Food, Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Community Development and Cooperation, in New Delhi, July 25, 1966.

[33] Interview with J. A. Dave, Director General, Food, Department of Food, Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Community Development and Cooperation, in New Delhi, July 25, 1966.

[34] *Study of Utilization of Cooperative Loans* (New Delhi 1965), 88.

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within a reasonably short period of time. Secondly, and even more remarkable, they greatly underestimated both the hostility of the traditional rural elites to these policies and the political effectiveness of these elites through their influence in local and state Congress party organizations.

Actually, the organizational requirements by themselves were so staggering that they raised serious doubts about the feasibility of key plan programs in agriculture. The enforcement of land-reform legislation, for example, presumed the existence of a large and specialized administrative structure reaching from the state down to the village level and capable of preparing accurate records of rights of all tenure-holders, including tenant-cultivators. The fact that at the time of the First Plan such records were incomplete, out-of-date, and limited to zamindars and other landowners liable for revenue payments gives some indication of the magnitude of this task. Yet the only governmental agency in India extending to the local level was the revenue administration. And at the time of independence, there was virtually no revenue staff below the district or subdivisional levels in substantial portions of the country where zamindari and other intermediary tenures prevailed. After zamindari abolition, an entirely new revenue agency had to be created at these levels in Bihar, Orissa, West Bengal, and Assam, and in large parts of Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan. The additional costs of revenue administration arising out of zamindari abolition in the states increased expenditure on local administration more than five times between 1950 and 1961.[35] Most states were therefore unable or unwilling to make much larger additional investment in local administration on behalf of land reforms; they decided to use the existing revenue agency to carry out land-reform laws. In practice, this meant relying on the accuracy of records prepared by hereditary village officers who have traditionally kept revenue rolls. Such officials are still poorly educated, untrained, meagerly compensated for their work—and have a reputation throughout India for their corruptibility. Superior officers have been too few in number to undertake accurate inspection of the village record-keepers' work. It has been rare to have even one revenue inspector for every ten villages; it has been much more common to have one inspector for every fifty villages. Higher supervisory personnel at the taluka, subdivisional, and district levels have been fewer still and have had too many other responsibilities to carry out more than a few *ad hoc* checks into the ac-

[35] M. L. Dantwala, "Financial Implications of Land Reforms," *Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics*, XVII (October-December 1962), 2.

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curacy of village records. Their primary concern has remained that of survey, settlement, and collection of land revenues.

The organizational base for carrying out other key agricultural programs under the plans was, if anything, worse. It was virtually nonexistent. The decision to cover the entire country (5,264 Blocks) with a national extension service under the Community Development program meant that India had to recruit and train more than 100,000 Block and village-level extension workers of varying specialization in little more than ten years.[36] And even this rate of expansion was characterized by the Minister of Community Development as "grossly inadequate for approaching every family covered by the Community Development Programme."[37]

During the Second and Third Plans, shortages of extension staff almost doubled over First Plan levels, increasing from 5.9 percent to over ten percent.[38] Even more serious was the problem of the qualifications and training of Block staff in important positions. To support the agricultural side of the program alone, more than 5,200 district-level extension officers for agriculture, an equal number of Block-level extension officers for agriculture, and more than 52,000 village-level extension officers had to be recruited and trained. Yet, in 1953-1954 there were twenty-two agricultural colleges with an annual admissions capacity of 1,254 and an annual graduating class of about 792.[39] With modest government programs in agriculture, this rate of output was probably sufficient to man existing extension, teaching, and research services. However, the rapid expansion of Community Development sharply increased the demand for trained agricultural graduates. These needs were met by a striking expansion in the number and admissions capacity of private agricultural colleges. At the end of the Third Plan, there were some sixty-six agricultural colleges, with a total admissions capacity of 8,900 and a graduating class of over 6,000 students per annum.[40] But this expansion was accomplished at the cost of a substantial deterioration in the quality of training. The Planning Commission reported in 1966 that most private agricultural colleges were "too

[36] In addition to various service personnel (messengers, clerks, typists, sweepers, and so on), the staffing pattern of a Community Development Block provides for one Block development officer, one extension officer each for agriculture, animal husbandry, cooperation, panchayats, and rural industries, one social education officer, one women's worker, two female village-level workers, and ten male village-level workers.

[37] S. K. Dey, *Community Development, A Chronicle, 1954-1961* (New Delhi 1962), 98.

[38] *Highlights of the Programme*, 10.

[39] India, Planning Commission, Agriculture Division, "Draft Chapter, Agriculture," prepared for the draft outline of the Fourth Plan, unpubl., 26.

[40] *Ibid.*

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crowded, inadequately equipped and poorly staffed" and that some of these colleges did "not have any facility whatsoever" to offer training in agricultural subjects.[41] Graduates of these colleges nevertheless continue to be recruited for positions as district and Block extension officers for agriculture and begin service without any other training. Village-level extension workers have been even more poorly prepared. They do not have any degree in agriculture—questionable or otherwise—but are high-school graduates who have received general training in extension techniques at government training centers.

The establishment of cooperatives as basic agricultural units also required extensive additions of well-trained administrative and supervisory staff. Headquarters staff in the state capital had to be expanded to provide the Registrar with a number of assistants in charge of various functional specializations, e.g., audit, marketing, and processing. These officers, in turn, had to be provided with a staff of deputies. An entirely new tier of cooperative administration had to be created at the divisional level, with its own inspectorate and clerical staff. District-level administration had to be strengthened to provide additional district officers and supporting staff for at least every eight hundred to a thousand cooperative societies. An entirely new level of cooperative administration had to be created in the Blocks, which entailed recruitment of another five thousand Block extension officers for cooperation. Finally, a supervisory staff of some seventy thousand persons—one for a maximum of every thirty societies—had to be created to oversee the operations of primary cooperative societies of all kinds. These targets were not always met, and when they were it meant placing untrained, unreliable, and even incompetent personnel in important technical and organizational positions.[42]

Formidable as the administrative problem may have been for the implementation of ideologically oriented development policies, it was less intractable than the barrier presented by the political exigencies confronting the Congress party government. Not surprisingly, the traditional rural elites—dominant landholding castes—were less than enthusiastic about proposals for social change. They recognized rather quickly that effective implementation of land reforms would alter the existing distribution of land in favor of the small cultivator, tenant farmer, and agricultural laborer. In the three plans, the Planning Commission even spoke of land reform as preliminary to a distant but far

[41] *Ibid.*, 27.

[42] See India, National Cooperative Development Corporation, *Report of the Committee on Cooperative Administration* (New Delhi 1963).

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more revolutionary goal, the elimination of *all* disparities arising out of private ownership of land and the creation of a new form of cooperative land management.[43] Nor did it escape the traditional rural elites that recommendations in the five-year plans for new principles of cooperative organization were designed to make cooperative credit and marketing societies instruments of social revolution in the countryside. Until 1956, when the Second Plan determined upon the rapid expansion of the cooperative sector, such rural credit societies as did exist were dominated by the landowning classes. The new organizing principles proposed by the Planning Commission—universal membership and crop loans linked to production and marketing—radically altered the existing nature and purpose of rural cooperatives. Effectively implemented, these principles would have changed cooperatives from private business associations functioning to benefit a selected membership—the more substantial persons in the village—to national agencies of social and economic reform, operating to transfer resources, and ultimately social status and political power, to the weaker sections and backward classes of the community. The traditional rural elites were not only asked to accept the growing challenge of cooperative institutions to their hegemony over agricultural finance, marketing, and distribution, but they were also called upon to hasten their own destruction by contributing extensively to the share capital and other funds of these very cooperatives.

This they would not do. Moreover, they were not without political resources. Under the Indian constitution, agriculture (including land reforms and cooperation) is a subject reserved to state governments. As it happens, it is the larger landowners and private traders who supply much of the leadership and financial support of district and state Congress party organizations. During the period of the three plans, they, or persons they helped to elect, sat in state legislatures and staffed the ministries. Understandably, therefore, the Congress leadership in the states found it most expedient to give loud public support to the ideologically determined development policies of the five-year plans, but to cooperate privately with the landed interests to prevent effective implementation.

Ceiling legislation is a clear case in point. The Second Plan recommended that the states use the following definition of "family holding" as a guide in fixing ceilings: "an area equivalent according to local conditions and under existing conditions of technique either to a plough unit or a work unit for a family of average size working with such as-

[43] *Second Five Year Plan*, 205-8.

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sistance as is customary in agricultural operations."[44] The states took advantage of this formula to define ceilings in terms of both ordinary and "standard" acres, ostensibly to compensate for regional differences in soil, irrigation, and other agronomic factors. A "standard" acre was defined as a multiple or fraction of an ordinary acre with respect to some constant measure of value—either yield of principal crops, rental value, assessment rate, or market price. The ceiling was initially fixed in ordinary acres and subsequently converted into equivalent standard acres for each class of land, e.g., dry crop land, perennially irrigated land, or sandy, hilly land. While this approach was sound in theory, the fact remains that most valuations of different categories of land have been made without any reference to demonstrable economic yardsticks.[45] As a result, the ceiling range in most states is much higher than the twenty to thirty ordinary acres that the Planning Commission initially envisaged. In Andhra Pradesh, for example, definition according to standard acres has produced a ceiling range of 27 to 324 ordinary acres. There are comparably wide ranges in other states as well.[46] Moreover, inaccurate land records have permitted landowners to evade even these provisions by effecting paper partitions or transfers of their holdings to relatives and friends. The Planning Commission reported in 1961 that excessive ceilings in state laws, combined with transfers and partition of land on a large scale "have tended to defeat the aims of legislation for land reform."[47] The Land Reforms Division of the Planning Commission now estimates that little more than two million acres will become available for redistribution as a result of ceiling legislation,[48] compared to some forty or fifty million acres that the planners originally hoped to have.

In the area of cooperation as well, the Congress leadership in the states found it expedient to accept the new pattern of organization in principle and to collaborate in practice with the larger landowners in

[44] *Ibid.*, 195.

[45] See M. L. Dantwala, "Land Reforms in the Second Plan," *Indian Affairs Record*, 11 (September 1956).

[46] The range of ceilings in ordinary acres for each state is as follows: Assam, up to 50 acres; Bihar, 20 to 60 acres; Gujerat, 19 to 132 acres; Kerala, 15 to 37.5 acres; Madhya Pradesh, 25 to 75 acres; Madras, 24 to 120 acres; Maharashtra, 18 to 126 acres; Mysore, 27 to 216 acres; Orissa, 25 to 100 acres; Punjab, up to 60 acres; and West Bengal, 25 acres. Rajasthan has established a ceiling at 30 standard acres, defined as land yielding ten maunds of wheat or any other crop of equal value. See India, Planning Commission, *Progress of Land Reform* (New Delhi 1963), 62-67.

[47] India, Planning Commission, Panel of Land Reform, *Report of the Committee on Ceiling on Land Holdings* (New Delhi 1961), 8.

[48] India, Planning Commission, Land Reform Division, *Statement to be laid on the Table of the Rajya Sabha in reply to Starred Question No. 475 on 17.8.1966*, mimeographed.

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preventing effective implementation. It is obvious that a number of levers are available to any state government that seriously wishes to implement national policy on cooperation. State acts give the Registrar and his organization extensive regulatory and executive powers over the whole range of operations of cooperative societies. These powers include control over registration of new societies, inspection of their finances, arbitration of disputes, supersession of managing committees negligent of their duties, annual audit, and liquidation. For instance, in most states the Registrar may refuse to register a society on such nebulous grounds as that the aims of the society are not consistent with the principles of "social justice" or are not in keeping with "cooperative principles."[49] Moreover, in the new acts of Madhya Pradesh, Madras, Maharashtra, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, and Gujerat, the Registrar may order compulsory amendments to the bylaws of cooperative societies, including provisions to extend crop loans and link credit with marketing. Since 1956, of course, officers of the state departments of cooperation have actually served as executives in state and central cooperative banks. Finally, and perhaps most important, there is the state's ability to bring financial sanctions against recalcitrant societies. Applications by primary agricultural credit cooperatives and central banks for loans from apex financing institutions must be recommended and approved by senior officers of the cooperation departments. Since the greatest proportion of the working capital of all cooperative societies is derived from outside borrowings, this would seem a sufficient lever in itself to enforce such long-standing policies as the crop-loan system. However, during the three plans, no state government felt strong enough to absorb the political consequences of initiating such an action. Nor, it might be said, did the government of India. The Reserve Bank, which supplied fifty percent of all production credit advanced by the cooperatives, never seriously considered the use of financial penalties to accelerate state compliance with national programs. After ten years of failure to implement national policy on cooperation, the draft outline of the Fourth Plan merely repeats that the government of India is "making concerted attempts to persuade the State Governments and the Cooperative Banks to introduce the crop loan system."[50]

V

During the last years of the Third Plan, important segments of the national leadership showed growing appreciation of the organizational,

[49] *Cooperation in India*, 199. [50] *Fourth Five Year Plan: A Draft Outline*, 136.

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financial, and technical obstacles to the rapid implementation of plan programs in agriculture. Similarly, they recognized that existing patterns of political influence pose formidable long-term barriers to the effective execution of development policies that require extensive social reforms and institutional changes as preconditions for success. Spearheading this reappraisal, the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, in November 1965, called for a reorientation of agricultural programs, including, if necessary, "a clear departure from some old principles having a bearing on production."[51] The Ministry's new approach emphasized the overriding necessity of achieving higher levels of agricultural output, even at some sacrifice of ideological goals. Specifically, it proposed (1) an intensive agricultural development program in approximately one-tenth the cultivated area of the country; (2) saturation of this area with a "package" of inputs, especially new high-yielding seeds, chemical fertilizers, and pesticides; and (3) price incentives to farmers as a stimulus for increased private investment in improved practices. Collectively, these recommendations (along with auxiliary suggestions for increased attention to agricultural research and the more efficient utilization of existing irrigation facilities) were described by the Ministry as their "new strategy" of agricultural development for the Fourth Plan. In reality, the Ministry's proposals represent in broad outline a return to the abortive pre-1953 approach of concentrating scarce inputs and facilities in areas and among farmers best able to utilize them.

Almost immediately, the "new strategy" encountered serious opposition. Influential members of the Congress party and the government, especially important officers of the Planning Commission, vigorously argued that selective and intensive patterns of development would turn India toward capitalistic methods of economic growth and away from socialist goals. V.K.R.V. Rao, then a member of the Planning Commission (Agriculture), set the tone of the criticism when he identified "one very disquieting feature" of the new agricultural strategy as "the uneven distributional character of the benefits of the programme among our farming population." In an address to the Indian Agricultural Research Institute in New Delhi in the summer of 1966, Rao protested, "The selective approach we are following certainly has its logic in production economics; but it is also going to increase interpersonal and regional inequalities among our farmers. . . . Such a development is bound to lead to tensions and discontent in the sixty million farming families and threaten social stability in rural India. It will also

[51] *Reorientation of Programmes of Agricultural Production* (New Delhi 1965), 2.

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be out of tune with the socialist and egalitarian ideals that constitute the motivational base of Indian planning."[52]

Unable to resolve these conflicting pressures, the leadership temporized. The draft outline of the Fourth Plan provides for a program of intensive agricultural development in 32.5 million acres of irrigated land—roughly one-tenth the total cultivated area. Simultaneously, however, the planners appear to have vitiated the prospects of the new program by assurances that "though priority in the allocation of essential inputs will be given to these areas, there is no question of ignoring the non-intensive areas in provision of inputs and administrative and technical personnel."[53] Even more damaging was the announcement in November 1966 by the Food and Agriculture Ministry that, under the Fourth Plan, intensive agricultural development programs would be carried out over 62 million acres—the entire amount of irrigated land under food crops. Although the clear import of this decision is to double the size of the program envisaged in the draft outline of the Fourth Plan, no increase in the availability of essential inputs was projected.[54]

It is, of course, a moot question whether a strategy of selective and intensive development could have been successfully implemented during the 1950's. Certainly, a decision to proceed in earnest with the "new" approach during the Fourth Plan will encounter particularly difficult political problems. Fifteen years of extensive development programs have strengthened parochial interests and demands in virtually every state, district, and Block. At the same time, constant emphasis upon equality and socialism since the early 1950's has substantially heightened political awareness among the rural masses and has excited expectations of tangible gains. Any government that openly adopts a development strategy that favors the more privileged areas and farmers and indefinitely postpones the prospect of improvement for the majority of cultivators may risk its political future. Serious as such problems are, however, they are not the only impediments to effective implementation of the new agricultural policy. At present, another danger is equally acute. It is possible that the planners' persistent concern with egalitarian and socialist values will prompt too rapid an expansion of the new program and reduce essential supplies to the "intensive" agricultural areas below the levels needed to make a substantial impact on

[52] India, Planning Commission, *Agricultural Development in the Fourth Plan*, by V.K.R.V. Rao (New Delhi 1966), 21.
[53] *Fourth Five Year Plan: A Draft Outline*, 175.
[54] *The Statesman* (November 14, 1966).

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production. If that should in fact happen, neither the ideological nor the economic goals of Indian planning are likely to be achieved. The present atmosphere of crisis and confusion would undoubtedly intensify. Frustration among all groups might then increasingly be directed at the political system that symbolizes these failures—for if there is one idea that is steadily gaining ground among all sections of Indian opinion, it is the melancholy notion that the most likely victim of continuing economic inertia will be the democratic system of parliamentary government.

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Research Note

PATTERNS OF REPRESENTATION IN NATIONAL CAPITALS AND INTER-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

By CHADWICK F. ALGER AND STEVEN J. BRAMS*

I. Introduction

ALTHOUGH the first recorded permanent diplomatic mission was established by the Duke of Milan at Genoa over five hundred years ago, knowledge of the structure and functioning of the global diplomatic enterprise is still extremely limited. The often-cited work of Nicolson provides a historical overview of diplomacy, describes some of the norms of recent practice, and enumerates traits of "the ideal diplomatist."[1] Morgenthau has analyzed the importance of diplomatic style to international peace,[2] and others have offered valuable descriptions of the diplomatic practice of single nations.[3] Yet there exist no systematic studies of the diplomatic behavior of nations, nor even comparative statistics on bilateral and multilateral forms of international representation.[4]

In this research note we shall first present data on the location of nearly 25,000 diplomats in 119 nations, including the number of diplomats that each nation sends abroad, the number it receives in its capital, the differences between these two figures, and the average size of the missions that each nation exchanges with all others. We shall then turn to an examination of the memberships of all nations in 161 intergovernmental organizations and compare measures of organizational involve-

* The research on which this research note is based was carried out while Steven J. Brams was a Social Science Research Council Research Training Fellow for 1964-1965 in the International Relations Program of Northwestern University, of which Chadwick F. Alger is Co-Director. Both authors wish to acknowledge the valuable research assistance of Rita J. Baltis and Lucille Mayer.

[1] Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 2nd ed. (London 1950).

[2] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 3rd ed. (New York 1960), 539-72.

[3] American practice is described in Elmer Plischke, *Conduct of American Diplomacy*, 2nd ed. (New York 1961), and Graham H. Stuart, *American Diplomatic and Consular Practice*, 2nd ed. (New York 1952).

[4] A noteworthy exception to this statement is a recent study comparing over time nations' status rankings based on different categories of diplomatic recognition. See J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "The Composition and Status Ordering of the International System: 1815-1940," *World Politics*, XVIII (January 1966), 236-82.

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ment and overlap with the statistics on diplomatic representation. Finally, we shall analyze similarities and differences in patterns of diplomatic exchange in national capitals and patterns of representation in intergovernmental organizations, focusing in particular on the opportunities for contact that these two forms of international representation provide. We shall conclude by assessing the implications of these patterns for integration on a regional and worldwide scale.

II. The Functions of Diplomats

A major theme in recent commentaries on diplomacy concerns the changes that have occurred in the functions of diplomats over the past century. Once considered the personal representatives of monarchs, with free-wheeling authority to act on their behalf, diplomats today are disciplined in their behavior by revolutionary advances in communications that keep them in constant touch with their home governments. While the development of modern communications, coupled with increases in literacy and the growth of mass media, has caused a diminution in the diplomat's role as self-reliant negotiator, he has emerged from royal courts to become an ever more visible representative of his government's interests in, and involvement with, the host nation.

The transformation of classical diplomacy has also been propelled by the growth in the number of international organizations and the increase in direct contact between national officials (heads of state, foreign ministers, other cabinet officials, and so on) and their counterparts in other nations. Testifying not only to the scope but also to the burdens of this increased contact is the United States government's official participation in 1963 in over four hundred multilateral conferences involving ten thousand votes.[5]

The growth in the number of international organizations and in the practice of "counterpart diplomacy" has not meant a decline in the number of diplomatic missions in the capitals of the world. Following World War I there were about 1,100 embassies and legations in approximately 50 nations,[6] but today the number stands at about 4,000 in over 120 nations.[7] These missions now include, in addition to diplomats

[5] Livingston Merchant, "New Techniques in Diplomacy," in E. A. J. Johnson, ed., *The Dimensions of Diplomacy* (Baltimore 1964), 128.

[6] DeWitt C. Poole, *The Conduct of Foreign Relations Under Modern Democratic Conditions* (New Haven 1924), 22.

[7] It should be noted, however, that the increase in the number of nations by a factor of about two and one-half produces about a sixfold increase in the number of *possible* missions that could be exchanged. The fact that the number of missions has not increased by this factor means that the average nation in the world today has *proportionately* fewer missions in other nations than the average nation forty years

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with the traditional skills of foreign-service representatives, numerous kinds of specialists—military, commercial, labor, agricultural, cultural, scientific, and so on—whose combined activities have an impact on virtually the entire spectrum of relations between nations.

While the diplomat's independence as a negotiator has declined, the advice he offers to decision-makers in his capital may on occasion determine what action his nation takes in response to threatening developments in another.[8] An ambassador is reporting from the scene, and the way in which he structures alternatives will have an important bearing on which one is chosen, even if he does not make that choice himself. This element in the diplomatic process has often been overlooked by those who discover in the march of technological forces an inevitable shrinkage in the shadow that diplomats cast.

In summary, a major part of the image that a nation's decision-makers have of the external environment is drawn from the reports of its diplomats abroad. These diplomats serve as the basis of what is by far the most comprehensive communication network that exists among governments.[9] In the section that follows we shall examine the nodal points in this network.[10]

III. Patterns of Diplomatic Exchange

Diplomatic-exchange data have been compiled from lists of diplomats in the national capitals of 104 nations. These *receiving lists* were, in almost all cases, official publications of the host governments and, with ten exceptions, were all printed during the two-year period 1963-1964.[11] In our compilation, honorary representatives and nonprofessional support staff were excluded from the diplomatic totals. Furthermore, only representatives who were physically present in a foreign nation

ago did. This is mostly explained by the large number of small nations today that receive few permanent missions in their capitals and send few abroad.

[8] To cite one example in which this reportedly occurred: Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett's telephone conversation with President Johnson from Santo Domingo on April 28, 1965, which was punctuated by the crackle of gunfire in the Dominican capital, was apparently decisive in provoking the President to order a large troop commitment to the Dominican Republic (*Newsweek*, May 10, 1965, 38).

[9] See Suzanne Keller, "Diplomacy and Communication," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XX (Spring 1956), 176-82.

[10] A systemic analysis of the *linkages* connecting the points for diplomatic exchanges and two other kinds of transaction flows is given in Brams, "Transaction Flows in the International System," *American Political Science Review*, LX (December 1966), 880-98.

[11] The exceptions are the lists of Albania, Algeria, Guinea, Haiti, Liberia, Malagasy Republic, Mali, Malta, Pakistan, and Togo, which were all issued in early 1965.

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were counted; we did not include those serving *in absentia* as representatives to one or more nations—a practice frequently employed by smaller nations, which station representatives only in major and neighboring capitals but gain accreditation for these representatives in many other capitals. Foreign-aid and military-aid personnel were excluded from the figures in order to preserve the comparability of the data across all nations. All specialists (including military) listed as attachés to an embassy or legation were counted in the totals, however, as were consuls residing in national capitals.

Lists of diplomats that a country sent abroad were obtained from forty-five nations, and 1,469 individual missions recorded as sent, as taken from these *sending lists*, were compared with the comparable missions received, as recorded in the receiving lists, to check the reliability of the receiving-list data. Only 153 of the comparisons, or 10.4 percent, differed either by more than five diplomats or by more than a factor of two, even though comparisons were based on sending and receiving lists that differed by as much as two years.[12]

We estimate that our tally of diplomats for 1963-1964 is over ninety percent complete. Receiving-list data were not obtained from fifteen of the 119 nations included in the study, all of which were independent in 1963 (see Table I).[13] These fifteen nations sent 1,362 diplomats to 104 nations from which data were obtained, or 5.8 percent of the total number of diplomats that these nations received (see Table V, footnote *b*). Even if these fifteen nations sent a proportionately high number of diplomats to one another, it is still unlikely that their contribution to the world diplomatic community would exceed ten percent.

The most striking fact about the diplomatic sending data in Table II is the very sizable contribution made to the world diplomatic community by only a few nations. Fifteen nations dispatch over half of all diplomats who are sent abroad, with the United States alone contributing twelve percent to the world total. The United States' corps is almost twice as large as the second-ranking British corps, and so is the average size of her missions. The only embassies that come close to matching United States embassies in average staff size are those of the Soviet Union, but the Soviets have thirty-five fewer embassies in the

[12] The diplomatic-exchange data given in this research note are based only on the 104 receiving lists; the sending totals for each nation given in Table II were derived by summing across all the receiving lists the number of each nation's diplomats that were reported by the host nations as stationed in their capitals.

[13] Very small nations such as Liechtenstein and Monaco have been excluded from the study.

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TABLE I. CODE ABBREVIATIONS OF THE 119 NATIONS IN THE STUDY

Abbreviation	Nation	Abbreviation	Nation	Abbreviation	Nation
1 AFG	Afghanistan	41 GRC	Greece	81 NIG	Nigeria
2 ALB	Albania	42 GUA	Guatemala	82 NOR	Norway
3 ALG	Algeria	43 GUI	Guinea	83 PAK	Pakistan
4 ARG	Argentina	44 HAI	Haiti	84 PAN	Panama
5 AUL	Australia	45 HON	Honduras	85 PAR	Paraguay
6 AUS	Austria	46 HUN	Hungary	86 PER	Peru
7 BEL	Belgium	47 ICE	Iceland	87 PHI	Philippines
8 BOL	Bolivia	48 IND	India	88 POL	Poland
9 BRA	Brazil	49 INS	Indonesia	89 POR	Portugal
10 BUL	Bulgaria	50 IRN	Iran	90 RUM	Rumania
11 BUR	Burma	51 IRQ	Iraq	91 RWA	Rwanda
12 BUU	Burundi	52 IRE	Irish R.	92 SAU	Saudi Arabia
13 CAM	Cambodia	53 ISR	Israel	93 SEN	Senegal
14 CAO	Cameroun	54 ITA	Italy	94 SIE	Sierra Leone
15 CAN	Canada	55 IVO	Ivory Coast	95 SOM	Somali R.
16 CEN	Central African R.	56 JAM	Jamaica	96 SPN	Spain
17 CEY	Ceylon	57 JAP	Japan	97 SUD	Sudan
18 CHA	Chad	58 JOR	Jordan	98 SWD	Sweden
19 CHL	Chile	59 KEN	Kenya	99 SWZ	Switzerland
20 CHN	China (People's R.)	60 KON	Korea (Dem. R.)	100 SYR	Syrian Arab R.
21 CHT	China (R.)	61 KOS	Korea (R.)	101 TAN	Tanganyika
22 COL	Colombia	62 KUW	Kuwait	102 TAI	Thailand
23 CON	Congo (Braz.)	63 LAO	Laos	103 TOG	Togo
24 COP	Congo (Leop.)	64 LEB	Lebanon	104 TRI	Trinidad & Tobago
25 COS	Costa Rica	65 LBR	Liberia	105 TUN	Tunisia
26 CUB	Cuba	66 LBY	Libya	106 TUR	Turkey
27 CYP	Cyprus	67 LUX	Luxembourg	107 UGA	Uganda
28 CZE	Czechoslovakia	68 MAD	Malagasy R.	108 UNS	Union of S. Afr.
29 DAH	Dahomey	69 MAL	Malaysia	109 USR	U.S.S.R.
30 DEN	Denmark	70 MLI	Mali	110 UAR	United Arab R.
31 DOM	Dominican R.	71 MLT	Malta	111 UNK	United Kingdom
32 ECU	Ecuador	72 MAU	Mauritania	112 USA	United States
33 ELS	El Salvador	73 MEX	Mexico	113 UPP	Upper Volta
34 ETH	Ethiopia	74 MON	Mongolia	114 URU	Uruguay
35 FIN	Finland	75 MOR	Morocco	115 VEN	Venezuela
36 FRN	France	76 NEP	Nepal	116 VTN	Vietnam (Dem. R.)
37 GAB	Gabon	77 NTH	Netherlands	117 VTS	Vietnam (R.)
38 GME	Germany (Dem. R.)	78 NEW	New Zealand	118 YEM	Yemen
39 GMW	Germany (Fed. R.)	79 NIC	Nicaragua	119 YUG	Yugoslavia
40 GHA	Ghana	80 NIR	Niger		

world. Significantly, missions from Communist China rank fifth highest in average size, and their number has grown.[14]

The lower end of Table II dramatically reveals that most nations are quantitatively involved in only a very small portion of all diplomatic intercourse. One hundred four nations have diplomats stationed in fewer than half of the national capitals, seventy nations have missions in fewer than thirty capitals, and forty-five nations are represented in fewer than twenty capitals. In capitals where nations do have representatives, the embassies of more than half (sixty-one) average four or fewer diplomats per mission.

[14] Although we were unable to obtain a Peking diplomatic list, the sending and receiving lists of other nations provided much information on Communist China. As of October 1966, Communist China had missions in forty-eight nations instead of the thirty-eight given in Table II (private correspondence, Donald W. Klein, October 26, 1966).

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TABLE II. DIPLOMATS SENT ABROAD BY 119 NATIONS IN 1963-1964

Nation	No. Dipls.	No. Nations Sent To	Avg.No. Dipls. Sent	Nation	No. Dipls.	No. Nations Sent To	Avg.No. Dipls. Sent	Nation	No. Dipls.	No. Nations Sent To	Avg.No. Dipls. Sent
1 USA	2782	100	27.8	42 SAU	155	25	6.2	85 CAM	53	13	4.1
2 UNK	1403	96	14.6	44 PHI	154	26	5.9	85 HAI	53	24	2.2
3 USR	1345	65	20.7	45 GME	153	16	9.6	87 PAR	50	18	2.8
4 FRN	1152	98	11.8	46 NIG	151	26	5.8	88 YEM	49	15	3.3
5 GMW	671	88	7.6	47 IRQ	140	27	5.2	89 IRE	46	16	2.9
6 JAP	638	71	9.0	48 FIN	139	48	2.9	89 LAO	46	11	4.2
7 UAR	550	67	8.2	49 POR	137	43	3.2	91 MON	43	11	3.9
8 ITA	511	87	5.9	50 VEN	133	38	3.5	92 CAO	41	10	4.1
9 IND	467	64	7.3	51 PER	131	35	3.7	93 IVO	39	12	3.3
10 CZE	422	57	7.4	52 MOR	129	32	4.0	93 SOM	39	10	3.9
11 TUR	392	54	7.3	53 COL	127	35	3.6	95 MLT	37	19	1.9
12 CHN	389	38	10.2	54 SYR	118	25	4.7	96 SIE	35	8	4.4
13 CAN	388	55	7.1	55 KON	111	18	6.2	97 CYP	34	7	4.9
14 POL	386	55	7.0	56 VTS	107	21	5.1	97 HON	34	13	2.6
15 RUM	360	40	9.0	57 URU	106	36	2.9	99 COP	33	7	4.7
16 NTH	352	74	4.8	58 PAN	103	31	3.3	99 UPP	33	10	3.3
17 INS	348	47	7.4	59 ALG	102	24	4.3	101 NEP	31	11	2.8
18 SPN	306	59	5.2	59 ECU	102	27	3.8	102 JAM	25	4	6.3
19 ARG	301	60	5.0	61 TUN	99	28	3.5	103 CON	22	9	2.4
20 BRA	300	60	5.0	62 SUD	93	27	3.4	104 DAH	19	8	2.4
21 ISR	292	64	4.6	63 LEB	91	42	2.2	104 MAD	19	4	4.8
22 AUL	280	34	8.2	63 NEW	91	12	7.6	106 ICE	18	8	2.3
22 YUG	280	57	4.9	65 BUR	85	20	4.3	106 TRI	18	5	3.6
24 BEL	279	72	3.9	66 AFG	83	20	4.2	108 LUX	17	8	2.1
25 CHT	268	46	5.8	67 BOL	82	27	3.0	109 CEN	16	7	2.3
26 HUN	264	42	6.3	67 DOM	82	23	3.6	109 CHA	16	6	2.7
27 IRN	248	36	6.9	67 JOR	82	22	3.7	109 TOG	16	5	3.2
28 BUL	247	47	5.3	70 ETH	81	25	3.2	112 NIR	15	8	1.9
29 SWZ	240	70	3.4	70 VTN	81	17	4.8	113 BUU	11	5	2.2
30 SWD	237	64	3.7	72 NIC	78	19	4.1	113 MAU	11	5	2.2
31 GRC	218	43	5.1	73 COS	77	22	3.5	115 GAB	10	4	2.5
32 CUB	216	41	5.3	74 SEN	72	23	3.1	116 TAN	9	3	3.0
33 GHA	212	42	5.0	75 ELS	70	20	3.5	117 RWA	8	5	1.6
34 DEN	201	58	3.5	76 LBY	68	17	4.0	118 UGA	6	2	3.0
35 TAI	191	29	6.6	77 GUA	67	22	3.0	119 KEN	2	1	2.0
36 PAK	188	43	4.4	78 CEY	66	22	3.0				
37 MEX	186	44	4.2	79 MAL	65	14	4.6				
38 UNS	163	19	8.6	80 GUI	63	17	3.7	Total	23356	3712	. .
39 AUS	162	53	3.1	81 ALB	56	15	3.7	Mean	196	31	4.9[a]
40 CHL	161	44	3.7	81 KUW	56	13	4.3	Median	102	25	4.0
41 NOR	156	42	3.7	83 MLI	55	18	3.1	Stnd Dev	329	23	3.3
42 KOS	155	25	6.2	84 LBR	54	23	2.3	Skewness[b]	+0.9	+0.8	+0.7

[a] This figure is an average of averages. An alternative interpretation of this mean would be the quotient of the totals of the two preceding columns, which is equal to 6.3.

[b] The skewness coefficient is defined as 3(Mn-Md)/SD, where Mn is the mean, Md the median, and SD the standard deviation. It may range between -3.0 and +3.0--though a distribution is considered quite skewed if its coefficient is in the vicinity of +1.0 or -1.0--with a negative value indicating a distribution skewed to the left (values concentrated at high end of scale) and a positive value indicating a distribution skewed to the right (values concentrated at low end of scale).

As is shown by the diplomatic receiving data in Table III, most of the ranks conform to commonsense notions of the diplomatic prominence of various capitals. The United States and the United Kingdom rank one and two, respectively, in the number of diplomats they receive as well as in the number they send. The United Arab Republic also duplicates on the receiving table her high sending rank of seven; this receiving rank undoubtedly reflects the importance of Cairo as a focus of diplomatic maneuvering in the Arab-African world. West Germany, on the other hand, ranking behind both France and the Soviet Union

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Table III. Diplomats Received in National Capitals of 104 Nations in 1963-1964

Nation	No. Dipls.	No. Nations Rec'd. From	Avg. No. Dipls. Rec'd.
1 USA	1418	107	13.3
2 UNK	1305	96	13.6
3 GMW	778	94	8.3
4 USR	732	69	10.6
5 FRN	716	98	7.3
6 ITA	707	85	8.3
7 UAR	559	73	7.7
8 IND	530	66	8.0
9 JAP	494	70	7.1
10 BEL	473	75	6.3
11 BRA	431	56	7.7
12 AUS	420	62	6.8
13 CAN	383	52	7.4
14 LEB	366	57	6.4
15 TUR	353	49	7.2
16 SPN	342	57	6.0
17 INS	339	47	7.2
17 ALG	339	49	6.9
19 YUG	324	56	5.8
20 PAK	321	48	6.7
20 CZE	321	53	6.1
22 SWZ	315	58	5.4
22 MEX	315	47	6.7
24 POL	301	41	7.3
25 SWD	287	52	5.5
26 TAI	286	35	8.2
27 NTH	258	52	5.0
28 IRQ	249	39	6.4
29 IRN	246	38	6.5
30 GRC	245	38	6.4
31 GHA	242	53	4.6
32 NOR	240	50	4.8
33 DEN	231	43	5.4
34 BUR	230	32	7.2
35 ISR	229	49	4.7
36 RUM	228	34	6.7
37 NIG	223	51	4.4
38 CHL	214	45	4.8
39 HUN	209	34	6.1
39 BUL	209	43	4.9
41 URU	206	41	5.0
42 PER	203	37	5.5
43 CUB	201	37	5.4
44 AUL	190	39	4.9
45 GME	186	17	10.9
46 FIN	182	35	5.2
47 PHI	180	27	6.7
48 SYR	179	35	5.1
49 POR	175	34	5.1
49 NOR	175	35	5.0
51 VEN	174	34	5.1
52 VTS	173	20	8.6
53 PAN	172	42	4.1
54 JOR	165	36	4.6
55 SEN	163	38	4.3
56 COL	162	37	4.4
57 GUI	158	32	4.9
57 COP	158	30	5.3
57 CEY	158	34	4.6
60 SUD	153	36	4.3
61 MAL	140	22	6.4
62 CAM	132	22	6.0
63 ETH	129	32	4.0
64 LEB	127	22	5.8
65 LAO	125	13	9.6
65 SAU	125	34	3.7
67 ECU	122	34	3.6
68 CHT	120	22	5.5
69 MLI	115	23	5.0
70 CYP	109	18	6.1
70 AFG	109	23	4.7
72 GUA	108	27	4.0
73 ELS	104	29	3.6
73 TAN	104	27	3.9
75 LBR	99	25	4.0
76 UNS	98	19	5.2
77 PAR	95	21	4.5
77 KOS	95	12	7.9
79 SOM	92	16	5.8
80 COS	88	24	3.7
80 NEW	88	22	4.0
82 CAO	80	16	5.0
83 HON	75	19	3.9
83 KEN	75	20	3.8
85 CON	60	12	5.0
86 ALB	59	16	3.7
87 HAI	58	23	2.5
88 IRE	57	18	3.2
89 NEP	52	9	5.8
89 UGA	52	14	3.7
91 MAD	51	13	3.9
91 NIC	51	20	2.5
93 JAM	50	14	3.6
93 SIE	50	15	3.3
95 KUW	49	14	3.5
96 TOG	45	12	3.8
97 TRI	44	9	4.9
98 CHA	40	11	3.6
99 ICE	35	9	3.9
100 LUX	32	9	3.6
101 CEN	29	9	3.2
102 MAU	26	5	5.2
103 GAB	23	5	4.6
104 MLT	18	4	4.5
ARG	No Data		
BOL	No Data		
BUU	No Data		
CHN	No Data		
DAH	No Data		
DOM	No Data		
IVO	No Data		
KON	No Data		
MON	No Data		
NIR	No Data		
RWA	No Data		
TUN	No Data		
UPP	No Data		
VTN	No Data		
YEM	No Data		
Total	23356	3712	. .
Mean	225	38	5.6[a]
Median	173	34	5.1
Stnd Dev	225	26	2.0
Skewness[b]	+0.7	+0.2	+0.8

[a] This figure is an average of averages. An alternative interpretation of this mean would be the quotient of the totals of the two preceding columns, which is equal to 6.3.

[b] See Table II, Footnote b, for definition of skewness coefficient.

on the sending table, outranks both in the number of diplomats she receives in her capital. Belgium's twenty-fourth position as a sending country is raised (to tenth) as a receiving country, probably as a result of her importance as a headquarters for European organizations.

It is interesting to compare the top ten nations today, ranked according to the number of missions in their capitals, with the rankings some forty years ago (see Table IV). Quite surprisingly, only four nations—the UAR, Japan, the Soviet Union, and India—have broken into the top ten, and all fall at the bottom of the ladder, while the United States

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TABLE IV. TOP TEN NATIONS RANKED ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN THEIR CAPITALS IN 1922 AND 1963-1964

1922[a]		1963-1964	
Nation	*Number of Missions*	*Nation*	*Number of Missions*
1. France	50	1. United States	107
1. United Kingdom	50	2. France	98
3. United States	48	3. United Kingdom	96
4. Italy	44	4. Germany (Fed. R.)	94
5. Germany	40	5. Italy	85
6. Belgium	32	6. Belgium	75
6. Netherlands	32	7. United Arab Republic	73
8. Spain	31	8. Japan	70
9. Brazil	30	9. Soviet Union	69
10. Austria/Switzerland	29	10. India	66

[a] Adapted from inside cover map of DeWitt C. Poole, *The Conduct of Foreign Relations Under Modern Democratic Conditions* (New Haven 1924). The year 1922 is approximate; data were taken from the 1923 edition of the *Almanach de Gotha* (Gotha, Germany, 1923).

and the top five European nations have remained about where they were. Among the newcomers, the Soviet Union made the largest jump, from a rank of forty with only ten missions in 1922 to her 1963-1964 rank of nine (third in absolute number of diplomats) with sixty-nine missions. The UAR (Egypt) rose from the thirty-fourth rank (fifteen missions) and Japan from the eighteenth rank (twenty-four missions); India, of course, was not an independent nation in 1922.

The mean and median number of diplomats that a nation sent abroad in 1963-1964 (see Table II) are substantially lower than the mean and median number of diplomats it received in its capital (see Table III). This is due principally to the fact that the sending statistics are based on incomplete data for 119 nations while the receiving statistics are based on complete data for 104 nations. The former statistics *underestimate* the size of the average (mean), and probably the size of the most typical (median), diplomatic corps by five to ten percent—the true values are probably about 210 and 110, respectively—because of the missing receiving-list data from fifteen nations. The receiving statistics probably *overestimate* slightly both the mean and median size of the diplomatic communities in national capitals—probably about 210 and 160, respectively—because most of the missing data are from small nations. It should be noted that the mean number of diplomats received in na-

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tional capitals always equals the mean number of diplomats that nations send to them.

If the number of diplomats that a nation contributes to the international system can be thought of as an indicator of the nation's overall involvement in world affairs, then the difference between the number of diplomats a nation sends abroad and the number it receives in its capital might be considered an index of its *world interest balance*.[15] A positive balance would indicate that a nation expends more human resources on observing and reporting on the world than the world expends on observing and reporting on it. In Table V, nations are ranked according to their balances and average balances in diplomatic exchanges. Only twenty-five percent of the nations had positive or "favorable" diplomatic balances in 1963-1964. This compares with twenty-six percent that had favorable trade balances in 1964.[16]

The diplomatic balance of the United States outstrips that of all other nations in magnitude: her absolute "excess" of diplomats is more than twice that of any other nation, and, in relative terms, her foreign embassies outdistance embassies in Washington by an average of fifteen diplomats per embassy, whereas her nearest competitors, the Soviet Union and France, outdo their capital embassies by averages of ten and four diplomats, respectively. Surprisingly, Britain has only a small positive balance of diplomats, and Italy and West Germany actually have negative balances. On the other hand, the internationalist orientation of the Communist states is reflected by the fact that all Eastern European nations except East Germany—whose diplomatic intercourse is vastly curtailed because she is not recognized by most nations in the world—have either positive absolute or positive average balances of diplomats.

Our examination of patterns of diplomatic representation has shown that most nations have opportunities for direct contact in their capitals and abroad with representatives from relatively few nations. To shed further light on the reservoirs of information from which decision-makers fashion images of their counterparts in other nations, we now turn to an examination of the participation of nations in intergovernmental organizations.

[15] Kenneth E. Boulding has suggested related indices for measuring friendliness and hostility in the world. See his "National Images and International Systems," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, III (June 1959), 121.

[16] International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Direction of Trade, Annual 1960-64* (Washington 1965), 3-9. These two balances for all nations have a coefficient of linear correlation of .55, indicating a moderate association between a nation's capability for maintaining favorable balances in the different kinds of international relations.

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TABLE V. BALANCES IN DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES: DIPLOMATS SENT MINUS DIPLOMATS RECEIVED FOR 104 NATIONS IN 1963-1964[a]

Nation	Dipls. Sent Minus Rec'd.	Avg. Sent Minus Rec'd.	Nation	Dipls. Sent Minus Rec'd.	Avg. Sent Minus Rec'd.	Nation	Dipls. Sent Minus Rec'd.	Avg. Sent Minus Rec'd.
1 USA	1364	14.6	43 PHI	-26	-3.0	87 CEY	-92	-1.6
2 USR	613	10.1	43 TRI	-26	-1.3	88 GUI	-95	-1.2
3 FRN	436	4.4	46 GRC	-27	-1.4	88 TAN	-95	-0.9
4 CHT	148	0.4	47 TOG	-29	-0.5	88 TAI	-95	-1.6
5 JAP	144	1.9	48 DEN	-30	-1.9	91 URU	-100	-2.1
6 RUM	132	2.3	48 GHA	-30	0.5	92 GMW	-107	-0.7
7 CZE	101	1.3	50 MAD	-32	0.8	93 IRQ	-109	-1.2
8 UNK	98	1.0	51 GME	-33	-1.4	94 MOR	-111	-0.8
9 NTH	94	-0.2	52 ELS	-34	-0.1	95 COP	-125	-0.6
10 AUL	90	3.4	53 COL	-35	-0.7	96 MEX	-129	-2.5
11 POL	85	-0.3	54 SPN	-36	-0.8	97 BRA	-131	-2.7
12 UNS	65	3.4	55 CON	-38	-2.6	98 PAK	-133	-2.3
13 ISR	63	-0.1	55 POP	-38	-2.0	99 BUR	-145	-2.9
14 KOS	60	-1.7	57 CAO	-39	-0.9	100 BEL	-194	-2.4
15 HUN	55	0.1	58 GUA	-41	-1.0	101 ITA	-196	-2.4
16 TUR	39	0.1	58 HON	-41	-1.3	102 ALG	-237	-2.7
17 BUL	38	0.4	58 VEN	-41	-1.6	103 AUS	-258	-3.7
18 SAU	30	0.9	61 FIN	-43	-2.3	104 LEB	-275	-4.3
19 NIC	27	1.6	62 YUG	-44	-0.9			
20 MLT	19	-2.6	63 LBR	-45	-1.6	ARG	No Data	
21 CUB	15	-0.2	63 PAR	-45	-1.7	BOL	No Data	
22 INS	9	0.2	65 UGA	-46	-0.7	BUU	No Data	
23 KUW	7	0.8	66 ETH	-48	-0.8	CHN	No Data	
24 CAN	5	-0.3	67 SWD	-50	-1.8	DAH	No Data	
25 NEW	3	3.6	68 CHL	-53	-1.1	DOM	No Data	
26 IRN	2	0.4	68 SOM	-53	-1.8	IVO	No Data	
27 ALB	-3	0.0	70 LBY	-59	-1.8	KON	No Data	
28 HAI	-5	-0.3	71 MLI	-60	-1.9	MON	No Data	
29 UAR	-9	0.6	71 SUD	-60	-0.8	NIR	No Data	
30 COS	-11	-0.2	73 SYR	-61	-0.4	RWA	No Data	
30 IRE	-11	-0.3	74 IND	-63	-0.7	TUN	No Data	
32 CEN	-13	-0.9	75 VTS	-66	-3.6	UPP	No Data	
32 GAB	-13	-2.1	76 PAN	-69	-0.8	VTN	No Data	
34 LUX	-15	-1.4	77 NIG	-72	1.4	YEM	No Data	
34 MAU	-15	-3.0	77 PER	-72	-1.7			
34 SIE	-15	1.0	79 KEN	-73	-1.8			
37 ICE	-17	-1.6	80 CYP	-75	-1.2	Total	-1362[b]	. .
38 NOR	-19	-1.3	80 MAL	-75	-1.7	Mean	- 13[b]	-0.6[c]
39 ECU	-20	0.2	80 SWZ	-75	-2.0	Median	- 35	-0.9
40 NEP	-21	-3.0	83 CAM	-79	-1.9	Stnd Dev	173	2.4
41 CHA	-24	-1.0	83 LAO	-79	-5.4	Skewness[d]	+ 0.4	+0.4
42 JAM	-25	2.7	85 JOR	-83	-0.9			
43 AFG	-26	-0.6	86 SEN	-91	-1.2			

[a] These figures and those derived from Tables II and III may differ slightly owing to the rounding of figures in Tables II and III.

[b] The number of diplomats sent is, of course, the same as the number of diplomats received; these discrepancies are a consequence of the fact that we do not have receiving data for fifteen of the 119 countries that are recorded as sending diplomats abroad. Because we did not have receiving data for these fifteen countries, we did not count in the balances diplomats sent by them, although these diplomats were unquestionably received by the 104 countries on which we did have receiving data.

[c] This figure is equal to zero when interpreted as the difference of the alternative means given in Tables II and III.

[d] See Table II, Footnote b, for definition of skewness coefficient.

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IV. Patterns of Representation in Intergovernmental Organizations

Alger has observed that the participation of nations in the United Nations encourages the development of "new contacts, cooperative activity, and interest groups that cut across older interest groups and regional groupings," and these, he argues, tend to inhibit the development of rigid and irreparable cleavages between antagonistic groups of nations.[17] Contacts in the United Nations constitute only a small fraction of the cross-cutting organizational affiliations of nations, however, and that is why it is useful to examine the multiple routes of access that the web of overlapping memberships of nations in *all* intergovernmental organizations provides.

Intergovernmental organizations (IGO's), whose members are all national governments, embrace a multifarious assortment of substantive concerns. There is the International Office of Epizootics in Paris, which conducts research on contagious diseases of livestock, and there is the International Tea Committee in London; in Geneva there is the Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, and in Rome there is the International Computation Center; the Administrative Center of Social Security for Rhine Boatmen is located in Strasbourg, France, and the Desert Locust Control Organization for Eastern Africa has headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya; and to keep track of these and more than 150 other IGO's, as well as more than 1,500 nongovernmental organizations, there is the Union of International Associations in Brussels.

While the individual contribution of each of the above and many other highly specialized organizations to the main stream of international relations is probably quite negligible, the impact of such well-known organizations as NATO, SEATO, the OAS, the ECSC, the EEC, and COMECON on the course of a nation's foreign relations may be far from negligible. Indeed, Claude observes that "the process of international organization . . . may ultimately prove to be the most significant dynamic element in the developing reality of international relations."[18]

In order to capture part of this reality and compare it with relevant aspects of diplomatic representation in national capitals, we have cal-

[17] Alger, "Intergovernmental Relations in Organizations and Their Effect on International Conflict," in Elton B. McNeil, ed., *The Nature of Human Conflict* (Englewood Cliffs 1965), 277-79.

[18] Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization*, 3rd ed. (New York 1964), 4.

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culated the number of memberships in 161 IGO's which each nation shared in 1963 with all other nations given in Table I (with the exception of Malta, for which data were not available).[19] The number of these shared memberships for each nation is given in Table VI, along with the number of different nations (out of a total of 118) with which it shared at least one membership in an IGO.[20] From these two figures we have computed the *average* number of IGO's to which each nation and all of its co-member nations (from at least one IGO) belonged.[21]

We have deliberately excluded from the IGO shared-membership figures in Table VI the United Nations and its fourteen specialized agencies (including, for example, the Universal Postal Union, the World Health Organization, the International Labor Organization, and the International Monetary Fund). Because these nearly universal organizations, with a few exceptions, include nearly all nations in the world, they would tend to add a constant to the number of shared memberships of a nation but would not significantly affect a nation's standing relative to other nations.

Turning to the IGO shared-membership data in Table VI, we find that France tops the list, with the next twelve ranks filled only by nations of Western Europe (including Great Britain) and Scandinavia. By contrast, the United States and the Soviet Union rank only fourteenth and fortieth, respectively, in number of shared memberships. Although the two superpowers contribute nearly seventeen percent

[19] The shared-membership data were computer-calculated from the nation-IGO table given in the *Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations: United Nations* (New York 1963), 258-65. Only members—not associate members, observers, participating nations, adhering nations, or signatory nations—are included in the IGO figures.

[20] This latter figure is not equal to the number of IGO's of which the nation was a member. Although the number of IGO's to which a nation belongs has very high linear correlations with the number of its shared memberships (.97) and the average number of its shared memberships (.96), the number of IGO memberships of a nation cannot be derived from the data in Table VI. For purposes of comparative analysis, the advantage of the *shared*-membership figure over that of just IGO memberships is the conceptual linkage of shared memberships to diplomatic exchanges: both are *direct* measures of internation contact. One writer, in fact, has conceptualized shared memberships as an index of a nation's organizational "involvements." See Robert C. Angell, "An Analysis of Trends in International Organizations," *Peace Research Society: Papers*, III (1965), 189.

[21] Another way to think of shared memberships is to consider all IGO's convened. The number of shared memberships of a nation is the total number of delegates with whom all of its IGO representatives sit at the same table (assuming one delegate per nation per IGO); the average number of shared memberships is the average number of times its representatives and delegates from one co-member nation sit at the same table. To illustrate for a world containing only two IGO's and four nations: if one IGO has nations A, B, and C as members and the other IGO has nations A, B, and D as members, nation A has four shared memberships with three nations (one shared membership each with C and D, two with B); the average number of its shared memberships is $4/3 = 1.3$.

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TABLE VI. SHARED MEMBERSHIPS OF 118 NATIONS IN 161 IGO'S IN 1963

	Nation	No. Shared Mem'shps	No. Nations Shared With	Avg. No. Shared IGO's		Nation	No. Shared Mem'shps	No. Nations Shared With	Avg. No Shared IGO's		Nation	No. Shared Mem'shps	No. Nations Shared With	Avg. No. Shared IGO's
1	FRN	1734	110	15.8	43	PER	718	103	7.0	85	BUR	235	75	3.1
2	UNK	1610	111	14.5	44	GUA	701	96	7.3	86	GAB	233	96	2.4
3	BEL	1591	109	14.6	45	BUL	688	106	6.5	87	MAU	228	88	2.6
4	ITA	1581	106	14.9	46	CUB	666	99	6.7	88	CAO	220	95	2.3
5	NTH	1557	105	14.8	47	HAI	665	101	6.6	89	CON	206	94	2.2
6	GMW	1427	106	13.5	48	NEW	644	103	6.3	90	COP	201	97	2.1
7	SPN	1288	105	12.3	49	LEB	639	103	6.2	90	LBR	201	99	2.0
8	DEN	1279	103	12.4	50	INS	624	102	6.1	92	LBY	192	80	2.4
9	AUS	1266	104	12.2	51	TUN	614	104	5.9	93	SIE	184	95	1.9
10	SWZ	1261	105	12.0	52	COS	612	95	6.4	94	AFG	178	87	2.0
11	NOR	1248	104	12.0	53	PAN	596	87	6.9	95	IVO	173	74	2.3
12	POR	1222	109	11.2	53	PAR	596	81	7.4	96	MLI	170	82	2.1
13	GRC	1196	104	11.5	55	IRN	569	99	5.7	97	CHA	166	83	2.0
14	USA	1141	103	11.1	56	ELS	567	94	6.0	98	DAH	162	81	2.0
15	BRA	1117	108	10.3	57	BOL	565	87	6.5	99	ALB	148	75	2.0
16	SWD	1113	102	10.9	58	NIC	557	85	6.6	99	UGA	148	79	1.9
17	MEX	1078	106	10.2	59	VTS	523	101	5.2	101	GUI	131	81	1.6
18	JAP	1052	105	10.0	60	CHT	521	101	5.2	102	KUW	104	60	1.7
19	TUR	1015	100	10.1	61	ICE	508	86	5.5	103	RWA	94	66	1.4
20	ARG	1002	102	9.8	62	HON	507	93	5.5	104	ETH	81	55	1.5
21	YUG	994	104	9.6	63	TAI	489	93	5.3	105	UPP	77	28	2.8
22	FIN	969	107	9.1	64	KOS	475	101	4.7	106	BUU	69	56	1.2
23	LUX	952	106	9.0	65	PHI	441	91	4.8	106	KEN	69	41	1.7
24	POL	924	108	8.6	66	UNS	436	97	4.5	108	TRI	63	57	1.1
25	ECU	902	108	8.4	67	IRQ	388	97	4.0	109	GME	60	29	2.1
26	IND	897	102	8.8	68	CAM	387	95	4.1	110	NEP	53	22	2.4
27	DOM	893	102	8.8	69	CEY	368	92	4.0	111	SOM	50	30	1.7
28	VEN	857	105	8.2	70	NIG	366	106	3.5	112	TOG	44	36	1.2
29	CHL	856	99	8.6	71	SUD	362	100	3.6	112	YEM	44	12	3.7
30	COL	852	105	8.1	72	JOR	315	97	3.2	114	JAM	35	35	1.0
31	CAN	846	105	8.1	72	SYR	315	84	3.8	115	MON	31	12	2.6
32	AUL	836	106	7.9	74	ALG	294	90	3.3	116	CHN	23	12	1.9
32	RUM	836	108	7.7	75	TAN	268	93	2.9	116	KON	23	12	1.9
34	UAR	800	102	7.8	76	SAU	266	85	3.1	116	VTN	23	12	1.9
35	CZE	797	107	7.4	77	CEN	261	95	2.7					
36	ISR	794	104	7.6	78	MAD	254	97	2.6		MLT	No Data		
37	HUN	777	107	7.3	78	MAL	254	84	3.0					
38	MOR	765	104	7.4	80	XEN	253	97	2.6					
39	IRE	744	99	7.5	81	CYP	248	77	3.2		Total	67640	10412	. .[a]
40	USR	740	105	7.0	81	GHA	248	97	2.6		Mean	573	88	5.9[a]
41	URU	734	90	7.6	83	NIR	244	94	2.6		Median	522	97	5.6
42	PAK	725	104	7.0	84	LAO	241	88	2.7		Strnd Dev	428	25	3.7
											Skewness[b]	+0.4	-1.1	+0.2

[a] This figure is an average of averages. An alternative interpretation of this mean would be the quotient of the totals of the two preceding columns, which is equal to 6.5.

[b] See Table II, Footnote b, for definition of skewness coefficient.

of all diplomats to the world community, they have a combined total of less than three percent of all shared memberships in the world.

A comparison of the organizational roots of Communist countries in the international system is revealing. The most "revisionist" of the Communist countries, Yugoslavia, also has the highest number of shared memberships, with Poland and Rumania, two Soviet-bloc nations that have shown considerable independence in the past, ranking not far behind. Forebodingly, the four Asian Communist countries—China, Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam—fall at the very

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bottom of the table, indicating their almost total lack of any cooperative institutional relations with the rest of the world.

When the 161 IGO's are classified by region, the reason for the high ranks of the European nations becomes evident: there are more regionally oriented IGO's in Western Europe and Scandinavia (thirty-five) than in all other regions combined (see Table VII). The only nonregional IGO's overlapping two continents in significant numbers are the thirteen that cut across North America and Latin America. Of the remaining eighty-two nonregional IGO's, the functional interests of forty-six are global in scope, although their memberships generally are not, and thirty-six encompass a wide variety of different regional combinations.

TABLE VII. CLASSIFICATION OF 161 IGO'S BY REGION

REGION	NUMBER OF IGO'S
Western Europe, Scandinavia	35
Africa	17
Latin America	9
Asia	2
Eastern Europe	2
Middle East	1
North America	0
None of the above	95
Total	161

The ninety-five IGO's that overlap regional boundaries increase the opportunities for small nations, which exchange diplomatic representatives with few nations outside their region, to develop interregional contacts. These ties could provide the seeds for the development of integrative ties on a worldwide scale, although, as in the case of Western Europe, a high number of regional organizations may vitiate the integrative effect of global associations that span two or more regions.

V. COMPARISON OF DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES, IGO MEMBERSHIPS, AND TRADE

Does the exchange of diplomats, the sharing of IGO memberships, or the movement of other kinds of transactions between nations suggest any patterns common to all international relations? This question can be answered either in terms of the characteristics common to nations or the characteristics common to their relations, but in this re-

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search note we shall limit our analysis to the comparison of characteristics common to nations.

The extent of a nation's involvement in diplomacy, participation in intergovernmental organizations, and expenditures in international trade are all significantly related (see Table VIII).[22] The number of

TABLE VIII. CORRELATION MATRIX FOR DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES, TRADE, AND IGO (SHARED) MEMBERSHIPS[a]

VARIABLE	No. Diplomats Sent	No. Diplomats Rec'd.	Exports (in $)	Imports (in $)	No. Shared Memberships
No. Diplomats Rec'd.	.83				
Exports (in $)	.85	.80			
Imports (in $)	.85	.83	.98		
No. Shared Memberships	.50	.54	.49	.56	
No. Memberships	.51	.60	.54	.62	.97

[a] All correlation coefficients are product moment, with N's $\geqq$ 104.

diplomats that a nation sends abroad and the number it receives in its capital correlate at an especially high level with its exports and imports (the four coefficients bounded by the solid rectangle in Table VIII range from .80 to .85), suggesting the unitary character of a nation's trade and diplomatic activities in the international system. The correlations support Russett's conclusion that "trade is more than an economic relationship. It tends strongly to mirror political and social community."[23]

The correlations between number of memberships and shared memberships in IGO's and both diplomatic exchanges and trade are moderately strong (the eight coefficients bounded by the dotted rectangle in Table VIII range from .49 to .62) but weaker than the correlations between diplomatic exchanges and trade. The participation of nations

[22] Since the correlation coefficients in Table VIII are based on nearly the universe of nations, tests of significance, as ordinarily applied to determine whether a particular relationship between two variables could occur by chance, are not applicable. However, if we can consider our data for the early 1960's to be representative of data chosen randomly from a longer time frame (say, the entire decade of the 1960's), then for an N of 104 a correlation coefficient of .30 would be significant at the .001 level. All coefficients in Table VIII are well above these levels.

[23] Bruce M. Russett, *Trends in World Politics* (New York 1965), 33.

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in IGO's would thus appear to be somewhat independent of their highly correlated involvement in diplomatic exchanges and trade. It should be noted that in both diplomatic and trading relationships nations tend to be highly responsive to each other: the correlation between total number of diplomats sent and total number of diplomats received is .83; between exports and imports, .98.

Figure 1 offers a useful alternative perspective for comparing the opportunities for contact provided by diplomatic missions in national



FIGURE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF DIPLOMATIC AND IGO LINKAGES (Diplomatic linkages refer to the number of missions a nation sends abroad; IGO linkages refer to the number of different IGO co-members of a nation.)

capitals and the opportunities for contact provided by memberships in IGO's. The solid line relates the number of nations that are linked to other nations by diplomatic missions abroad, and the dotted line relates the number of nations that are linked to other nations through the shar-

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ing of one or more memberships in IGO's. The *bi*modal points on the diplomatic-linkage curve reveal that fifty nations send diplomats to only ten to twenty-nine other nations. In sharp contrast, the peak of the IGO-linkage curve reveals that forty-nine nations share IGO memberships with 100-109 other nations. Put in cumulative terms, national-capital diplomacy offers fifteen nations opportunity for contact with more than half the nations whereas IGO memberships provide to almost seven times this number of nations (103) contact with over half the nations.[24]

VI. Conclusion

The most important conclusion that emerges from our analysis is that organizational ties provide most nations with far greater access to the outside world than do diplomatic ties. While only one-eighth of all nations have diplomatic representatives in more than half the world capitals, seven-eighths of all nations have organizational affiliations with more than half of all other nations. Organizational ties thus provide communication links between many nations that have no bilateral exchanges of diplomats.

The ninety-five IGO's that transcend regional boundaries could serve as important mechanisms for strengthening *inter*regional ties that have perhaps been loosened by recent efforts toward regional integration. The cross-pressures that the members of nonregional IGO's are able to exert could turn out to be especially significant in mitigating conflicts between big powers in different regions. These IGO's offer to small powers in particular, which often do not exchange diplomats with each other, channels for mediating big-power disputes and opportunities for fostering peaceful change.

Differences in patterns of diplomatic and organizational representation should not obscure some important similarities. Diplomatic exchanges and IGO affiliations are correlated with each other at moderately high levels, and the relationship between diplomatic exchanges and trade is even stronger. In addition, inbound and outbound flows of both diplomats and trade dollars appear *in toto* to be highly responsive to each other.

These findings should be qualified by the recognition that the representational patterns that we have analyzed are based only on aggregate

[24] Another way of characterizing the differences in the curves is by comparing the skewness coefficients given in Tables II and VI. The right-skewness of the diplomatic-linkage curve is indicated by the coefficient of +0.8, and the even sharper left-skewness of the IGO-linkage curve by the coefficient of −1.1.

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figures for all nations and do not take into account the effect of particular organizational or diplomatic relationships on a nation's foreign policy. We believe that the data presented here can serve both as a useful backdrop for more substantive explorations of international relations and as a baseline against which to compare future changes that occur in patterns of international representation.

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Review Articles

THE STATE THAT MAO BUILT

By JOHN K. FAIRBANK

Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 540 pp. $12.50.

CHINA has been such a big unit during most of the last two thousand years that it has habitually been thought of in terms of models, whether Legalist, Confucian, Neo-Confucian, or Communist. To put it another way, the remarkable early success of Chinese administrators in setting up and maintaining a centralized bureaucracy was part and parcel of their inveterate penchant for blueprinting the social order. Today "China" is one of the largest concrete referents commonly used in discussions of world politics. Generalizing about China is a particularly daring venture, but it is a game we continue to play because the Chinese have always played it. Before appraising the most interesting recent treatment of China in this customary fashion—Franz Schurmann's book *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*—I should like to look briefly at the fashion itself.

To talk about "China" as a holistic entity is the bane of Chinese studies, yet it seems inescapable. This simplistic way of thought has too long been a habit both in China and in the West. On the European side, early observers who followed in the footsteps of Polo, especially the Jesuit missionaries, were called upon to describe an entire society and culture in an age when Western Christendom was fascinated by the existence of another complete but non-Christian civilization. The early all-about-China works of Gonzalez de Mendoza, Valignano, Ricci, and a host of others[1] set the style for later comprehensive compendia like Henry Charles Sirr's *China and the Chinese: Their Religion, Character, Customs, and Manufactures*[2] or S. Wells Williams' *The Middle Kingdom: A Survey of the Geography, Government, Education, Social Life, Arts, Religion, Etc. of the Chinese Empire and its Inhabitants*.[3] Until very recently, premodern China has remained so different from the

[1] See Donald Lach, *Asia in the Making of Europe*, Vol. I, *The Century of Discovery* (Chicago and London 1965), 743ff.

[2] (London 1849).

[3] (New York and London 1848). Williams became the standard work, but was only one example of a large genre.

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rest of the world, so cocooned in its distinctive culture and writing system, that it has seemed like a galaxy apart, a single Chinese nebula in the Western world's firmament.

On the Chinese side, the early European sinologues were equally led into holistic discussions of "China" by the Chinese historians themselves, who inveterately used whole dynasties as chronological units of record with little concern for spatial-geographical differentiation within the time frame. For example, any library research into institutions has had to start with definitions of terminology dynasty by dynasty. Thus, a commonly used handbook of official titles like the *Li-tai chih-kuan piao*, or *Tables of Official Posts in Successive Periods*, lists for each title the variations or equivalents in eighteen dynastic eras.[4] The tendency to treat most subjects in dynastic segments also is found in encyclopedias, documentary compilations, dictionaries, and even essays. Scholarship has had to begin by noting, for instance, that the *yü-shih t'ai* (censorate) of T'ang, Sung, and Yüan was the *tu-ch'a yüan* (censorate) of Ming and Ch'ing. By the time the differences in terminology and structure between one period and another have been straightened out, the scholar has often found he had a whole chapter written and it was time for supper.[5]

A generalizing, all-China style of thought has derived still more basically from the court-centered approach to history. This approach was not unique to China but, as so often, it became unusually well entrenched there as a tradition. The outstanding source of information on recent centuries right down to 1911 is still the 4,485 chapters (*chüan*) of imperial edicts in the *Ta-Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu*, or *Veritable Records of Successive Reigns of the Ch'ing Dynasty*.[6] Using such sources, Chinese scholars, like their emperors, tried to look at China as a whole. Consequently, like the imperial administration itself, their works generally remained superficial to the diversity of local conditions. They stressed the central imperial aim more than the various and particular results. This laid a broad foundation for those "simplistic interpretations . . . based on general policy pronouncements and composite data"

[4] The *Tables* were imperially commissioned in 1780 and have gone through many editions. The *Kuo-hsueh chi-pen ts'ung-shu* edition was published in Shanghai in 1937 in eight volumes.

[5] Charles O. Hucker, *The Censorial System of Ming China* (Stanford 1966), 322-24, has an exemplary footnote on a typical problem of "history by etymology": numerous scholars have confused the Chou *yü-shih* (royal recorders) with the Ch'in-Han *yü-shih* (surveillance officials) and so inferred that the latter had the duty of remonstrance with the emperor, when this actually was the duty of the *yen-kuan* (speaking officials).

[6] Printed in Tokyo by Okura (1937-1938) and recently in Taiwan.

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against which John W. Lewis has recently inveighed in reviewing seven works on Communist China.[7]

Modern sinologist-historians, sitting on top of the accumulated lore of their field, have hardly broken out of this tradition. To take a typical example, a current textbook analyzes the Single-Whip reform of the late Ming (which combined local taxes into fewer categories and commuted them into silver payments) as due partly to the dynastic cycle and partly to the inflow of silver.[8] But the authors, following Chinese scholars, do not go into the obvious question of how far this reform can be viewed geographically as an index of modern commercialization spreading into one locality after another according to the degree of production for export, domestic trade, or monetary accumulation. Thus they fall under John Lewis' stricture that "aggregate data that may be used to identify ideal patterns lose their value for analysis. . . ." As he says, ". . . It is a mistake for us to assume . . . that governmental policies are uniformly received throughout China."[9]

In short, one of the considerable intellectual problems posed for the outside world by the rise of the Chinese People's Republic is the continuing Chinese and foreign effort to treat this vast land as a manageable unit, both of domestic government and of outside analysis. Comprising so much of mankind and spreading over a terrain from the tropics to the subarctic, China is far and away the largest political-economic entity that we are accustomed to thinking of as a unit, and yet it offers us the fewest concrete statistics per capita of any country.

Indeed, one cannot help wondering if China's sheer size has not been the basic problem facing Chairman Mao and the Peking government generally. Is not the task of maintaining a central leadership so great that it really necessitates putting "politics in command," if necessary at the expense of economics, no matter what one's ideology may be? The ancient tradition of government by heavy reliance on indoctrination in an orthodoxy has combined with China's modern culture-based nationalism to demand political unity and central leadership at all costs. But in a subcontinent so big, diverse, capital-poor, and underdeveloped,

[7] "The Study of Chinese Political Culture," *World Politics*, XVIII (April 1966), 503-24, see 524.

[8] Edwin O. Reischauer and John K. Fairbank, *East Asia: The Great Tradition* (Boston 1960), 339-40.

[9] P. 524. Mr. Lewis' salutary effort to rank "the potential for revolution and mobilization according to the level of modernization of the locality" of course suffers from the part-and-whole difficulty that, by his own definition (footnote 15), the degree of "mobilization" is one index of the more inclusive phenomenon of "modernization." Thus, a modernized locality is identifiable partly by its degree of mobilization; that the "potential for revolution and mobilization" may be measured by the "level of modernization" is to some degree automatic or tautological.

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this puts a bigger burden on Peking than any political leaders have ever borne anywhere. It is not yet by any means certain that Chinese life can be modernized successfully on the present governmental basis.

Our need to see the Chinese revolution as a whole, and the immense difficulty of seeing it in all its concrete local variety, are both illustrated in Franz Schurmann's important volume. This is undoubtedly a brilliant tour de force, by an author who combines linguistic facility and conceptual creativity. Schurmann trained originally as a sinologist in Yüan economic history[10] and has long been a close student of the mainland documentation. He uses Japanese and Russian as well as Chinese and the European languages and has read widely in sociology, including communication, administration, and industrial management. He has pursued his research in Hong Kong at the Union Research Institute as well as at Berkeley, where he is a professor in both sociology and history and is currently director of the Center for Chinese Studies.

Ideology and Organization opens with a useful glossary of Chinese terms and a chronology to September 1965. The historical Prologue sets the Chinese social revolution in its world context. This revolution constitutes "for the latter half of the twentieth century what the Russian Revolution was for the first half. By transforming Chinese society, it has brought a great power into being which proclaims itself the revolutionary and developmental model for the poor countries of the world" (p. xxx). Such nations as Britain, Germany, and Japan attained the twin goals of economic development and political integration without social revolution. But as in the France of 1789 and the Russia of 1917, so in China the social revolution has been "an act of destruction willed against a whole ruling class (p. xxx). . . . When a revolution destroys a social system, it also annihilates its elites. The new revolutionary regime can only pull society together again through organization (p. xxxiii). . . . The one great organizational product of the Chinese Revolution has been the Chinese Communist Party (p. xlii). . . . The Chinese have constructed a powerful and effective organization, but one that has in-built deterrents against bureaucratization . . . a non-Weberian model (p. xlv). . . . There is indeed a new China—a China of organization. This complex struggle, to create and impose structures of organization on the country, is the subject of this book" (p. xlvi).

The sixteen-page Introduction next sets up a whole system of sociology. I suppose most historians working on China now find this neces-

[10] Herbert Franz Schurmann, *Economic Structure of the Yüan Dynasty: Translation of Chapters 93 and 94 of the Yüan shih*, Harvard-Yenching Institute Studies XVI (Cambridge, Mass., 1956).

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sary, though often it is done in the half-in, half-out fashion that many of us affect when straddling the boundary between concrete humanistic story-telling and generalized social science analysis. Mr. Schurmann is more professional. In rapid succession he defines "social system," "culture," "elite," "authority," "power," "prestige," "status," "role," "ethos," "ideology," and "modal personality." He finds that "in traditional China, the trinity of ethos, status group, and modal personality was represented by Confucianism, the gentry, and the *pater familias* . . ." (p. 7). All of these have now been destroyed. And so, "with the traditional trinity of authority gone, the social system itself has disappeared. . . . Organization must now do for society what earlier had been done by the social system" (pp. 7-8). In the result in China today, ethos has given way to ideology, status to leadership, the gentry to the party, and the *pater familias* to the cadre (who must, however, be both "red and expert" to compete with the educated professional).

Mr. Schurmann concludes that "it is an immense task to study a structure of ideology and organization which is the functional equivalent of an entire social system. The only approach I could see was to identify certain central areas of concern, and begin the study. The chapters of this book are the central concerns I chose: Ideology, Party, Government, Management, Control, Cities, and Villages. . . . Whereas chapters two through five discuss organization alone, the last two chapters, cities and villages, deal with the imposition of organization on society" (pp. 8, 10).

This stress on organization has the merit of a fresh look and a unified approach, yet I feel it brings difficulties. The first is semantic. Organization was an attribute of the old order ("all societies have organization"; for example, there was the "traditional village social organization") but it is vastly more important in the new situation, to such a degree that the term "organization" seems often to be used in the new context at a different level of abstraction. This produces some ambiguity between old, customary organization and the new, revolutionary type. Perhaps the term could be subdivided as organization and Organization.

Secondly, it still makes for a China-wide approach: where the old social system was value-oriented and self-maintaining, the new organization is goal-oriented and purposive, constructed for conscious action, and thus it represents the revolutionary leaders' efforts in the central apparatus rather than the results they may eventually achieve in the daily life of the people in their localities. Studying organization as it has been attempted by the Communists is not too different from study-

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ing the imperial edicts of old—the goals are announced but the local responses and results often remain obscure.

Finally, Mr. Schurmann's chapters offer a multitude of new insights —insights derived from his new approach and its large measure of intuition. After one has immersed oneself in the documentary and human material, he says, "intuition is a major part of the rational process, for one has to sense the relevance of problems before one can use the ordering capacities of the mind to construct patterns" (p. 13). This is sound doctrine, surely, for the historian, but it again ties the author sympathetically to the regime, its problems and its attempted solutions. *Ideology and Organization* is less a record of what has happened in the Chinese revolution than of what the revolutionaries have tried to do. This needs to be kept in mind.

While each chapter is a universe of discourse impossible to summarize here, a few highlights may be selected. In the Chinese Communist view of *ideology*, as systematized by Schurmann, theory (*li-lun*) is pure ideology while thought (*ssu-hsiang*) is practical ideology. Thus theory is the unchanging world view of a class, while thought arises from action in individual minds and keeps changing. Creation of Marxist-Leninist theory ended with Stalin, but Mao's thought has continued to develop. This makes China independent of present-day Soviet views. It also means that Mao's thought can be only a model for other national liberation movements, each of which must evolve its own practical ideology.

The chapter on ideology then continues with ideology's function in behavior, in communication and the mass media, in organization, and in the dialectical processes within the economy, the state, and the society. Mao's theory of contradictions is basic in all of these areas. Mr. Schurmann's illustrations are mainly from movements leading up to 1958, when "Mao Tse-tung's vision of Chinese society saw all major contradictions in it capable of resolution with a single grand program —the Great Leap Forward . . . carried out simultaneously in the economic, political, and social realms. Its driving force was ideology."

Mr. Schurmann next compares the Soviet and Chinese conceptions of the *party*'s relationship to state, society, and nation; the Chinese party's self-image as reflected in its rules; its growth, composition, and structure at the central, provincial, county-city, and basic levels; and its use of cadres.

In dealing with *government*, or state administration at the central and provincial levels, he distinguishes between vertical rule (the exercise of full control down through branch agencies) and dual rule (when

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a branch agency is subordinate both to a higher-echelon agency and to a coordinating committee on the same level). Efforts at decentralization have naturally stressed dual rule. Mr. Schurmann distinguishes between decentralization I (transferring decision-making power all the way down to production units) and decentralization II (transferring it down only to provincial levels). The latter, of course, like dual rule, has increased the power of provincial party committees, notably in 1958. The author suggests that the party is naturally strongest at the provincial, coordinating level, since at the center it must compete with trained professionals and at the basic level must face the masses. But here arises an ancient evil, the growth of regionalism (provincialism, localism), making for disunity. The antirightist movement of '58 struck at such "localism." But China still faces the old dilemma phrased by *Jen-min jih-pao*: either "the unity of despotic rule or the divisiveness of regional feudalism" (p. 213).

Management in China is an underdeveloped field of study and perhaps for this reason Mr. Schurmann's discussion of it seems a bit more schematic than do other sections. He distinguishes between bureaucracy and management, policy and operations, technical and human organization, and similar dichotomies. He then traces the Chinese Communists' early use of the Soviet model of management, especially in Manchuria under Kao Kang, where the individual "responsibility system" was introduced along with one-man management. But this soon came under attack, and after Kao Kang's fall (his suicide was announced in March 1955) there was a swing toward collective leadership, shifting responsibility from managers to cadres. ". . . The Chinese Communists felt that all decision-making powers must be concentrated in the hands of the Party, regardless of the economic consequences" (p. 279). Eventually the Great Leap Forward lacked even a conception of management. In the aftermath it had to be revived.

Control in Communist China, like management, was first developed on the Soviet model by creating a bureaucracy external to the administration and parallel to it, under such control institutions as the Public Security Forces (secret police), the Ministry of State Control, and the State Bank. To combat incompetence as well as disloyalty, the regime in 1951 set up "people's control correspondents" who were publicly known to be informers and who received rewards. It also encouraged denunciation from the masses, both secret and public. The Three-Anti and Five-Anti movements of 1951 and 1952 (against offenders within the bureaucracy and against the bourgeoisie, respectively) used terrorism on a wide scale. Subsequently, the control network that was

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gradually built into the regional administrations recruited specialists for full-time control work, to check on performance generally. Stress was put increasingly on economic control, notably through the "Harbin system." This consisted of a network of accounting offices directly under Peking, which became in particular "Peking's weapon to wrest power from the Manchurian bureaucracy" in its "independent kingdom." Once that had been accomplished with the fall of Kao Kang, however, a shift began away from the Soviet model and toward political rather than economic control, exercised in collaboration with intraunit party committees and by internal means, by "insiders" rather than "outsiders." Thus "formal control work failed in China for the same reason that formal law failed" (a story that Mr. Schurmann does not go into). "Business, in order to get done, required such an array of devious means and approaches that full application of control and law would have paralyzed it. During the Great Leap Forward, the regime tried direct political command. That did not work either" (p. 349). In 1959 the Ministry of Control, like the Ministry of Justice, was abolished, which may be regarded as "belated recognition of the impossibility of using Soviet-style central planning in China" (p. 363).

In imposing organization on *cities*, the Communists first took over the Nationalist police and only in 1951 began to develop urban residents' committees. These bodies resolved disputes, superintended welfare, public health, and literacy work, and gradually took on wider duties in maintaining public security and reflecting local opinion. In particular, they mobilized urban womanpower for a multitude of tasks, always under the watchful eye of the police. Under each police station was appointed a street office as a branch of city government, under which in turn were residents' committees (representing one hundred to six hundred households) and then residents' groups (fifteen to forty households). Mr. Schurmann notes the general comparability of this structure, *mutatis mutandis*, with the imperial and the Nationalist *pao-chia* control structures, but historical case studies of the *pao-chia* system are inadequate for a close comparison of their actual functioning.

The urban communes, like the rural ones, were originally intended to be integrated units "combining industrial, agricultural, commercial, cultural, and military-police functions" (p. 383). After this broad and utopian social aim was abandoned, an economic effort was still pursued through small-scale "street industries" or neighborhood factories. But "production was the main obsession of the cadres" (p. 393). With their spirit of "production fetishism," as it was later called, they hoped that

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labor and organization would replace capital and achieve industrialization. They tried to revive and transform the traditional urban handicraft industries on a state-controlled instead of a family-controlled basis. In general, they failed. By 1961, they had to increase private incentives and therefore restore some market conditions. Mr. Schurmann concludes that the regime has created effective political institutions for the cities but has "yet to create effective economic institutions to resolve the dilemma of population, and effective social institutions to resolve the dilemma of community" (p. 403).

Villages are where the Chinese live, and the rural communes of 1958 were the high point of Mao's effort to "impose organization" on them. Mr. Schurmann's final chapter thus brings the themes and counterthemes of earlier chapters to a symphonic climax. His motif here is that, lacking capital to invest in agriculture, the Chinese Communists tried "to use organizational means to bring about a political and social transformation of rural society from which the needed economic revolution would develop" (p. 405).

Looking first at the traditional rural scene, Mr. Schurmann has to telescope a large slice of history. While I follow him open-mouthed on the arcane mysteries of management, for example, here in history I find some slips, just as a specialist reading Arnold Toynbee's *A Study of History* may find most sections fascinating but his own special area perhaps distorted. In discussing the Ming *li-chia* and Ch'ing *pao-chia* structures, Schurmann follows the work of Shimizu Morimitsu and Wen Chun-t'ien, but takes inadequate account of later studies, notably that of Hsiao Kung-ch'uan.[11] This leads him to call *li-chia* "essentially civil" and *pao-chia* "essentially a military organization" (p. 409, repetition on p. 428), whereas a more accurate distinction would be between the economic functions of *li-chia* (taxes and labor service) and political functions of *pao-chia* (registration and mutual responsibility for police control). Professor Hsiao explicitly regards the mid-nineteenth-century efforts to use the *pao-chia* system for local defense as transitory and ineffective.

In distinguishing between the "natural village" and "administrative village," Mr. Schurmann also leaves the gentry out of account, ignoring the significant fact stressed by Hsiao that gentry under the Ch'ing were not allowed to serve as *pao-chia* heads. In this way the *pao-chia*

[11] Shimizu, *Shina shakai no kenkyū* [*Studies on Chinese Society*] (Tokyo 1939); Wen, *Chung-kuo pao-chia chih-tu* [*The Pao-chia System in China*] (Shanghai 1935); Hsiao, *Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century* (Seattle 1960), 66. See Hsiao, chap. 3, "Police Control: The *Pao-chia* System," *passim*.

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structure was kept under the officials, inaccessible to the gentry who were the potential leaders of any local challenge to authority. Similarly, Mr. Schurmann makes no reference to the Ch'ing local militia structure or *t'uan-lien* system; to be sure, it has only recently been seriously researched.[12] But by the time he reaches his conclusion, he has creatively extrapolated from his rather misleading sources on *pao-chia* and roundly declares, "Though the Ch'ing *pao-chia* had some civil functions . . . its main purpose was military. It was seen as a local militia . . ." (p. 495). This betrays either an underresearched or an overwilful working style. Possibly other specialists can fault the author on comparable points within their own specialties. I would rate these as minor blemishes. We need the new stimulus of this kind of overarching synthesis, despite the faults that are almost unavoidable in such a broad, multidisciplinary work.

As for Communist rural organization, it was first started with cooperatives in the Kiangsi era but began to succeed only in the Yenan period when, "by training a new type of leader, the cadre, the Chinese Communists were finally able to achieve what no state power in Chinese history had been able to do: to create an organization loyal to the state which was also solidly imbedded in the natural village" (p. 416). First, the anti-Japanese war fostered a synthesis of production and fighting, work and warfare, as cognate forms of struggle based on cooperative effort in natural villages. Thus the party penetrated the village. Second, this was followed by land reform, often terroristic, which destroyed the rural elite, the landlord gentry, and distributed the land. The administrative village (*hsiang*) was then built up as the basic-level unit of organization, party-controlled, to dominate the old natural villages. Next, in the mid-1950's, the Communists moved on from mutual aid teams toward "cooperativization." In its early stage, this movement consolidated landholdings in agricultural producers' cooperatives (APC's), while in its later stage it led to genuine collectivization of property and a unified village economy. All this eliminated the threat posed by the recrudescence of the rich peasant and transformed the old natural village usually into a higher-level APC. This APC was composed of production brigades that comprised somewhere between twenty and forty households apiece. Each household lived in its accustomed home, farming among its neighbors on more or less the same land as before with its own garden, trees, and even some animals. Its "share of the crop was probably little different from what it had been

[12] See Philip A. Kuhn, "*T'uan-lien* Local Defense System at the Time of the Taiping Rebellion," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, XXVII (forthcoming 1967).

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under the *ancien régime*. . . . Work was diffuse, unrationalized, and still involved a total agricultural cycle: plowing, planting, irrigating, harvesting" (p. 470). This was in 1957.

The Great Leap, history's greatest fiasco, is high drama and has been much studied. In discussing it Mr. Schurmann stresses the attempted change in work organization. It was first manifest in mobile water-work brigades of the winter of 1957-1958, then in the mobilization of women as well as men in rationally organized work-squads and even battalions, and eventually in the "militarization" and even arming of the peasantry. As the trend toward a more rational, factory-type organization of work teams accelerated, it induced the amalgamation of APC's in a larger administrative framework, which turned out to be the commune. Mao's acolyte Ch'en Po-ta, as early as July 1958, for example, urged the combining of industry, agriculture, commerce, culture, education, and militia in this new form. Thus at last, with the transformation of their work organization, the poor peasantry were finally mobilized by the revolution. Most communes merged with their *hsiang* or administrative villages, and so state and society were amalgamated and the natural villages superseded, at least for the moment.

In the retreat from the Great Leap disaster, Peking gave up "its attempts to create a rural economy transcending the limits of the natural village," which is now again the unit of the collective economy. Thus the Chinese Communist effort to achieve "total managerial control" over the society, a true Wittfogelian "oriental despotism," did not come off.

After breaking new ground and suggesting many interesting hypotheses in his seven chapters, Mr. Schurmann has to do what is expected of all "China experts" (why don't we give this grandiose term its due by calling ourselves "Chi-sperts" and "Chi-com-sperts"?): he caps his minor generalizations with still broader ones. His final conclusion as of mid-1965 is that "China has experienced the acts of political and social revolution before it has fully entered the process of economic revolution. . . . Politically and socially it has achieved a unity and undergone a transformation which are the foundations of its further technical and economic development" (p. 500). I read this as an author's final profession of enthusiasm for his subject. His own chapter conclusions do not support such optimism. Neither, of course, do the ongoing events since August 1966. As our perspective continues to be jolted by events, we can all echo the plane designer in the *New Yorker* cartoon who turns away from an appalling crash of an enormous plane: "Ah well, back to the old drawing board!" As of early 1967, with the

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universities still closed, one may equally well conclude that the Chinese Communists' efforts at political and social organization are still impeding China's economic and technical development. But if recent events have invalidated Mr. Schurmann's concluding broad generalizations about China-as-an-entity, they have not equally affected the less general evaluations in his monographic chapters.

Ideology and Organization in Communist China, like any seminal work, points toward more work to do. For example, Communist China's remarkable nondevelopment of law is a nonstory still untold.[13] Analysis of organization could also include the reorganization of historical study and interpretation and its ideological motives and uses.[14] Each of Mr. Schurmann's chapters, full of insights and observations to which a review cannot do justice, calls for further monographic research. This means further immersion in documentation and field contacts, further analysis through the modern disciplines, and also, it seems to this reviewer, further mastery of Chinese history—integrating the thought of Chairman Mao not only with that of Dr. Amitai Etzioni but also with that of the K'ang-hsi emperor.

The dearth of this kind of work is a reflection on the historians. Few have even tried to cross the linguistic-terminological ravine that separates Mao's China from T'ang and Ch'ing, Franz Schurmann being himself an outstanding exception.

Even the most violent social revolution is not, of course, completely discontinuous with the past. Language, literature, folklore, history, and culture are inherited by the revolutionaries along with the material conditions of landscape, soil, weather, and man-made installations. These all constitute a matrix within which revolutionaries must choose among the available options. Historical modes, models, and influences (not "causes") form part of this matrix, or social repertoire, and require appraisal accordingly. For example, Charles Hucker's study of surveillance, impeachment, counsel, and remonstrance as practiced by Ming censors has been published since Schurmann's chapter on control.[15] Who can doubt that the present-day denunciations made by newly literate informers in the Communist control system show certain traces or echoes of continuity with China's two-thousand-year-old censorial

[13] Jerome Alan Cohen, "Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization," *California Law Review*, LIV (August 1966), 1201-26, makes an approach to this problem. Cohen concludes that "Chinese emphasis upon mediation significantly emasculated the growth of law through legislation and judicial processes" (p. 1225).

[14] Albert Feuerwerker and S. Cheng, *Chinese Communist Studies of Modern Chinese History* (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), surveys materials on this problem.

[15] See footnote 5 above.

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tradition? This is a complex question of degree, not of whether-or-not. Schurmann's discussion bypasses it, focusing on the Soviet control model, though he says that "history has many examples" of troubled organizers using informers, witness the *metsuke* of Tokugawa Japan! A better *locus classicus* would be the development of "eyes-alone" palace memorials (*tsou-che*) by the early Ch'ing emperors. Research just now being published shows that Yung-cheng (1723-1736) had an empire-wide network of correspondent-officials. He personally opened their specially sealed reports and replied to them by the same top-secret channel.[16]

The continuing present-day influence of China's still rather unknown traditions seems to me ensured by a fact that Mr. Schurmann rightly stresses in several of his case studies—that Chinese Communist organization has not been achieved purely from the top down but also from the bottom up, that is, with extensive participation by the masses and especially by millions of cadres, who may be most conscious of the new ideology but whose available options of language and style still lie within the old social matrix surrounding them. In fine, revolutionary organization must be achieved among the people and therefore largely within the limits set by their inheritance.

Mr. Schurmann follows Reinhard Bendix in positing that "ideology and organization oriented toward the attainment of social goals" are "unique products of the modern world" (p. 19) developed since the seventeenth century. Without arguing this point,[17] one may note the massive Ch'ing tradition of "statecraft" (*ching-shih*) according to which the scholar-administrator, steeped in the universal principles of imperial Confucianism, applied them to the concrete realities he faced in government.[18] These included not only fiscal, legal, and technical problems usually handled by the magistrate's private specialists (*mu-yu*) but also the problem of maintaining popular acquiescence in the regime, not least by keeping a keen eye on what the traffic would bear—for example, how far new taxes would be tolerated. The techniques of

[16] Silas Hsiu-liang Wu, "The Memorial Systems of the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1911)," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, XXVII (forthcoming 1967).

[17] It would be only mischievous to pit this view against the carefully argued finding of Professor Herrlee Creel of Chicago that something very like the modern Weberian-type bureaucracy was independently invented in ancient China. See Creel, "The Beginnings of Bureaucracy in China: The Origin of the *Hsien*," *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXIII (February 1964), 155-84.

[18] Thousands of essays of this *ching-shih* genre were printed in nineteenth-century collections, beginning with more than two thousand in the *Huang-ch'ao ching-shih wen-pien*, or *Collected Essays on Statecraft Under the Reigning Dynasty*, published by Ho Ch'ang-ling in 1827. Some fifteen supplementary collections were produced, down into the twentieth century.

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local control (conveniently surveyed by Hsiao Kung-ch'uan)[19] included educational, ethical, and religious features as well as economic, political, and welfare measures. They derived from a broad and sophisticated tradition of manipulating people. Mr. Schurmann's phrase "control and exploitation" may or may not adequately characterize the aim of Confucian government, but he would presumably agree that its manner and methods form a rich body of precedent for much that the Chinese Communists have tried to do.

Take one example. From an analysis of the fiscal administration monographs (*shih-huo chih*) of the early dynastic histories, Dr. Rhea Blue long ago extracted their "central proposition" under four steps to be followed by Chinese administrators: "(1) *Parceling out the soils* . . . to prevent *latifundia*; (2) *Placing the people* or *settling the people* . . . fixing the people at their agricultural tasks; (3) *Enriching the people* . . . an equalization of wealth more than any desire to make them all affluent . . . the solution was government control and stabilization of prices; (4) *Teaching the people* . . . to prevent the individual from putting his interest above that of the ruling authorities."[20]

I would not demand that this effort of the traditional ruling elite be called "organization," though it does seem social in scope and distinctly goal-oriented. I would ask only that the multiform tradition of "statecraft" be kept in mind by the many researchers who will be inspired by Mr. Schurmann's book. As formerly practiced by the ruling elite, "statecraft" deserves closer examination. It looks like the natural grandfather of "organization."

[19] See footnote 11 above.

[20] "The Argumentation of the *Shih-huo chih* Chapters of the Han, Wei, and Sui Dynastic Histories," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, XI (June 1948), 1-118, see 92-93.

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THE FRENCH ARMY

From Obedience to Insurrection

By RICHARD D. CHALLENER

Robert O. Paxton, *Parades and Politics at Vichy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966, xi, 472 pp. $9.00.
George Armstrong Kelly, *Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis, 1947-1962*, Cambridge, The M.I.T. Press, 1965, 404 pp. $10.00.
John Steward Ambler, *The French Army in Politics, 1945-1962*, Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1966, x, 427 pp. $6.50.

WHAT tempts an army to move into politics and ultimately to pass beyond the threshold of legality into the realm of civil disobedience and insurrection? In Latin America and the underdeveloped world, where such occurrences have been common, the phenomenon of military "praetorianism" poses relatively few analytical problems for the historian or social scientist. But the forces in modern democratic societies which lead an army into rebellion are far more complex, just as, fortunately, they arise with far less frequency. In contemporary France the problem of military insurrection is especially complicated, all the more so since the French army, until the era of the Second World War, had always regarded itself as "*la grande muette*," suffering but obedient, and the French officer corps had prided itself on its apoliticism and devotion to strict professional duty.

The three books under review all bear, in varying degree, upon the many forces that drew the postwar French army into politics and beyond—until it became so thoroughly enmeshed in political disobedience that it was patron of the insurrection that destroyed the Fourth Republic in the spring of 1958 and then, a mere three years later, was sponsor of a movement aimed at overthrowing one of its own, General Charles de Gaulle, who had been the principal beneficiary of the army's Algerian "intoxication." These three studies raise important questions of interpretation and analysis: Can the collective indiscipline of the French officer corps be explained largely in terms of the political weakness of the Fourth Republic and the lugubrious history of the army's experiences in Indochina and Algeria? Is there relevance in the military history of Vichy or in searching for antecedents in the experiences of the Third Republic, when the army was presumably the silent but obedient servant of the state? How much attention should be given to

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such matters as the social origins of the officer corps, the patterns of military recruitment, the structure and institutions of the army, the system of promotions? How much force can be attributed to the value system of the officer corps as well as to ideological factors—above all, to the well-publicized theory of "*la guerre révolutionnaire*" which French military writers distilled out of the army's experiences in Indochina and Algeria? Do any of the prevailing theories and hypotheses of the field of civil-military relations assist in the analysis of these events?

The books naturally vary in the extent to which they illuminate these questions. In *Parades and Politics at Vichy*, Robert O. Paxton directs his attention to the institutions of the Armistice Army of 1940-1942 and to the political, diplomatic, and social ideas that animated its leaders. His is a detailed, historical interpretation of a fragment of the French military record—a small fragment indeed, since by Hitler's decree the Armistice Army passed out of existence with the German occupation of all of France in the wake of the Anglo-American landings in North Africa. His concluding chapter, however, draws some solid inferences about the implications of the Vichy experience for the future of the French army. George Armstrong Kelly concerns himself with the years from 1947 to 1962, with nearly two-thirds of his book *Lost Soldiers* focusing on the impact of Algeria upon the army and upon French politics. His is clearly the most distinguished literary effort of the three; his descriptions of the emotional attachment that French officers formed in and for Algeria have a literary power rarely found in academic writings. John Steward Ambler, in *The French Army in Politics*, also concentrates upon the postwar years, but the framework of his analysis is broader. He devotes considerable space to a summary of the civil-military relationship that existed in France from 1815 to 1940 and directly relates postwar events to the theories and concepts of military organization that have been developed by such social scientists as Samuel P. Huntington and Morris Janowitz.[1] His basic focus is upon the issue of civilian control. In this sense, then, his book is the most valuable. Nonetheless, all three volumes supplement rather than duplicate one another; to single out the Ambler study is by no means to minimize the value or the analytical sophistication of the others.

[1] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957); Huntington, ed., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics* (Glencoe 1962); Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Glencoe 1960).

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I

It is a familiar axiom of French history that the army spurned politics during the lifetime of the Third Republic. Thus, there is technically no background for its insurrectionary activities in 1958, in 1960, and again in 1961. Nevertheless, it is also true that French republicans—in the days of MacMahon, Boulanger, and, above all, Dreyfus—feared that the army and its conservative allies sought opportunities to intervene in the political arena. But this, like their fear of the Church, is the stuff of republican legend. The French army not only failed to march but, by and large, simply wanted to be left alone to pursue its own professional goals. Similarly, if the French officer corps in the 1930's produced a few generals who were genuinely hostile to what they termed "the regime of the moment," it also, and perhaps more typically, produced high-ranking officers like Maurice Gamelin, the ill-fated commander-in-chief of 1940, who knew all too well how to adapt themselves and their careers to the game of French politics.

Still, the concept of *la grande muette* should not be accepted uncritically. There was always a colonial "outlet" for those who found life and politics in the *métropole* distasteful; the empire, governed in the tradition of Gallieni and Lyautey, was an area where officers enjoyed more than a modicum of authority to make—and not simply accept—policy. More significant is the fact that the army's acceptance of the Third Republic was often negative rather than positive; many a conservative officer made his personal reconciliation with the republic on the basis that, as a professional, he was serving the nation and not the particular government in power, for which he might have only scorn. In the 1920's and 1930's, moreover, there was an increasing alienation of the army from the government—dissatisfaction with the game of political musical chairs, with budgetary restrictions and reductions in the length of military service, and, above all, with the Popular Front experiment that nationalized war industries and decreed a forty-hour week. The extent of that alienation and the existence of certain "dark currents" were revealed in the actions of such individuals as General Weygand and Marshal Pétain in June of 1940. It is not simply that they refused, in the name of the honor of the army, to continue the war from North Africa or that their intervention in a political decision (a decision made, to be sure, by civilians) made them especially prominent among the gravediggers of the Third Republic. Of greater relevance—and omens for the future—were their fear of social disorder and Communist uprisings in the major cities and their desire to preserve

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the army as the one remaining viable instrument of social pacification and, ultimately, of regeneration.

One additional facet of the *grande muette* approach to French military history needs to be mentioned. As Ambler reminds us, it is virtually a truism that armies are drawn to politics by the lack of a national consensus and continuing political instability. But the Third Republic (1940 excepted) had more continuity and more stability than many of its critics ever realized, especially those critics who focused their attention upon the often misleading phenomenon of ministerial instability or who chose to interpret the republic as a kind of lowest common denominator, as no more than "the form of government that divides us least"—which is to say that analysis of the civil-military equation in France should not overconcentrate upon the "virtue" of an army that stuck to its professional knitting amid a kaleidoscope of changing cabinets but should instead pay some attention to the fact that the often-despised Third Republic was generally in a position to keep its army at arm's length, to enforce the government's decisions on military policy, and, in short, to command and receive the obedience of the army.

Still, the intervention of Weygand and Pétain in 1940 was, if nothing else, a first precedent on the road to disobedience. Then, as the Paxton study shows, the Vichy era was a time when traditional loyalties, obedience, and discipline were sorely tested. Ironically, it was Charles de Gaulle who delivered one of the heaviest blows to established tradition. From London he called upon French officers to desert the legally constituted government of Marshal Pétain, break their oath to the established regime, and serve the only "legitimate" government of Frenchmen, that of Free France. An even greater conflict of loyalties arose in North Africa when the Allies landed in November 1942: should a French officer in the Armistice Army of Vichy obey orders from the Marshal to fire upon the Anglo-American invaders, should he disobey his instructions and welcome the Allies, or should he simply try to sit tight, covering all possible bets in an attitude of *attentisme*, until the political dust had settled? Moreover, as many an officer later recalled, the rewards of promotion and status often went to those who "disobeyed," while those who remained loyal to the duly constituted government of Vichy were penalized. Indeed, those who could not ultimately "prove" some act of resistance prior to the Liberation were cashiered.

In the early sixties, when the Fifth Republic was trying its own dissidents, not a few of the accused defended themselves by pointing back to the examples of the war years when, they claimed, old standards had

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been broken, both discipline and obedience made conditional. But such a legal defense smacks of rationalization; it is more than a little doubtful if any officers were actually motivated to act in 1958 or 1961 by the precedents of the forties. The wartime antecedents were a useful legal crutch on which to lean, and even more, a taunt to hurl in the face of the President of the Republic. For an officer on trial for insurrection against Charles de Gaulle, how better to express one's scorn than to argue that it was, after all, this same Charles de Gaulle who had first taught the French officer corps to drink of the cup of disobedience?

There were more significant ways in which the Vichy experience pointed to the future. The postwar army was, in fact, the direct descendant of the Armistice Army that Hitler had tolerated from 1940 to 1942. It is, of course, true that there were many changes in the officer corps immediately after World War II. Many officers, as we have noted, were compelled to resign or were put on the inactive list; some Gaullist officers were incorporated in the postwar army, as were certain members of the Resistance. But the number of Gaullist troops had never been large, and, for various reasons, few Gaullists or members of the Resistance were able to find careers in the postwar army of France. Thus, the postwar change was misleading, and the "new" army had a lineage that went straight back through the Armistice Army to the prewar army. A single set of statistics will bear this out: in 1946 every single one of the French generals had been an officer in 1938, as had 250 of the 259 colonels, 467 of the 485 lieutenant colonels, and 932 of the 940 majors. Virtually all of these men were veterans of the Armistice Army. And the proportion of officers able to present the hallowed St. Cyr credentials was relatively unchanged from 1938.

Moreover, the officer corps of Vichy had by no means been a mirror of French society. Permitted an army of only 100,000 men (Hitler well recalled the terms of Versailles), the Vichy authorities took great care to weed out of the officer corps those men judged to have unsafe political opinions as well as lesser social backgrounds. They seized upon "the necessity for retrenchment," writes Paxton, "as an opportunity to enhance the club-like intimacy of a homogeneous officer corps, largely drawn from the *grandes écoles*, freed of ethnic minorities and political mavericks, a tighter family circle than the old mass army could ever be. . . ." The result was a "group measurably nearer the social ideal cherished by senior officers" (pp. 46, 45). It was an officer corps attuned to the Pétainist trinity: work, family, country.

Moreover—and, as Paxton reminds us, it is an indicator of the true spirit with which the army had previously accepted its role as *la grande*

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muette—this officer corps burned with a zeal to undo the errors of France's republican past. It sought an educational function; it wanted full opportunity to regenerate the political, social, and moral virtues that French youth had forgotten in the days of republican decay. This role, so eagerly assumed, was not easily forgotten after 1945. A principal heritage left by the Armistice Army to the postwar army was this latent desire to "lay siege to French society and capture its youth" (p. 432). It emerged again in the late fifties when, to the embattled officer corps, the only way to save not merely Algeria but the nation itself appeared to lie in reeducating French society to understand the truths of the army's logic.

The Armistice Army also left a bitter legacy of alienation. During its brief existence it had not been accepted by Frenchmen. Rather, it had been laughed at, scorned, even loathed. The officer corps, aware of its low status in civilian eyes, virtually felt itself to be a besieged order within the larger, unrepentant society.

These, then, were the bequests of the Armistice Army to the postwar army: a widening of the gap—one could almost say gulf—between army and people, a latent desire to educate the people against "the enemy within," and a corrosive dispute over discipline, loyalty, and obedience. And there was something else, something frequently forgotten by outsiders. The Second World War was for the French army, despite 1940 and the Liberation, largely a colonial war. It was in the colonial area that the most bitter battles were waged and in which many ideas and attitudes were formed. The fact that the postwar French army would also be principally engaged outside the European continent is by no means unimportant in assessing the various impulses that led it to insurrection.

II

From 1945 to the "praetorianism" that levelled the Fourth Republic is a mere thirteen years. Yet the many themes that must be explored are both broad and intricate. Kelly, for example, lists no fewer than seven major threads leading through the "labyrinth" he seeks to explain: decolonization in its world perspective, the continuing decline of French political institutions, the further alienation of the army from civilian society and its values, the actual military history of the wars in Indochina and Algeria, the general background of the cold war, the inability of government and army to agree upon military policy, and the "growing preoccupation" of the army with ideological approaches to warfare as well as its manifest desire to put these "*pur et dur*" doc-

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trines into operation—and then, above all else, there is the need to understand the goals, the motives, the tactics, and the grand strategy of Charles de Gaulle (p. 11).

No reviewer can hope to deal with more than a few of these themes, and these but marginally. Also, subordinate themes must be explored, especially those that relate to accepted hypotheses about civil-military relations and military organizations.

For example, in his various studies of the military profession, Professor Morris Janowitz has observed that the democratization of a military service may actually weaken civilian control if it introduces into the officer corps men of lower social background who are ambitious and less liable to be governed by the traditional restraints than are more aristocratically oriented military elites. Thus, Ambler raises the important question, "In what degree is military indiscipline and revolt in the late 1950's and early 1960's attributable to a style of 'military Poujadism,' itself rooted in subaltern and middle-ranking officers drawn from the lower class, the frequent breeding ground for fascism?" (p. 135). He has, in turn, combed the statistics of St. Cyr and the École Polytechnique and available data on the social origins of the officers who entered military service after World War II. There was, to be sure, a considerable "democratization," most notably, as one would suspect, in the ranks of the junior officers.

But what conclusions can logically be inferred from such findings? Ambler finds them of limited significance in determining motives for revolt. "Where *esprit de corps* was strongest," he notes, "particularly in paratroop units and in the Legion, common war experience and remoteness from the concerns of civilian France tended to wean the officer from his former class prejudices and predispositions when these conflicted with the military-group interests" (p. 137). The French air force, generally recruited from a lower social base than was the army, provided few officers for the insurrections. It was also less deeply involved in the political-military problems of Indochina and Algeria than was the army. The evidence would therefore seem to point toward the conclusion that the social origins of an officer were of less significance than his direct experience in the field.

The very term "democratization" is itself misleading. Recruitment statistics indicate that what was actually happening was that the officer corps was increasingly being recruited from within; that is to say, in the postwar years, as the military profession lost its attractiveness to middle and upper-class French youth, more and more of those who attended St. Cyr or who were promoted from the ranks were them-

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selves the sons of soldiers. The figure approached forty percent in both categories. Thus, an officer corps that in 1945 was already separated from the mainstream of French society was further separated from its "source" by the pattern of increasing recruitment from within.

So much has been written about the famous, or possibly infamous, doctrine of *la guerre révolutionnaire* that an exposition of its tenets is hardly necessary. Both Ambler and Kelly analyze its origins, content, and implications with perceptiveness and sophistication—the latter author with a particular skill that catches the nuances and subtleties. The doctrine developed in an army that had had little previous experience with or appreciation of the techniques of psychological warfare, and not a few officers in the high command always remained skeptical of its validity. But it most assuredly captured, especially among junior officers, many adherents, most notably the group of colonels who plotted the scenario of May 1961. More important, the gospel of *la guerre révolutionnaire* pointed not simply at operations in Algeria but also at the *métropole*. What angered the officer corps was the failure of the French government to give unswerving support to the cause of *Algérie française*, as well as its apparent willingness to consider compromises with Algerian nationalism, to tolerate Communists in the political processes, to conduct business as usual. The officers sought to define a national purpose and found it in their concept of revolutionary war—an all-compelling, monistic doctrine which maintained that France, by fighting for Algeria, was defending not simply French interests but the entire Western world in the remorseless struggle against the further spread of communism. The disciples of the doctrine were convinced that Algerian nationalism, even if the FLN did not realize or acknowledge it, was no more and no less than the handmaiden of international communism. Thus defined, *la guerre révolutionnaire* was a warning to metropolitan France. It had implications for direct intervention in the political affairs of the nation if government and people failed to comprehend the truth of the national purpose that had been revealed by the Army theorists.

But these French officers, even when "intoxicated" by doctrine, were also professionals. Whoever wishes to interpret the postwar role of the army must assess the thrust of professionalism—especially since such social scientists as Samuel Huntington have argued that the professionalization of the armed services is, as Ambler phrased it, "the surest guarantee of civilian control in a democracy" (p. 370). But Ambler's study suggests that the theory needs at least some modification in the light of the French experience, for professionalism, as such, was not

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enough. Military professionalism, for example, includes the concepts of both honor and obedience. And these two values may come in sharp conflict. Many French officers believed—and, it must be emphasized, believed sincerely—that they had pledged their honor as soldiers to defend the cause of French Algeria. On numerous crucial occasions they felt it more important in their scheme of values to preserve their honor than to obey the orders of a government from which they were already estranged. Moreover, as we have previously observed, in the days of the Third Republic, professionalism had been marked, even reinforced, by a scornful apoliticism. But in the fifties, officers now alienated from their government could convince themselves that, according to the tenets of *la guerre révolutionnaire*, it was their professional duty to make the nation accept their view of the only proper way to defend both France and the West. And this is simply to say that professionalism can be a two-edged sword. In most instances, as Huntington maintains, it is a reinforcing agent for civilian control. But it is not always or inevitably so—for the concept of professionalism contains numerous values, and these can be in conflict not only with each other but also with the "truths" of civilian society.

The underlying theme of both Kelly's and Ambler's studies, which unites the many strands of the "labyrinth," is the ever-spreading alienation of the army from the government and the public. There was alienation created by the low pay and rewards and by the tendency of postwar governments to treat officers as no different from any other group of *fonctionnaires*; alienation increased by seemingly inconsistent military policies in Indochina and Algeria, especially by the unwillingness (and inability) of any regime to send draftees to help the professionals until well into the Algerian conflict; and, above all else, alienation from the government and, eventually, from the public that would not accept the logic of the ideology that derived from the army's bitter experiences in war.

III

The themes of alienation, ideology, professionalism, social origins, and recruitment are, to be sure, far more complex than the preceding paragraphs could hope to suggest. But it is explicit in Ambler, implicit in Kelly, that they could not by and of themselves explain the postwar politicization of the French army. There were, after all, strong countervailing tendencies: high-ranking officers who looked with skepticism upon the new ideology of revolutionary war, who still clung to the apolitical heritage of the past, and, even under the Fourth Republic,

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officers who found the path to promotion through cooperation with Parisian authorities.

Hence, both authors conclude that any overall explanation of insurrection depends upon the conjuncture of the forces just described with two very specific, unique series of events: the tribulations of the army in Indochina and Algeria and the continuing decline of the political authority of the Fourth Republic. Both writers, in short, not only focus their attention upon the historical process but find in it the ultimate determinant of insurrection.

By the time that the French army cast its lot with the cause of *Algérie française*, it had lived through a long and bitter military experience. Since 1940 it had suffered defeat after defeat. It could not claim, in 1945, that it had redeemed its record in the Liberation. Frenchmen, after all, cherish the belief that if Paris did not burn, it was because Parisians themselves, in the Jacobin tradition of the Great Revolution, snatched their own city from the German grasp. Then the army had suffered humiliating defeat after defeat in Indochina—in that colonial world always of special significance to the French officer corps. In this sense, then, Algeria (even if legally defined as a part of the *métropole*) was the last foothold of empire, the army's last rallying point before being thrust back within the geographical limits of France. Moreover, the army lost what few "victories" it achieved, as they were taken away either by the government in Paris or by the interference of so-called allies. After De Gaulle came into power, for example, the army achieved some notable military successes against the FLN, but these "victories" meant little in the face of the broader calculus of the leader of the Fifth Republic. Tactical success in operations against Egypt in 1956 was denied by the intervention of the UN and the United States (read: John Foster Dulles). It is assuredly no coincidence that among the hottest of the hotheads in Algiers were the very same paratroopers who, after securing an easy success in the Suez operations, had almost immediately been forced to strike their colors.

But, in the last analysis, the determinant of insurrection was the government in Paris—the degree of consensus it enjoyed, the firmness it could display, the legitimacy it commanded in the eyes of the army and of the people. As is still true in France, all roads led to Paris. Both Ambler and Kelly, it should be added, show no false mercy for the feeble cabinets that presided over the destinies of the dying Fourth Republic. Both writers—Kelly in greater detail and with more corroborative evidence—point to the abysmal record of these governments in pursuing consistent policies and to the many evident signs of political collapse.

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Still, between the two writers, one is faced with some choices in interpretation. The difference—not absolute, but relative—involves the role of the army in the various insurrections and attempted coups of 1958, 1960, and 1961. Kelly, who details plot and counterplot in both civilian and military circles, tends to argue that in 1958 (and, for that matter, again in 1960 during the January "week of the barricades") the army seized upon disorders created by civilian dissidents in Algeria and elsewhere. The coup of May 1958 was, in his striking phrase, "handed to the unprepared Army as a kind of trophy" (p. 309). His emphasis upon the army's surprise and lack of preparation sometimes seems almost to approximate the later argument of General Massu that he was an engineer who jumped aboard a train already in motion and out of control and who sought, as an engineer-patriot, to seize the throttle before the train jumped the tracks to disaster. Ambler, less sanguine about the role of the officer corps, suggests that it should be remembered that those civilians who set the train in motion had counted upon the officers to hop aboard and had included this in their calculations.

Still, regardless of what actually happened in Algiers, events in Paris were decisive. Pierre Pflimlin soon discovered that, no matter who had started or seized the insurrectionary train, the Fourth Republic enjoyed no consensus and had lost its legitimacy. There were simply no defenders to rally to the Fourth Republic. The outcome was therefore the turn to De Gaulle—an event, it should be added, that did not fit any of the scenarios written or imagined by plotter or counterplotter and that was certainly not expected to take the form that it did.

There is a similar but sharper difference of opinion between Kelly and Ambler about the two attempted moves against De Gaulle and his Fifth Republic in January of 1961 and a year and a half later in 1961. What is involved is the question of the extent to which Army dissidents in Algiers and elsewhere represented a clear and present danger to the new regime. It is not an unimportant issue, for without any question, the abortive coup of May 1961 was military in its origin; it was hatched by the colonels of Algiers. It had a simple, direct motive. The army in Algeria was now thoroughly convinced that it was about to be betrayed by De Gaulle, by a man who had initially promised to defend *Algérie française* but who was playing a double game in which the army was the unwilling pawn. The officers were no longer faced with drift and indecision but rather with a leader developing a coherent line of policy to which the army was opposed.

To Kelly, the situation was always one fraught with danger that the army might succeed. He writes in a tone of "might have been," sees

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turning points at a number of critical junctures, finds "shakiness" in De Gaulle's handling of the January days. And even after the May 1961 coup had failed, he can regard it as a "miracle" that the OAS did not succeed in its plan to pit *colon* against Muslim and thereby provoke the army to the defense of the former. This is the general thrust of his presentation, even though he can write scornfully of the attempted *putsch* of the colonels as proceeding with less foresight and planning than one expects to find in Middle Eastern palace revolutions.

Ambler, analyzing events from the perspective of civilian control, has a somewhat different interpretation—though he never writes off the dangers as nonexistent. Still, he is essentially committed to the proposition that "military intervention in politics is closely related to the degree of *legitimacy* of existing political institutions, i.e., the strength and breadth of the national political consensus which supports them." (One might parenthetically note, as observed earlier, that the unappreciated strength of the Third Republic was a compelling reason for the apoliticism of the pre-1940 army.) From this perspective, then, Ambler views De Gaulle, both in 1960 and 1961, as "strong and popular"—with the logical corollary that the army, in turn, was hesitant and divided. His emphasis is on the legitimacy and popularity of the Gaullist regime and the consequent lack of unity among military dissidents. Thus, General Challe's move in May of 1961 "failed to attract the active support of the majority of officers, for these men saw that mutiny now meant civil war and a split within the army." In fact he goes further. When Ambler analyzes the downfall of the Fourth Republic in 1958, his controlling sentence reads, "Had government leaders in Paris enjoyed solid authority and the backing of a more united nation, in all probability there never would have been a serious threat to civilian control in France" (pp. 366-67).

To this reviewer the weight of the evidence seems to support such a conclusion. The "week of the barricades" was indeed marked by *attentisme* on the part of most officers in Algeria and elsewhere; the plot of May 1961 was the work, by and large, of a handful of colonels who found few supporters. In both instances, the majority of French officers, while their obedience may have been grudging and their loyalty conditional, realized that De Gaulle would stand firm and that he enjoyed the support of a nation grown tired of insoluble conflict.

If this is correct, then what should be stressed in analyzing the history of the French army between 1945 and 1962 is not simply the threat to the state of military praetorianism—a subject on which there is already an abundance of literature. What should perhaps be emphasized is that

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it requires exceptional circumstances for a modern army to be drawn into insurrection against the modern state. Even with the successful precedents of 1958 as immediate background, the French officer corps could not act in unity during the next three years—and this despite the fact that in 1960 and 1961 it had, at least by its own standards, all the more reason to act, since its opponent was a man who had committed himself to oppose the one cause, a French Algeria, to which the Army had passionately committed itself. Moreover, as this review has tried to indicate, it had taken many, many things to bring the army to the state of mind that existed in the officer corps in 1958: lost wars, weak governments, alienation from vital aspects of French society, an ideology that was mystique—the list is almost infinitely expandable. Thus, after one chronicles the many forces that impelled French officers to dissidence, one should emphasize how much it takes to push an army over the political brink—and also the fact that the modern state, given a reasonable degree of civilian leadership and consensus, is in a relatively strong position to impose an unpopular military policy upon even a disaffected army of professionals.

IV

All three of the works here reviewed are fine books. Taken together, they certainly illustrate the widening horizons of military studies and military history, subjects no longer confined to narrow materials but dealing with fundamental issues of history and political science and using the analytical resources of social science. To be sure, one wishes that these resources were more abundant. Also one can wish that the analytical net of the authors had been cast even wider. It is, for example, unfortunate that neither Kelly nor Ambler has much to say about the French navy. Admittedly, the navy was scarcely involved in Indochina and Algeria and was not, in fact, a participant in the insurrections. So in one sense it can safely be ignored. Ambler mentions only, on the basis of the testimony of several naval officers, that the navy had been so badly "burned" in the Vichy years that it had no taste for further political involvements. But this is hardly analysis: after all, simply in terms of numbers, far more army officers had been "burned" by their association with Vichy. It would have been useful (especially since the navy in the Vichy years had been so closely associated with Pétainist policies) to use the political attitudes and ideas of naval officers as a control. If one knew how many of the same disaffections and alienations were shared by naval officers, one could be even more definitive about the ultimate x in the French civil-military equation.

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Similarly, one could wish that more had been written about the background of the cold war and international affairs—though this, to be sure, is not entirely ignored. The concept of *la guerre révolutionnaire* emerged in the era of massive retaliation, at a time when many Europeans were restive about American control of the nuclear deterrent. To what extent could it be regarded as the French army's equivalent for what De Gaulle eventually sought to accomplish with his concept of a *force de frappe*—that is, as an example of a deeply rooted French desire to develop and implement a purely French technique of warfare and reassert French nationalist pride? Moreover, throughout the Algerian conflict not all of the enemies of the French army were located in Paris or the FLN, for there was an American push to the whole movement for decolonization. This, again, is to see the Army's commitment to Algeria in almost "Gaullist" terms—that is, as a last effort on the part of the army to reassert French nationalism and vanished international power in an age when the world seemed to be conspiring in an effort to reduce France to the role of a minor continental state.

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WHEN THE FIGHTING HAS TO STOP

The Arguments About Escalation

By FRED CHARLES IKLÉ

Bernard Brodie, *Escalation and the Nuclear Option*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966, 151 pp. $4.50.
Herman Kahn, *On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1965, 308 pp. $6.95.

I

IN a great many wars—perhaps in most wars since the Middle Ages—one or both of the belligerents could have done significantly more to fight his enemy but chose not to do so. Whether we want to call all these wars "limited," or only those in which both sides hobbled their military effort, is perhaps a minor matter of terminology.

Yet, our terminology must not mislead our thinking. There are many ways in which a limited war can become *less* limited and many reasons why, during a war, governments change the level of effort that they devote to bargaining, fighting, and deterrence. Today, all this is tucked under the label "escalation," a word scarcely fifteen years old (in its present meaning), which we find daily in our newspapers though not yet in most of our dictionaries. "Escalation" makes us think of stepwise increments, each of which confronts the enemy with a noticeable challenge. The word suggests that such steps succeed each other up or down a "ladder," meaning that expansions and contractions in military effort occur along a single dimension and follow sequentially, rather than being competing alternatives.

Herman Kahn is aware that the metaphor of an "escalation ladder" has serious shortcomings (to which he devotes a full chapter). He does recognize that the level of military effort (or violence) need not change in discrete steps; indeed, he invented his forty-four steps precisely to remind us "that there are many relatively continuous paths between a low-level crisis and an all-out war" (p. 40). ". . . Both the distinct quality of a rung [on the ladder] and the distance between rungs can be blurred, particularly if a participant in the escalation wishes to blur them" (p. 214). Kahn also makes the important point that the participants in a war will have different perceptions of these various levels or intensities of military power.

Even if one is not misled by the seeming discreteness of "escalation

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rungs," the idea of a "ladder" is a captivating metaphor. (Indeed, Luigi Nono, the modernist Italian composer, used Herman Kahn's ladder as the theme for a musical composition which moves from (1) "crisi manifèsta" to (44) "spasmo o guèrra insensata." And being a good Communist, Nono dedicated this opus to the National Liberation Front of Vietnam.) But if we think in terms of a single ladder descending from here to hell, we are likely to overlook important trade-offs between an increment in one dimension and a decrement in another. Of course, a sophisticated author like Kahn would be the first to recognize these trade-offs,[1] and he begins his book by stressing that there are several ways to "escalate" a conflict.

Paraphrasing Herman Kahn, one might say that fighting can be expanded either (1) by increasing the physical effort or level of violence (more men, more matériel, or more powerful weapons) or (2) by fighting the enemy in more places or extending the fighting to his allies. The second form of expansion is a particularly significant possibility if opponents with global capabilities and global interests are confronting each other: one side might carry the conflict elsewhere on the globe. For instance, during the Cuban missile crisis, many people feared Khrushchev would respond by blockading Berlin. One might ask, of course, why the United States felt so vulnerable in its access to Berlin, since it, too, could have fought that conflict elsewhere.[2]

To these two dimensions along which a conflict can be expanded, Kahn quite properly adds economic sanctions and verbal or symbolic acts (hostile propaganda, declarations of war, and such). But a major additional dimension is *time*, and most writings on "escalation" (Kahn's book included) fail to relate it fully to the other dimensions. It is useful to bring in the time dimension more explicitly, not to enlarge the taxonomy, but to show how *prolongation of a war* competes with "escalations" along other dimensions.

To clarify this relationship, we must recall why governments tend to limit their war effort. Four motives—singly or in combination—offer most of the explanation:

1. To keep down the economic and social costs of sustaining a war effort.

[1] He occasionally mentions some, e.g., level of violence versus geographic expansion (p. 68) and ceasing to use nuclear weapons versus repealing a declaration of war (p. 217).

[2] Kahn distinguishes a geographic expansion adjacent to the local threater of conflict from an expansion into a more distant theater. For the latter, he coins a special term ("compound escalation"—a somewhat infelicitous label!), but says little about its interesting peculiarities.

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2. For fear that more fighting might cause greater destruction and death on one's own side or in friendly territory.
3. Because an expansion might fail to improve the military situation since the enemy might cancel its effectiveness by expanding his own effort.
4. For fear that an expansion of one's war effort might, through various mechanisms, erupt into a further expansion still more costly and more destructive.

Given these motives, governments ought to be (and usually are) as concerned about prolonging a war as they are about "escalating" its level of violence or its geographic spread. Indeed, one can imagine indifference curves—familiar to the economist—that would indicate all the possible combinations in the prolongation-escalation continuum that are equally undesirable. For instance, to the extent that the President wants to keep down the social and monetary costs of sustaining the war effort in Vietnam, having to fight for three years with half a million men might seem just as bad as fighting one year at the escalated level of one million men. Or, to the extent that the President worries about the risk that the war, if escalated further, might erupt into still higher levels of violence—particularly into a global nuclear war—he must consider how this very risk compares between a short war at a high level of violence and a long war at a lower level. And there are many other trade-offs between escalation and prolongation.

Of course, the enemy's willingness to escalate and to prolong has to be figured in. When Imperial Germany "escalated" the level of violence in World War I by adopting unrestricted submarine warfare, it did not underestimate the capacity of the Allied powers to "escalate" the number of men and equipment after the American entry into the war; it underestimated England's willingness (or capacity) to *prolong* the war until American help could become effective.

II

Herman Kahn's book is largely analytical in that it deals with a wide range of possibilities and takes up many aspects of escalation. Bernard Brodie's book, on the other hand, is essentially a plea for a change in U.S. policy, a plea that the United States give tactical nuclear weapons a greater role in NATO (to deter large-scale aggression) and cease to press for stronger conventional forces.

Along with the time dimension, the above-mentioned four motives for limiting wars can serve as convenient categories within which to fit

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together some of the points made by Brodie, Kahn, and other writers on escalation:

1. Our first-mentioned motive for limiting wars—to keep down the monetary and social costs of sustaining a war effort—does not apply to nuclear weapons (except, of course, for the costly process of building up a nuclear arsenal in peacetime). As Kahn points out, "Nuclear war can escalate to total violence without significantly involving the citizenry in the process of . . . mobilization. . . . Preparations for large-scale conventional war are painful; for nuclear war, they are not" (p. 120). The fact that peacetime preparations for large-scale conventional defense seem painful to the Europeans is one reason, incidentally, why Brodie favors greater reliance on tactical nuclear weapons in NATO's strategy. But to build up strong conventional forces for a major offensive is also costly, a fact that might help to curb aggressive ambitions. Moreover, *during* a conventional war, the costs of sustaining a large-scale military effort can keep the aggressor from escalating. Hitler, for example, limited his war effort precisely because he wanted to reduce these costs. As late as 1943, he still opposed the conscription of German women.[3] And today, China's assistance to North Vietnam and the Vietcong is perhaps more limited by cost considerations than by the fear of American reprisal.

2. The concern that a higher level of fighting would cause more destruction to one's own or to friendly areas is a powerful motive for limiting one's military effort. The U.S. forces in South Vietnam are severely hobbled for this very reason. This same inhibition, but immensely stronger, would apply to tactical nuclear weapons—especially if the enemy might use them too. In a paragraph that jars with his overall theme, Brodie reminds us of the French argument that our willingness to use tactical nuclear weapons does not reassure them, since such use would make Europe a scorched battleground (p. 29).

3. The third motive against escalation—the possibility that its military gains might be cancelled by the enemy's counterescalation—of course applies to the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons only if the enemy, too, possesses them. The assumption that the enemy does not have these weapons, or not enough of them, goes a long way to explain the early American interest in tactical nuclear war. But as Bernard Brodie himself wrote (when still in his "anti-tactical-nuclear" period), if we are planning on a *unilateral* use of these weapons where we do not have a monopoly, we "should make clear the circumstances

[3] Burton H. Klein, *Germany's Economic Preparations for War* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), 201 and *passim*.

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under which we would expect to get away with it."[4] Incidentally, it would be easy to cull more quotations from Brodie's earlier writings as arguments against his present position. What gives his present essay special weight is precisely the fact that he was one of the earliest and most eloquent proponents of restraining the role of nuclear weapons and preserving the "nuclear threshold." He deserves to be listened to as he tries to warn us of the danger "of carrying an intrinsically good idea so much too far" (p. 7), for this good idea started out largely as *his* idea.

As the Soviet capability in tactical nuclear weapons grew, American proponents of a tactical nuclear defense for NATO began to argue that even if these weapons were used on both sides, the defender would still have an advantage, for he could remain in fortified strongholds whereas the aggressor would have to mass his troops in vulnerable formations. By way of a counterargument, however, it has since been pointed out that the NATO nuclear weapons called "tactical" are far more vulnerable than the strategic weapons, so that an aggressor could destroy them as soon as the nuclear threshold was crossed—nay, that he might even destroy them with high explosives. Obviously, this debate cannot be carried on intelligently without detailed figures and calculations on the potential effects and actual vulnerabilities of these tactical nuclear weapons on both sides.[5]

4. The fourth motive against escalation has become widely publicized and even vulgarized. In a conflict to which the major nuclear powers are fully committed (or where nuclear weapons might be introduced), the dominant motive for limiting the fighting is the fear that further expansion could lead to either a gradual or a sudden descent into the abyss of central thermonuclear war. Morton Halperin greatly clarified matters by sharply distinguishing this *unwanted* transition into a central nuclear war from a *deliberate* expansion of fighting through the introduction of additional military power or through geographic widening.[6] However, by using the term "explosion" for the former, he might have unnecessarily circumscribed it. In an era when nuclear strategic forces have a low vulnerability, this unwanted transition need not be so sudden. Perhaps the only historical experience comparable to this feared escalation into a thermonuclear war is the "explosion" of

[4] "More About Limited War," *World Politics*, x (October 1957), 118.

[5] A detailed discussion of the complexities and problems of a tactical nuclear defense for NATO can be found in William W. Kaufmann, "The Crisis in Military Affairs," *World Politics*, x (July 1958), 579-603.

[6] *Limited War in the Nuclear Age* (New York 1963).

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the Austrian-Serbian war, which remained a limited war only from July 28 to August 1, 1914.

However, a defender might also see some virtue in the fact that escalation (especially to the nuclear level) appears to bring an increasing danger of "explosion" into a totally destructive war, for this very danger might also impress the enemy and induce him to back down. Thomas Schelling was perhaps the first to explain it most lucidly as "the threat that leaves something to chance."[7]

III

What makes Bernard Brodie's book somewhat frustrating to an exacting reader is that these various motives for and against nuclear escalation are inextricably intermingled in his easy-flowing prose. On the one hand, he seems to argue that our use (or threatened use) of nuclear weapons would give us an advantage on the battlefield (or would threaten to do so); that is, he seems to feel that the third reason against escalation listed above should be given less weight.[8]

On the other hand, he seems to be uninterested in affecting the local military situation and instead wants to use tactical nuclear weapons merely to introduce "the threat that leaves something to chance." What we can threaten, Brodie argues, is some action that "*could* escalate," but we "have to leave to the opponent in his next move the choice of making the situation more dangerous or less so . . ." (pp. 28-29). In the event of large-scale Russian aggression, Brodie writes, "the best way, perhaps the only way, for us to avert not only defeat but unnecessary escalation is to demonstrate clearly that our readiness to take risks is not less than theirs. How can we do that except by using [nuclear] weapons—demonstratively, few rather than many, and in as controlled a manner as possible, but nevertheless rather more abruptly than the Russians seem to have bargained for in launching their aggression?" (p. 128).[9] But if it is Brodie's objective to increase the shared risk of nu-

[7] *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), chap. 8. For Schelling's most recent discussion of this idea, see his *Arms and Influence* (New Haven 1966), 105-16.

[8] This feeling is evident, for instance, when he stresses the new technological possibilities for "specialized bombs" and recommends studies on the "small-scale, controlled use" of nuclear weapons (pp. 22-23).

[9] Brodie makes it abundantly clear that he considers such aggression exceedingly unlikely and that he is addressing himself to a contingency postulated by others. One would have to read his book upside down to find that he is calling for "a giant, one-sided, American escalation, without provocation"—as Amitai Etzioni did in the *New York Times Book Review* (October 30, 1966). With a whole chapter on "the status quo as a standard," Brodie conveys even to the most hurried polemicist that the hypothetical crisis, for which he recommends greater reliance on the threat

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clear war and to demonstrate our willingness to compete in this risk-taking, it is not at all clear why we need "*tactical*" nuclear weapons. A single "strategic" bomb against a military target might be just as effective, perhaps more controllable, and would certainly belong to a less vulnerable category of weapons.

Perhaps the fairest interpretation of Brodie's book is that he wants us to rely more on tactical nuclear weapons for both reasons: the better to defeat aggression locally, and to scare the enemy into retreat by raising the risk of further escalation. After the mid-1950's, the possibility of such a dual effect of our tactical nuclear weapons might indeed have helped to deter the Russians from military aggression against NATO or against Berlin, assuming the Russians had to be deterred at all. But the proposal that, in the future, NATO should rely more rather than less on this effect is a bit like walking over thin ice and then saying, "Let's do it again—it was so nice and smooth!"

To demonstrate our "readiness to take risks" by exploding nuclear weapons that we call "tactical" is not an appealing strategy for an alliance, particularly if this demonstration is to occur so close to our allies' heartland. If the proposal were to make such a demonstration in outer space, it might go over better; but then, as Schelling warns us, "there is no cheap, safe way of using nuclears that scares the wits out of the Russians without scaring us too."[10] The difficulty with "the threat that leaves something to chance" is that some members of the alliance might back away from it before it has done its work.

Brodie illustrates his thesis with a hypothetical conflict that started about Berlin—an interesting discussion with many worthy points: for instance, his excellent passage showing that our concern about having to "shoot first" is entirely inappropriate (pp. 83-84). Yet, the record of the actual Berlin conflict suggests that our (felt) weakness in conventional strength weakened our negotiating strategy—in spite of all our nuclear superiority. In 1948, when we had a nuclear monopoly but probably a worse conventional inferiority than ever since, we not only accepted the blocking of our ground access but practically offered to be phased out of West Berlin: with our anxiety about our conventional in-

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of escalation, is a crisis with enormous Soviet provocation. How, then, did Etzioni justify his allegation that Brodie recommended escalation *without provocation*? By saying that "Mr. Brodie is unable to realize that it is a major provocation to decrease conventional forces and increase the reliance on nuclear weapons . . ." (*ibid.*, November 27). That is, Etzioni first blames Brodie for recommending that we escalate while there is no provocation from the Russians; then he tries to smear over this untruth by blaming Brodie for recommending a "provocation" on our side!

[10] *Arms and Influence*, 114.

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

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feriority we offered Stalin acceptance in West Berlin of the Soviet-controlled East German currency; and where this would have ended up a few years later is easy to imagine. In 1959, our negotiating position was firmer: we were ready to give up only part of the status quo (and again we were spared this concession by the Soviet rejection of our proposal). Finally, in 1962-1963, when our preoccupation (or "obsession," as Brodie calls it) with conventional strength was greatest, our negotiating position became firmer than in any of the previous crises.

Perhaps the Western powers, and particularly the U.S. government, need not have acted this way during the earlier crises. Brodie is probably right in saying that in Berlin in 1948 "the Russians desired us to interpret their actions as a blockade . . . only so long as we were not ready to test our interpretation with force" (p. 47). But official strategists and force planners have to serve their government and its allies as they are, not some hypothetical decision-maker. In their analysis of the Cuban missile crisis, Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter remind us that "there was in fact at no time . . . any suggestion on the part of President Kennedy and his immediate staff that this was a careless game of bluff, in which they incautiously might let a war get started by chance. . . ."[11]

To be sure, if an aggressor should force us into a competition in nuclear risk-taking, we would have to go along or else meet his demands. The most important meaning of our strategic superiority is precisely that it makes such a competition increasingly unattractive to the enemy the further he pushes it. That is, "superiority" can mean the enemy has to fear that *in extremis* (say, if overwhelmed by his conventional forces or attacked by his "tactical" nuclears) we might launch a strategic attack. Or "superiority" can mean the enemy has to fear that if we both went down that uncharted road of "limited strategic war,"[12] he would lose his forces faster than we.

While we must be prepared to meet such a "threat that leaves something to chance," we do not have to plan on making the "chances" more perilous *on our own initiative*, by introducing tactical nuclears as sort of a randomized doomsday machine. It is unwise to do so for two rea-

[11] "Controlling the Risks in Cuba," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 17, Institute of Strategic Studies (London 1965), 15. The only time Bernard Brodie seems to agree with Secretary McNamara is when he quotes him as attributing Khrushchev's withdrawal in 1962 to our *nuclear* weapons (p. 52). But as the Wohlstetters point out, "this single encounter where the United States had both the capability to dominate in a conventional conflict and also to inflict overwhelming nuclear damage could not demonstrate . . . that conventional superiority will always have a major utility; still less could it show that it might be easily dispensed with" (p. 17).

[12] The only public writings focusing on possible uses of strategic weapons short of a large-scale attack (or retaliation) are a couple of chapters in Kahn's present book and Klaus Knorr and Thornton Read, eds., *Limited Strategic War* (New York 1962).

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sons. First, whenever our opponent bullies us into a corner where we might have to start fighting or give in, our reliance on the randomized doomsday machine will scare us into a timid diplomatic posture (see the comments above on the Berlin negotiations).

Second, once fighting has started and we then do introduce tactical nuclears, will the enemy know when the fighting has to stop? That is, will he know that he should stop instantly? Brodie's point is well taken, that the enemy would have a strong incentive to recognize our controlled, small-scale use of nuclears as such (p. 107) and that he would contemplate his option of responding in kind with utter dismay (p. 125). But Brodie skips over the difficulties of war termination in suggesting that the enemy would be less "willing to accept defeat (or even stalemate) in a battle that has remained conventional than in one that has gone nuclear" (p. 128). This brings us back to the importance of the time dimension.

Even if the enemy did not respond in kind to our introduction of nuclears, he need not stop the advance of his conventional forces. His superior conventional forces might overcome our "demonstration" use of tactical nuclears, if—as Brodie seems to recommend—our conventional forces were kept small relative to his and our use of nuclear weapons remained very limited. Should we then step up the use of nuclear weapons? Doing so might finally bring us success on the battlefield (assuming the enemy still withheld his nuclears), but it would confront us with the "tactical" vulnerability problem: the fact that in the realm of "tactical" nuclears, a large-scale first strike *does* pay. And if we therefore decided on a "tactical preemption" instead of leaving this option to the enemy, could we rely on the firebreak between tactical and strategic weapons? Or should we go all the way? My point here is that we cannot separate the introduction of tactical nuclears from a certain willingness to threaten strategic nuclear war, or at least a willingness to move into some of Herman Kahn's "bizarre" crises of "limited strategic war."

We have some idea about how *conventional* wars are fought, what havoc they might cause, how they might become larger, and how the fighting can be stopped. Our image of nuclear wars is a house of cards with one untested hypothesis piled upon another. The only thing we know fairly certainly are the physical effects of nuclear detonations.

It is one of Brodie's themes that since conventional war can be so awful (and conventional preparations so costly), we should bring the nuclear deterrent up closer on the heels of conventional fighting. This is a valid motive. Yet, we must not become smug about the reliability of

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nuclear deterrence. Deterrence, in the long run, is dangerous. To appreciate this does not mean that one is captivated by the more lurid scenarios of accidental war (Brodie is quite right in putting these remote possibilities into proper perspective, pp. 53-59). One can appreciate the long-term dangers of nuclear deterrence in many ways, with complex analyses or in the simple intuitive fashion of Herman Kahn's telling passage: "Imagine, for example, that an accidental war actually occurred and someone then tried to persuade an investigating committee that the system had, in fact, been quite safe, but that there had been an incredibly unlucky event, rather than that the system had been dangerous and the inevitable had happened. It would be almost impossible to convince anyone after the fact that a system with literally thousands of armed and alert missiles and planes widely distributed actually was safe, and that extremely bad luck had occurred, even if it were true. And it probably would not be" (p. 64).

Against the threat of strategic nuclear attack we may have no other choice—for decades to come—but to rely on deterrence. To cope with the threat of conventional attack, however, we do have some choice. And in view of the long-term danger just alluded to, it would seem prudent to choose strategies that will help to curtail the implements and role of nuclear deterrence.

IV

We all know the story about the members of a club who numbered their jokes to facilitate retelling them. In the "club" of military analysts or strategic writers, the arguments about escalation might well be numbered, too, since nearly all of them have been mentioned before. Whether we number our arguments or not, however, we cannot have a useful debate—much less intellectual progress—unless we make it clear where we agree and disagree.

I would have found it useful if Bernard Brodie had related his themes more to the existing body of thought. He never mentions Schelling's "threat that leaves something to chance," and yet this is what he primarily seems to have in mind (if he does not, all the more important to say so). And, in a footnote, Brodie writes that Kahn's present book came too late for him to consider. Yet one wishes Brodie had added some linkages with Kahn's work (after all, he did have time to add an appendix *after* Kahn's book had come off the press). For instance, some of the points that seem to be missing in Brodie's criticism of the "firebreak theory" can be found in Kahn's rich chapter on the nuclear threshold.

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To keep a fair balance while dotting the *i*'s and crossing the *t*'s, I should perhaps add that Brodie meant to write one coherent essay, not a lexicon of cross-references. Kahn, on the other hand, is less willing to make sacrifices for the harmony of his prose. He enjoys sticking in little asides. And once in a long while, *ach*, his dictating machine—like the sorcerer's apprentice—kept going after the master had left: "Another metaphor as useful as the escalation ladder would be that of an elevator stopping at various floors. We can think of a typical escalation situation between the United States and the Soviet Union in terms of a department store with seven floors, each offering a number of options . . . from which the decision-makers on one side or the other may choose" (p. 41).

By contrast, Kahn's Appendix, "Relevant Concepts and Language for the Discussion of Escalation," is a masterpiece in comprehensiveness and lucid categorization. With perhaps some additions and refinements, this could become a truly definitive synopsis of the subject. It is one of the merits of Kahn's book that it deals with so many aspects of escalation. He has far more to say on war termination than other writers (and war termination is obviously intimately linked with the problem of escalation); he discusses possibilities of "deescalation"; and he tackles the difficult problem concerning the determinants that give one side in a limited war an advantage ("escalation dominance"). He never denies that many of his situations not only *seem* most improbable, but ought to be considered as such. Yet, unless we explore new combinations and possibilities as he does, we are likely to overlook that which turns out to be decisive.

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WEAKENING THE BELIEF IN GENERAL WAR

Schelling on Strikes

By NATHAN LEITES

Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1966, 293 pp. $7.50.

"WE may argue about the wisdom of announcing 'unconditional surrender' as an aim in the last major war," observes Schelling in his recent book, *Arms and Influence*—as one might expect, a brilliant and important study[1]—"but seem to expect 'unconditional destruction' as a matter of course in another one" (p. 23). Secretary McNamara does in fact require "adequacy of our forces from the standpoint of convincing others that the initiation of general nuclear war would inevitably bring about" not their facing the choice between capitulation and devastation, but exclusively "their own destruction."[2] Suppose the enemy underestimates our force and its defenses or exaggerates the obstacles he can put in our path—suppose, that is, we have failed to be "clear and convincing" about our capabilities.[3] Assume that the enemy then attempts to disarm us, disarming himself in the act. He fails; that is, contrary to his presumptions, we do possess a capability for "Assured Destruction" (AD). What do we then do? We proceed to an "Assured Destruction attack," of course. Such a resolve is often implicitly conveyed in discussions by knowledgeable people, and is sometimes expressed. Thus massive retaliation, in the strict meaning of this discredited phrase, lives on: deterrence seems strengthened when one's AD capability is publicly allocated to an immediate and single AD attack. One of the authors writing on prenuclear affairs whom Schelling uses to novel and telling effect recounts the following incident about the Western outlaw, Starr, and his pursuer, Wilson: "Starr . . . offered Wilson the first shot, saying: 'If you miss and I kill you, it will be in self-defense.' Wilson fired and missed, and Starr killed him."[4] We are prepared to repeat this sequence, even if our Wilson also disposes of only one bullet.

[1] I shall deal with only one of the several major contributions made by Schelling, that concerning the coercive use of nuclear weapons.
[2] Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, February 18, 1965, 42.
[3] *Ibid.*, 38.
[4] Paul I. Wellman, *A Dynasty of Western Outlaws* (Garden City 1961), 255.

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Still, this stance of ours is not an assured one. According to the Secretary of Defense, the aggressor's death follows "inevitably" from his deed; yet it is hard to find indications of the nature of this allegedly indissoluble link. Surely it is a matter of the victim's choice. We are, of course, accustomed to discussions of "things" that "get out of hand," "out of control"; but this is just shorthand for an interaction between opponents that—whether still based on calculations of cost and benefit, or throwing off that shackle—makes them proceed to decisions they had neither foreseen nor approved a bit earlier.

If one proceeds by one's own choice to "destroy the aggressor as a viable society,"[5] what objective might one be pursuing?

In the current sensibility of Western analysts and rulers alike, one aim, once deterrence has failed, appears paramount, so much so that the Secretary has singled it out for extreme abbreviation, along with AD: Damage Limitation, or DL. (One may add to it, or include within it, the obvious orientation toward securing an end to the war on acceptable conditions, the successor to "victory.")

Now how is DL served by an AD attack in the situation sketched above? It is hard to see that it would be. To destroy the aggressor may be justified as the only effective means for protecting the next generation against a recurrence of attack; but, since the presumably successful shelving of Morgenthau in favor of Erhard after the last war, this has ceased to be a persuasive rationale. Some moral systems may require that the aggressor's country be destroyed as the only adequate punishment for his extreme deed, but not the prevailing Western sensibility in the era of Vatican II, with older devils and hells in rapid decline and with "retaliation," in the DOD's language, becoming a synonym of "response." Vengeance and rage no longer seem adequate motives for actions on the scale considered here. Of course, an Assured Destruction attack could, if one imagines the Establishment to be dominated by characters like those in *Dr. Strangelove*, literally be what some critics of nonrestraint are in the habit of calling an "orgy" of destruction.

As massive city-killing cannot easily be derived from the objectives of limiting damage and ending the war on acceptable conditions, while these are the only aims that command unbroken assent, and as the vision of "holocaust" appears difficult to discard (for reasons on which I shall not speculate here), such an attack must be presented with little or dubious justification.

Whatever the cost-effectiveness of "strategic bombing" during the last war, we were being sensible, even when mistaken, to expect benefits

[5] McNamara, 38.

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from campaigns directed against the enemy's production and morale. This same expectation now lends a certain, though perhaps decreasing, aspect of continued usefulness to being as quick as we can in city-killing in nuclear war, even though we may now recognize that the role of production for a war once started is close to zero, and that a Leipzig should survive so as to be properly impressed by the fate of a Dresden. But it was precisely the years immediately preceding the appearance of nuclear weapons that saw the diffusion of the belief, often unformulated, according to which, even when we hold to modest objectives, there cannot be too much damage inflicted on the enemy's value as long as the war is on—that is, as long as he inflicts damage on us and threatens more. (If we in the West want to destroy a present-day Carthage, it has to be done as a "normal" military operation within a war, after which the target risks reemerging with its destroyer's help.)

To this preatomic heritage we may add the legacy of the first nuclear decade, when it seemed evident that if any of the new weapons were employed, they were bound to be used in "all-out" fashion, and when targeting them on their counterparts was still a fancy idea of a few specialists. "Automatically"—the mysteries of the new technology facilitated the denial of one's responsibility in choosing—nuclear war would be "general."

You might have to use your weapons so as not to lose them. (Wasn't it, isn't it outlandish to consider whether certain kinds of use are really preferable to loss?) Even if you think of your opponent's forces as a desirable target, they may not be a feasible one, in which case you will have to hit his value. "If we were at a shooting gallery, had paid our fee and picked up the rifle and could shoot either the clay pipes or the sitting ducks," Schelling explains, " 'shoot the pipes' would mean the same as 'don't shoot the ducks.' " And so hard is it for us to use our minds effectively in this domain that it has remained for the recent work of this eminent analyst to let us perceive further consequences of the capital and obvious point that "we are not talking about a shooting gallery" (p. 193).

There are yet more factors contributing to the survival of "massive retaliation." If threatening an instant and total obliteration of the aggressor's cities enhances deterrence, is it not "inevitable" that this posture will lead to the threat's being made good if deterrence fails? As this point, too, is usually not elaborated, it is hard to say how much a belief in the lack of nuclear flexibility and to what extent the concern for maintaining "credibility" for the next bout of deterrence enter here.

Finally, if the enemy has already struck our cities, does it not stand

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to reason—which in part may represent unsure morality—that we will not (should not) spare his? The penchant for envisaging the destruction of our enemy's society—after proper provocation, to be sure—is thus buttressed by the disposition (nourished by that very penchant, of course) to consider his attack on our cities. "In the Soviet first strike case," explains the Secretary with regard to a table showing the consequences of several U.S. postures, "we assumed that the Soviets initiate nuclear war . . . with the weight of their attack directed at our cities."[6]

Why the enemy would do this is almost never indicated. It is exceptional for the Secretary to mention even in a general way that the "potential utility" of certain U.S. efforts with regard to "a nuclear exchange" would be "critically dependent" on, among other things, "the Soviet objective in such an exchange."[7] It might, of course, be recalled that all the Secretary is concerned with here is providing for such a "worst case," rather than elucidating its origins. In this vein, he indicates that "damage-limiting programs could range across the entire spectrum, from one designed against a threat of a minor nuclear power . . . to one designed against the threat of a . . . first strike by the Soviet Union on our urban-industrial areas."[8] Still, it might be worth mentioning that while the motive for the opponent's disarming attack (for which we provide by AD) is easy enough to fathom, the state of mind behind his directing "the weight of his attack" in a first strike, or for that matter in any very large strike, "at our cities" is hard to construe.

But such a state of mind is easy to assume, as long as no indication of motives is required. Is the massive and simultaneous obliteration of cities with nuclear weapons not much more feasible than the destruction of the opposing force? Have modern wars not tended to be all-out? As the level of the enemy's "full damage potential" is indeed a crucial characteristic of the situation we are in, is it not natural to assume that this potential will be delivered in a single strike, in a "well-coordinated attack to maximize fatalities"?[9]

Much of this argument also applies to the last strike. Given our own propensity to imagine ourselves conducting an AD attack once disarming (of us by them) has failed, we tend to assume that after *our* counterforce strike (here decency in public speech, and perhaps also the exercise of reason, make for an asymmetry: we do not target cities to start with) their remaining devastation potential will be delivered upon us right away, as if no other employment would then seem more attrac-

[6] Statement before the Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense appropriations, 1966, 53.
[7] *Ibid.*, 51. [8] *Ibid.*, 46. [9] *Ibid.*, 54.

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tive, making the probable value of terminal devastation sink below the ultimate capability to kill value.

That other employment is, of course, the one with which Schelling's analysis is so largely and so lucidly concerned: "coercion" by threats or inflictions of "violence"; "bargaining." This use, if its dominance be accepted, would make one but little interested in the capacity to render actual, all at once, one's devastation potential. (One may not even much care to threaten talion for an opponent's foolish allegation that he will so use *his*.) It would rather make one concerned with the capacity to fraction this potential through time, with strikes now serving only as means for influencing forecasts (about strikes). For 1965-1966's "Assured Destruction," let us write "Assured Coercion" in 1967 and beyond.

And let us take leave of the term "general war." One of its major connotations seems to be the hidden proposition that nuclear wars with either very low or very high total yields exploded are very much more likely to occur than are exchanges in the intermediate range—a contention whose explicit formulation directs attention to the lack of evidence for it. Another connotation of "general war" appears to be the more obviously present belief that an all-out use—a rapid expenditure —of one's force is a major contingency for a major nuclear power in an exchange with another member of its class; and that belief is dubious. I have in the preceding pages recalled the reasons against all-out countervalue strikes; it is easy enough to add that all-out counterforce strikes—disarming attacks—have also become difficult to construe between major nuclear powers—this time, of course, for reasons not of motive but of opportunity.

If, then, nuclear weapons are going to be used between powers of the top class, the salvos are apt to be limited with regard to the forces involved—though, of course, through time, expenditures may produce a depletion of arsenals similar to that which would be quickly reached (by definition) in all-out conduct.

The Secretary seems to overstate a point when he affirms that the possession of AD is sufficient "to deter deliberate nuclear attack" on its possessor.[10] If I render myself undisarmable (which is what AD means), and if I convince my opponent that I have done so, I do indeed "deter" (by definition) his "deliberate" and full (self-disarming) attempt to disarm me, nothing more (not that this is not a lot already). Disregarding the unlikely case of our enemy's disarming himself in impairing our value (leaving his value at the mercy of our undamaged force), other and smaller attacks will be reliably deterred only by possessing

[10] *Ibid.*, 46.

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more than AD, something for which no abbreviation is offered in the Secretary's exposition (partly because the posture in question appears unfeasible, but also because that very fact, though admitted, does not seem worth stressing): the capacity to deprive the opponent of *his* AD, to disarm him, precisely because he will not already have done so himself in the smaller attacks here considered.

Such smaller attacks may aim at changing the relationship of nuclear forces to the attacker's advantage, a move that requires (if realities be correctly perceived) not only ratios of exchange of force favorable to the attacker, but also a sufficient expectation of gain in future exchanges of strikes or threats with an enemy who has not been disarmed—a matter that still awaits even initial exploration.

And then there is the whole range of possible attacks that aim at modifying the opponent's conduct by influencing his forecasts about what will, or will not, befall him, in case, on one hand, he persists in behavior unwanted by the attacker or in case, on the other hand, he chooses to act in ways demanded by that attacker: "coercive" attacks, of which those threatening or reducing the target's value form a major class, and the one to which Schelling addresses himself in particular.

In so doing, he discovers the pertinence in nuclear war—and, strangely and obviously, the *relative* humanity—of the equivalent of the practice (attributed, for instance, to the Binh Xuyen in not-so-old Vietnam) of sending a reluctant family bits of flesh supposedly taken from a kidnapped relative. In nuclear war, these would be bits of the opponent's urban-industrial sector, "taken out" so as to make him desist from doing the same to us (and in this sense, reassuring him about his value) or so as to make him accept our conditions for ending the war (and then frightening him about his value in case of noncompliance) —two policies that may not always be compatible, a problem that I hope Schelling will consider in future elaborations of his present analysis.

As the reliability of warning systems, their speed, the intelligence they furnish about characteristics of approaching attacks, and their survivability all increase, the case for having a force that can ride out an attack rather than having to be launched on warning would seem to be weakened—were it not for the probable primacy of coercive strikes, for coercion entails withholding. Replacing "destroying" by "coercing," which is Schelling's insight and emphasis, will leave few aspects of posture, or analysis, untouched.

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INDEX TO VOLUME XIX

Africa, *see* Galtung, Leiss, Zolberg
Aggregate Analysis, by Michael Haas, 1:106
agriculture, *see* Frankel
Alger, Chadwick F., and Steven J. Brams, Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Intergovernmental Organizations, 4:646
alliances, *see* Dawson and Rosecrance
Ake, Claude, Political Integration and Political Stability: A Hypothesis, 3:486
Ambler, John Steward, *The French Army in Politics, 1945-1962,* reviewed by Richard D. Challener, 4:678
American Policy and the Future of Southern Africa, by Amelia C. Leiss, 1:151
arms control, *see* Bobrow
Asia, *see* McAlister, Mozingo

Banks, Arthur S., and Robert B. Textor, *A Cross-Polity Survey*, reviewed by Michael Haas, 1:106
Bator, Victor, *Viet Nam: A Diplomatic Tragedy*, reviewed by John T. McAlister, Jr., 2:258
Beaufre, General André, *see* Kolodziej
Befu, Harumi, The Political Relation of the Village to the State, 4:601
Berkowitz, Morton, and P. G. Bock, The Emerging Field of National Security, 1:122
Binder, Leonard, The Tragedy of Syria, 3:521
Bobrow, Davis B., ed., *Components of Defense Policy*, reviewed by P. G. Bock and Morton Berkowitz, 1:122
Bobrow, Davis B., Old Dragons in New Models, 2:306
Bock, P. G., and Morton Berkowitz, The Emerging Field of National Security, 1:122
Brams, Steven J., and Chadwick F. Alger, Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Intergovernmental Organizations, 4:646
Brodie, Bernard, *Escalation and the Nuclear Option*, reviewed by Fred Charles Iklé, 4:692
Burns, Arthur L., Dale J. Hekhuis, and Charles G. McClintock, eds., *International Stability: Military, Economic and Political Dimensions*, reviewed by P. G. Bock and Morton Berkowitz, 1:122

Cady, John F., *Southeast Asia: Its Historical Development*, reviewed by John T. McAlister, Jr., 2:258
Challener, Richard D., The French Army: From Obedience to Insurrection, 4:678
China, *see* Bobrow, Fairbank, Mozingo
Cho, Soon Sung, The Politics of North Korea's Unification Policies: 1950-1965, 2:218
communism, *see* Fairbank, Gilison, Tucker, Willner
Communist Phoenix and the Indonesian Garuda: Reflections on Cyclical History, The, by Ann Ruth Willner, 3:500
comparative politics, *see* Haas, Kalleberg, Tucker
Conciliation and Deterrence: A Comparison of Political Strategies in the Interwar and Postwar Periods, by Evan Luard, 2:167
conflict management, *see* Iklé, Leites, Miller
Congo, *see* Miller, Zolberg
Containment in Asia Reconsidered, by David P. Mozingo, 3:361
Cyprus, *see* Miller

Dawson, Raymond, and Richard Rosecrance, Theory and Reality in the Anglo-American Alliance, 1:21
diplomacy, *see* Alger and Brams, Dawson and Rosecrance, Luard, McAlister, Mozingo
Dominican Republic, *see* Miller
Dommen, Arthur J., *Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization*, reviewed by John T. McAlister, Jr., 2:258
Dysrhythmic Process of Political Change, A, by C. S. Whitaker, Jr., 2:190

economic development, *see* Frankel, Haas, Malenbaum
Effect of the Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, The, by Gabriella Rosner Lande, 1:83
elites, *see* Gilison
Emerging Field of National Security, The, by P. G. Bock and Morton Berkowitz, 1:122
escalation, *see* Iklé, Leites

Fairbank, John K., The State That Mao Built, 4:664
foreign policy, *see* Dawson and Rosecrance, Hammond, Leiss, Luard, Mozingo, J. Allen Smith
France, *see* Challener, Kolodziej
Frankel, Francine R., Ideology and Politics in Economic Planning: The Prob-

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lem of Indian Agricultural Development Strategy, 4:621
French Army: From Obedience to Insurrection, The, by Richard D. Challener, 4:678
French Strategy Emergent: General André Beaufre—A Critique, by Edward A. Kolodziej, 3:417

Galtung, Johan, On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, With Examples From the Case of Rhodesia, 3:378
Gilison, Jerome M., New Factors of Stability in Soviet Collective Leadership, 4:563
Ginsburg, Norton, *Atlas of Economic Development*, reviewed by Michael Haas, 1:106
Government, Entrepreneurship, and Economic Growth in Poor Lands, by Wilfred Malenbaum, 1:52
Great Britain, *see* Rosecrance and Dawson

Haas, Michael, Aggregate Analysis, 1:106
Halperin, Morton H., and Dwight H. Perkins, *Communist China and Arms Control*, reviewed by Davis B. Bobrow, 2:206
Hammond, Paul Y., The Political Order and the Burden of External Relations, 3:443
Hekhuis, Dale J., Charles G. McClintock, and Arthur L. Burns, eds., *International Stability: Military, Economic and Political Dimensions*, reviewed by P. G. Bock and Morton Berkowitz, 1:122
Hero, Alfred O., Jr., *The Southerner and World Affairs*, reviewed by J. Allen Smith, 2:320
Hindley, Donald, *The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963*, reviewed by Ann Ruth Willner, 3:500
Hoskyns, Catherine, *The Congo Since Independence: January 1960-December 1961*, reviewed by Aristide R. Zolberg, 1:137

Ideology and Politics in Economic Planning: The Problem of Indian Agricultural Development Strategy, by Francine R. Frankel, 4:621
Iklé, Fred Charles, When the Fighting Has to Stop: The Arguments About Escalation, 4:692
India, *see* Frankel
Indonesia, *see* Willner
international law, *see* Lande, Leiss

Kalleberg, Arthur L., The Logic of Comparison: A Methodological Note on the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1:69
Kahn, Herman, *On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios*, reviewed by Fred Charles Iklé, 4:692
Kaplan, Morton A., The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations, 1:1
Kelly, George Armstrong, *The French Army in Politics, 1945-1962*, reviewed by Richard D. Challener, 4:678
Kelman, Herbert C., ed., *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis*, reviewed by P. G. Bock and Morton Berkowitz, 1:122
Kerr, Malcolm, *The Arab Cold War 1958-1964: A Study of Ideology in Politics*, reviewed by Leonard Binder, 3:521
Knorr, Klaus, Social Science Research Abroad: Problems and Remedies, 3:465
Kolodziej, Edward A., French Strategy Emergent: General André Beaufre—A Critique, 3:417
Korea, *see* Cho

Lacouture, Jean, *Vietnam: Between Two Truces*, reviewed by John T. McAlister, Jr., 2:258
Lande, Gabriella Rosner, The Effect of the Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, 1:83
Leiss, Amelia C., American Policy and the Future of Southern Africa, 1:151
Leites, Nathan, Weakening the Belief in General War: Schelling on Strikes, 4:709
Lemarchand, René, *Political Awakening in the Congo: The Politics of Fragmentation*, reviewed by Aristide R. Zolberg, 1:137
Lerche, Charles O., Jr., *The Uncertain South*, reviewed by J. Allen Smith, 2:320
Logic of Comparison: A Methodological Note on the Comparative Study of Political Systems, The, by Arthur L. Kalleberg, 1:69
Luard, Evan, Conciliation and Deterrence: A Comparison of Political Strategies in the Interwar and Postwar Periods, 2:167

McAlister, John T., Jr., The Possibilities for Diplomacy in Southeast Asia, 2:258
McClintock, Charles G., Dale J. Hekhuis, and Arthur L. Burns, eds., *International Stability: Military, Economic and*

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Polititical Dimensions, reviewed by P. G. Bock and Morton Berkowitz, 1:122
McLane, Charles B., *Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia*, reviewed by John T. McAlister, Jr., 2:258
McVey, Ruth T., *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*, reviewed by Ann Ruth Willner, 3:500
Malenbaum, Wilfred, Government, Entrepreneurship, and Economic Growth in Poor Lands, 1:52
methodology, *see* Alger and Brams, Bobrow, Haas, Kalleberg, Kaplan, Knorr, Tucker, Vital
military affairs, *see* Challener
Miller, Linda B., Regional Organization and the Regulation of Internal Conflict, 4:582
modernization, *see* Ake, Fairbank, Frankel, Haas, Malenbaum, Whitaker
Mozingo, David P., Containment in Asia Reconsidered, 3:361
Murti, B.S.N., *Vietnam Divided: The Unfinished Struggle*, reviewed by John T. McAlister, Jr., 2:258

national security, *see* Bock and Berkowitz
New Factors of Stability in Soviet Collective Leadership, by Jerome M. Gilison, 4:563
New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations, The, by Morton A. Kaplan, 1:1
Nielsen, Waldemar A., *African Battleline: American Policy Choices in Southern Africa*, reviewed by Amelia C. Leiss, 1:151
Nuechterlein, Donald E., *Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia*, reviewed by John T. McAlister, Jr., 2:258

Old Dragons in New Models, by Davis B. Bobrow, 2:306
On Approaches to the Study of International Relations, Or, Back to Machiavelli, by David Vital, 4:551
On the Comparative Study of Communism, by Robert C. Tucker, 2:242
On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, With Examples From the Case of Rhodesia, by Johan Galtung, 3:378

Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Intergovernmental Organizations, by Chadwick F. Alger and Steven J. Brams, 4:646
Paxton, Robert O., *Parades and Politics at Vichy*, reviewed by Richard D. Challener, 4:678
Perkins, Dwight H., and Morton H. Halperin, *Communist China and Arms Control*, reviewed by Davis B. Bobrow, 2:306
political development, *see* Ake, Fairbank, Frankel, Haas, Malenbaum, Whitaker
Political Integration and Political Stability: A Hypothesis, by Claude Ake, 3:486
Political Order and the Burden of External Relations, The, by Paul Y. Hammond, 3:443
Political Relation of the Village to the State, The, by Harumi Befu, 4:601
political theory, *see* Ake, Befu, Hammond, Kalleberg, Kaplan, Vital, Whitaker
Politics of North Korea's Unification Policies; 1950-1965, The, by Soon Sung Cho, 2:218
Possibilities for Diplomacy in Southeast Asia, The, by John T. McAlister, Jr., 2:258

Quade, E. S., ed., *Analysis for Military Decisions*, reviewed by P. G. Bock and Morton Berkowitz, 1:122

regional organization, *see* Alger and Brams, Miller
Regional Organization and the Regulation of Internal Conflict, by Linda B. Miller, 4:582
research methods, *see* Alger and Brams, Bobrow, Haas, Kalleberg, Kaplan, Knorr, Tucker, Vital
Rhodesia, *see* Galtung, Leiss
Rosecrance, Richard, and Raymond Dawson, Theory and Reality in the Anglo-American Alliance, 1:21
Russett, Bruce M., and others, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, reviewed by Michael Haas, 1:106

sanctions, *see* Galtung, Leiss
Schelling, Thomas C., *Arms and Influence*, reviewed by Nathan Leites, 4:709
Schurmann, Franz, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, reviewed by John K. Fairbank, 4:664
Seale, Patrick, *The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics 1945-1958*, reviewed by Leonard Binder, 3:521
Smith, J. Allen, The South and Foreign Affairs: The Hope for Subcultures, 2:320

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Smith, Roger M., *Cambodia's Foreign Policy*, reviewed by John T. McAlister, Jr., 2:258
Social Science Research Abroad: Problems and Remedies, by Klaus Knorr, 3:465
South and Foreign Affairs: The Hope for Subcultures, The, by J. Allen Smith, 2:320
Southeast Asia, *see* McAlister, Mozingo
southern Africa, *see* Galtung, Leiss
Soviet Union, *see* Gilison
State That Mao Built, The, by John K. Fairbank, 4:664
strategy, military, *see* Bock and Berkowitz, Iklé, Kolodziej, Leites
strategy, political, *see* Bobrow, Hammond, Luard
Syria, *see* Binder

Textor, Robert B., and Arthur S. Banks, *A Cross-Polity Survey*, reviewed by Michael Haas, 1:106
Theory and Reality in the Anglo-American Alliance, by Raymond Dawson and Richard Rosecrance, 1:21
Tragedy of Syria, The, by Leonard Binder, 3:521
Tucker, Robert C., On the Comparative Study of Communism, 2:242

United Nations, *see* Galtung, Lande, Leiss, Miller
USSR, *see* Gilison

Vietnam, *see* McAlister
View From the Congo, A, by Aristide R. Zolberg, 1:137
Vital, David, On Approaches to the Study of International Relations, Or, Back to Machiavelli, 4:551

war, *see* Iklé, Leites
Weakening the Belief in General War: Schelling on Strikes, by Nathan Leites, 4:709
When the Fighting Has to Stop: The Arguments About Escalation, by Fred Charles Iklé, 4:692
Whitaker, C. S., Jr., A Dysrhythmic Process of Political Change, 2:190
Willner, Ann Ruth, The Communist Phoenix and the Indonesian Garuda: Reflections on Cyclical History, 3:500

Young, Crawford, *Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence*, reviewed by Aristide R. Zolberg, 1:137

Zolberg, Aristide R., A View From the Congo, 1:137

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CONTENTS

No. 1—October 1966

The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations — *Morton A. Kaplan* — 1

Theory and Reality in the Anglo-American Alliance — *Raymond Dawson and Richard Rosecrance* — 21

Government, Entrepreneurship, and Economic Growth in Poor Lands — *Wilfred Malenbaum* — 52

Research Notes

The Logic of Comparison: A Methodological Note on the Comparative Study of Political Systems — *Arthur L. Kalleberg* — 69

The Effect of the Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly — *Gabriella Rosner Lande* — 83

Review Articles

Aggregate Analysis — *Michael Haas* — 106

The Emerging Field of National Security — *P. G. Bock and Morton Berkowitz* — 122

A View From the Congo — *Aristide R. Zolberg* — 137

American Policy and the Future of Southern Africa — *Amelia C. Leiss* — 151

No. 2—January 1967

Conciliation and Deterrence: A Comparison of Political Strategies in the Interwar and Postwar Periods — *Evan Luard* — 167

A Dysrhythmic Process of Political Change — *C. S. Whitaker, Jr.* — 190

The Politics of North Korea's Unification Policies: 1950-1965 — *Soon Sung Cho* — 218

Research Note

On the Comparative Study of Communism — *Robert C. Tucker* — 242

Review Articles

The Possibilities for Diplomacy in Southeast Asia — *John T. McAlister, Jr.* — 258

Old Dragons in New Models — *Davis B. Bobrow* — 306

The South and Foreign Affairs: The Hope for Subcultures — *J. Allen Smith* — 320

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

No. 3—April 1967

Containment in Asia Reconsidered — *David P. Mozingo* — 361

On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, With Examples From the Case of Rhodesia — *Johan Galtung* — 378

French Strategy Emergent: General André Beaufre—A Critique — *Edward A. Kolodziej* — 417

The Political Order and the Burden of External Relations — *Paul Y. Hammond* — 443

Social Science Research Abroad: Problems and Remedies — *Klaus Knorr* — 465

Research Note

Political Integration and Political Stability: A Hypothesis — *Claude Ake* — 486

Review Articles

The Communist Phoenix and the Indonesian Garuda: Reflections on Cyclical History — *Ann Ruth Willner* — 500

The Tragedy of Syria — *Leonard Binder* — 521

No. 4—July 1967

On Approaches to the Study of International Relations, Or, Back to Machiavelli — *David Vital* — 551

New Factors of Stability in Soviet Collective Leadership — *Jerome M. Gilison* — 563

Regional Organization and the Regulation of Internal Conflict — *Linda B. Miller* — 582

The Political Relation of the Village to the State — *Harumi Befu* — 601

Ideology and Politics in Economic Planning: The Problem of Indian Agricultural Development Strategy — *Francine R. Frankel* — 621

Research Note

Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Intergovernmental Organizations — *Chadwick F. Alger and Steven J. Brams* — 646

Review Articles

The State That Mao Built — *John K. Fairbank* — 664

The French Army: From Obedience to Insurrection — *Richard D. Challener* — 678

When the Fighting Has to Stop: The Arguments About Escalation — *Fred Charles Iklé* — 692

Weakening the Belief in General War: Schelling on Strikes — *Nathan Leites* — 709

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